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There has been a dramatic unconventional warfare (UW) renaissance in recent 
years. Much of the published material on the subject has been focused on what 
unconventional warfare is, re-defining it, and attempting to frame the concept of its 
use as it relates to the current military operational environment. Little work has 
been produced that examines the more basic question:  Why UW?  
This research begins where the 2009 redefinition of UW left off. Identifying 
an expanded field of 51 cases of U.S.-sponsored unconventional warfare from 
1892 to 2010, the authors select four cases that represent a wide variety of UW 
methods, locations, and goals.   These four cases of UW are compared with one 
case of conventional warfare focusing on the question:  
What are the factors that lead to the use of unconventional warfare as a 
strategic policy option?  
This study empirically identifies what factors lead to the use of 
unconventional warfare. The results of this study provide recommendations for the 
advancement of UW as a strategic option. By understanding the why first, as in 
why unconventional warfare is chosen as a method of operation, the subsequent 
questions of how and who become easier to answer. 
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 1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF 
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
 
 “It is well known that when you do anything, unless you understand its 
actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not 
know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it well.”  
               ―Mao Tse-Tung, December 19361  
 
A. U.S. SPONSORED UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
There has been a dramatic unconventional warfare renaissance in recent 
years within the media, academia, among policy makers and the military special 
operations community in the United States.2 Returning to the origins of Special 
Forces is a currently popular idea that may be an answer to the organization’s 
relevance, missions and roles in the changing world.3  Much of the published 
material on the subject has been focused on what unconventional warfare is, on 
re-defining it, and attempting to frame the concept of its use as it relates to the 
current military operational environment. Little work, if any, has been produced that 
examines the more basic question: Why? Why would unconventional warfare be 
chosen over traditional warfare? Under what conditions? In order to answer these 
questions, this study will focus on the research question: What are the factors that 
lead to the use of unconventional warfare as a strategic policy option? 
                                            
1 Mao Tse-Tung, Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, Selected Works, Vol. I  
(Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, LLC. 2011),179.  
2  One example from a Washington Post op-ed titled “The Risks of Inaction in Syria,” 
Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Joseph Lieberman argued for stepped-up U.S. 
intervention in Syria’s civil war in what amounted to a UW campaign, see 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mccain-lieberman-and-graham-the-risks-of-inaction-in-
syria/2012/08/05/4a63585c-dd91–11e1–8e43–4a3c4375504a_story.html, (accessed on 20 
November 2012).  
3 Throughout this paper the term Special Forces or SF refers specifically to the U.S. Army 
special operations unit commonly known as Green Berets. All other units of advanced capability 
or assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are referred to as Special 
Operations Forces or SOF. While other SOF units may have roles in modern unconventional 
warfare campaigns, Special Forces are the only unit specifically established for UW with direct 
lineage from the OSS in its founding members. 
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The President of the United States has the responsibility to articulate and 
execute the nation’s grand strategy.4  He has a wide array of tools at his disposal, 
including declaring and sending troops into total war, as seen in the devastation 
from World War II, to placing the most limited economic sanctions on a foreign 
country. Understanding the conditions under which unconventional warfare is 
chosen as a tool of U.S. policy adds to the understanding of U.S. policy at large 
and explains many related questions, such as the particular conditions under which 
such campaigns would be successful. Finally, if we can understand the why first, 
as in why unconventional warfare is the choice method of operation, then 
subsequent questions of how and who will be much easier to answer. As such, this 
thesis is a qualitative analysis of four cases of U.S. sponsored unconventional 
warfare, in addition to one case of U.S. conventional warfare, to answer questions 
regarding why these actions were chosen.5 By examining the existing doctrine and 
applicable case studies of past campaigns, this thesis will attempt to identify the 
factors that led decision makers to utilize unconventional warfare as a means to 
enforce U.S. foreign policy. This research will expand the existing body of 
unconventional warfare literature and provide an analysis of decision factors that 
were a part of U.S. sponsored unconventional warfare campaigns. This work is 
relevant to the continued future application of unconventional warfare as a national 
strategic option. Additionally, understanding the historical applications of 
unconventional warfare will help identify some actions or methods that should be 
                                            
4 The idea of encompassing political, economic, ideological, and technological elements into 
the concept of strategy has existed since ancient times. See Edward Mead Earle, Makers of 
Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1941). These elements are commonly described as “Grand Strategy.” See also Michael 
Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy.” Foreign Affairs. Summer 1979 No. 5. 975–986. 
For the purposes of this thesis, strategy and grand strategy are used interchangeably. 
5 Throughout this paper the term “unconventional warfare” or UW is used as defined by 
current U.S. doctrine (see below) it does not imply a connection between the mission and any 
specific unit or organization within the Department of Defense or U.S. government. Alternately the 
term “conventional warfare” is used in this paper to describe traditional military use of force and is 
not synonymous or exclusive to any specific military unit. For the purpose of this paper, both 
terms, “unconventional” and “conventional warfare” describe the type of campaign used to 
accomplish U.S. national strategy. Special Operations Forces or SOF, in this context, can be 
used in “conventional warfare” campaigns and in theory General Purpose Forces or GPF could 
be used in “unconventional warfare” campaigns as well. 
 3
sustained, and some that must be improved upon, in the future. If the context in 
which unconventional warfare is utilized can be better described, then policy, 
organizational design, and technology will help improve the functionality of 
unconventional warfare.  
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LANGUAGE OF UNCONVENTIONAL 
WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT OF THE FIELD 
Unconventional warfare, or UW, is a term that has been used since the 
1950s to describe a type of warfare that stretches back hundreds if not 
thousands of years. Over the years, the terms guerrilla warfare, revolutionary 
warfare, partisan warfare, small wars, low intensity conflict, resistance, 
insurgency, fifth-column, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, special 
operations and even terrorism had become somewhat interchangeable. Derek 
Jones’ Command and General Staff College thesis articulated a discussion that 
was being held in team rooms and around water coolers across the Special 
Forces community; that there was a lack of understanding and a need for a clear 
and concise definition of what UW was and how to do it. Jones proposed an old 
idea, that words matter, not just because they help us describe specific ideas; 
words matter because they have the power to transfer entire belief systems to 
others.6 Glenn Hastedt, Professor of Political Science at James Madison 
University and author of American Foreign Policy wrote that the importance is 
more than mere words it is an entire language:  
 
The language of small wars is different. Here, we tend to start by talking 
about the reasons for wars, the casus belli. This is not to say that they do 
not involve the national interest but that this phrase by itself does not 






                                            
6 Derek Jones, “Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and 
Why Words Matter” (Master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth: CGSC, 2006). 
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choice rather than wars of necessity. In talking about small wars we tend to 
classify them in terms of the concrete issues that gave them life.7 
 
In order to clarify the definition, to find the right words, the Special Forces 
community came together in April of 2009. From that working group, emerged the 
beginnings of a new language of UW. Discussions began on the implications that 
new definition would have on the community for training, roles, and organizations.8 
The value in the new definition was to specifically focus on UW as a mission not a 
method. Unconventional warfare was re-defined as: 
 
Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating 
through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied 
area.9 
 
Unconventional warfare in this context is no longer synonymous with 
unconventional units, tactics, or methods. UW is clearly delineated as the 
activities or actions of the external sponsor, not the resistance movement. This 
sponsor-centric mission-focused distinction provides a more defined 
understanding of the role of the actor and desired end state in a UW campaign.   
This new perspective paves the way for resurgence of studies and theory 
development in the field. To regard UW as a mission, rather than as a method, 
                                            
7 “Casus belli” is a Latin expression used by strategists meaning the justification for acts of 
war. “The opposite is the language of large wars, which speaks of windows of opportunity, where 
leaders calculate they can win; windows of fear, where leaders do not believe they can win but 
see the consequences of inaction as so dire that they feel forced to try to go to war; and 
accidents, where neither side wanted war but find themselves fighting one. This language also 
underlies our efforts to stop big wars.” Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy Course, 9th 
Edition (On-line edition: Pearson Publishing, 2012), 340.  
8 Author participated in the series of UW Evolution working groups from 2009–2010 as a 
representative of 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) See also David M. Witty, “The Great UW 
Debate,” Special Warfare, 23 No.2 (March-April 2010); Derek Jones, Ending the Debate: 
Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Why Words Matter, (Master’s Thesis, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas CGSC, 2006); Mark Grdovic, Developing a Common Understanding of 
Unconventional Warfare, JFQ / issue 57, 2d quarter (Online edition, NDU Press, 2010). 
9 USSOCOM approved definition. Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional 
Warfare, Training Circular (TC) 18–01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 
2010). 
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allows researchers to look back at historical operations that have long been 
considered cornerstones of UW with a new perspective. Some cases, long 
accepted, as UW operations may not meet the parameters of the new definition, 
while still falling under the umbrella of irregular warfare.10  Other cases not 
previously considered UW could be included. Finally the new definition allows 
researchers to expand on the field, to create a new language, to re-evaluate and 
propose new theories looking at historical cases with more specific application to 
modern context.  
C. THE LANDSCAPE REDEFINED AND RECREATED 
 Looking back at historical cases through the lens of the new definition opens 
up a large number of UW cases that were previously overlooked.11 Existing 
research indicates that there is no definitive study that answers the question 
proposed in this study. Most literature on the topic, even those published after the 
re-definition, either continue to use the term to describe methods or mindset that 
are either oblivious or in disagreement of the new definition.12  One researcher, 
Robert Kelley, prior to the re-definition, identified a gap in existing academic work 
from a U.S. sponsor perspective. He explained, “While a detailed search of the 
Library of Congress revealed numerous academic works on the theory and 
                                            
10 IW is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it 
may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s 
power, influence, and will. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
Joint Publication 1–02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 8, 2010). 
11 These include: non-military covert actions, coup d’état, non-violent, cases whose goal was 
disruption or coercion, political subversion, and cases that ell out due to overlap with FID or UW 
in support of general war, etc. Some examples of this are the Solidarity Movement in Poland, 
Indonesia in 1958, Argentina in 1976, and South Vietnam in 1963, see expanded field Chapter II. 
12 While no published research has been identified by this study that directly addresses the 
sponsorship from the U.S. perspective there have been several recent works on surrogate and 
proxy warfare that present many similar concepts and ideas; See Ariel Ahram Proxy Warriors: 
The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford Security Studies, 2011); Chris Loveman.  
“Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention.” In: Journal of Conflict, Security, and 
Development. (2002) 30–48; Klaus Schlichte, “With the State against the state? The Formation of 
Armed Groups.” In: Krause, Keith, Ed. (2010); Armed Groups and Contemporary Conflicts: 
Challenging the Weberian State.45–63. Oxon: Routledge (2010); Philip Towle, “The Strategy of 
War by Proxy.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, Vol. 126. No.1, 
24–5.  
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practice of communist sponsored insurgency against the free world. There were no 
scholarly works on the theory of democratic support to an insurgency.”13 
[Emphasis added] There are various theories and strategies to explain the 
evolution of insurgencies their ideologies and grievances. Research in the field of 
UW has centered on these theories determining why insurgency groups form and 
why individuals join them.14 However, understanding the reasons why an external 
actor would sponsor a movement from the U.S. perspective has yet to be explored.   
D. THE STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESI 
The structure of this thesis will include five chapters. In the introductory 
chapter, the landscape and evolution of the definition of unconventional warfare 
was discussed along with the relevance to the field. The research question was 
introduced: What are the factors that lead to the use of unconventional warfare 
as a strategic policy option?  To answer this question, the following process will 
be followed: Chapter II will utilize a four-step process in order to select historical 
cases of UW with high degrees of variance. In step one the entire field of UW 
cases will be presented based on the parameters set by the new definition. 
During step two the field will be further divided into three time periods separated 
by significant, global shaping events: The Colonial period, the Cold War period 
and the period of U.S. Hegemony of Power. The goal of this step is to identify the 
period with the greatest number of cases to allow for the widest variations in 
                                            
 13 Robert Kelley, “U.S. Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine:  Engine 
of Change or Relic of the Past,” (Master’s thesis: Naval War College, 2000). 
 14 There are numerous studies on insurgency theory including: Ernesto Che Guevara, 
Guerrilla Warfare, (Nebraska: Bison Books, 1998); Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, (New 
York, NY: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2009); Robert Taber, War of the Flea: 
The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, (Washington DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2002); David 
Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); Walter Laqueur Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study. (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Little Brown, 1976); Nathan Leites, and Charles Wolf, Jr. Rebellion and Authority: 
An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. (Chicago, Illinois: Markham, 1970); Michael McClintock, 
Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 
1940–1990, (New York NY: Pantheon, 1992); Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From 
Revolution to Apocalypse, Second Edition Revised, (Washington DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2005); 
this material was discussed and debated in Professor Gordon McCormick’s “Seminar in Guerrilla 
Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2011. 
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locations, methods, goals, and initiation. Step three, the remaining cases 
separated into four groups by period differentiated based on how and why the 
movement was formed. Finally, step four will result in one case being chosen 
from each quadrant or type. The cases selected will cover the widest range of 
variation across the spectrum of goals, methods, times and locations. One case 
of conventional warfare will be selected from the CRS database.15 This will allow 
for comparison against the findings from the UW cases. 
 Chapter III will examine the four cases of UW and the one non-case. Each 
case will be presented in historical context including details and events that may 
have shaped the decision to use UW. The events will be divided into those 
internal to the U.S. and those that were external. Both will be placed on a linear 
timeline in order to identify the decision point for each case. Overlaying the UW 
doctrinal phase template on the timelines of cases is one way to help determine 
the decision point.16 This helps simplify the process by identifying events that 
precede the decision point. This point of time is alternately called left of beginning 
or Phase-0.17 The objective of the case studies is to identify the events that occur 
                                            
15 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of U.S. 
Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2009, by Richard Grimmett, CRS Report RL32170 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 2010), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32170.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2012). 
16 The seven-phase UW framework is a conceptual construct that aids in planning. It is 
meant to depict the phases of a U.S. sponsored UW campaign. Phase I: Preparation, Phase II: 
Initial Contact, Phase III: Infiltration, Phase IV: Organization, Phase V: Build-up, Phase VI: 
Employment, Phase VII: Transition. Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional 
Warfare, Training Circular (TC) 18–01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010), 1–8 
sec. 1–44. 
17 “Left of beginning” and “Phase-0” are interchangeable terms used to describe the 
conceptual environment and activities leading up to the policy decision to execute a UW 
campaign. Most discussions on this concept, within the SF community, tend to focus on specific 
tactical/operational activities, such as Operations Preparation of the Environment (OPE), in order 
to determine a check list of activities that happen in a linear pre-phase leading up to the event 
horizon of the decision point. However, this study will present left of beginning/Phase-0 as an 
“operational steady state environment” with countless events, random or planned, that may 
coalesce and support the decision to execute UW, conventional warfare (CW) or neither to 
continue in the steady state. Lt. Gen. John Mulholland, former Commanding General of U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), coined the term “left of beginning.” His 
assessment, based on experience as a TSOC commander, is that the critical point in time where 
military UW skills are crucially relevant to decision makers is “left of the beginning” of a policy 
decision contemplated by the United States Government. Unconventional Warfare Evolution, 
USASOC leadership briefing, Aug. 23, 2010, Special Warfare Magazine, (March-April edition 
2011). 
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during this period of time, which for the purpose of this study will be referred to as 
the operational steady state environment or simply the steady state. This 
approach will allow this study to examine historical cases of UW through the lens 
of current doctrine. Identifying the decision point also, therefore, identifies phase 
zero and the events and activities that fall left of it. Furthermore, historical 
retrospect dispels the need to speculate if an activity or event will, or will not, lead 
to UW because it is certain in these cases they did. The events and details 
relevant to the case that are identified in the steady state will be divided into 
internal and external, enablers and constraints. Because all of the cases 
presented in this study, except for the non-case, resulted in the decision to do 
UW, any constraints identified should be overweighed by the enablers and will 
include a description of how they were overcome. The enablers will be 
summarized in their heading description. This will allow for easier comparison 
and analysis in the final next chapter.  
 Chapter IV will be the comparative analysis of the enablers from all the 
cases. The enablers will then be compared across the cases to eliminate outliers 
that may have enabled only one case but are not present in all four. Eliminating 
any UW enablers that are also present in the non-case will shorten the remaining 
list of enablers further into what will be called factors. Finally, the factors will be 
further synthesized into variables.18 The analysis will end with the proposal of a 
conceptual framework explaining the decision to use UW. 
 Chapter V will summarize the entire thesis and offer any recommendations 
for either future research or suggestions for consideration by the UW stakeholder 
community. 
                                            
18 The research method used in this research attempts to identify two variables; the 
independent variable (IV) and the dependent variable (DV). In the most basic sense two variables 
are needed to examine a phenomenom (a policy, a event, a decision, etc.) and determine if there 
is an effect on some other thing (The decision to use UW). Any other variables identified that 
effect the state or range of the IV’s affect on the DV are conditional variables (CV). This process 
is outlined in Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. (Berkeley CA: University of California, 1987). 
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II. CASE SELECTION 
A. THE EXPANDED FIELD OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Based on the expansion of the field of UW created by the new definition 
discussed in Chapter I, there have been 51 estimated cases of U.S. sponsored 
unconventional warfare from 1892 to 2010.19 These cases are listed in Figure 
1.20 While validating the level of U.S. involvement in each case is beyond the 
scope of this study, the list provides a starting point to begin evaluation and 
further assessment for case selection. The list includes only cases of stand-alone 
UW campaigns regardless of what element in the US government was involved, 
and includes a variety of methods ranging from political subversion, coup d’état, 
and armed conflict in order to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow the foreign 
government or occupying power. The list only includes UW operations whose 
details were available through open sources, however, presumably some events 
were excluded due to classification. Other cases were not included because they 
were uncorroborated, or simply did not meet the criteria of the work. UW 
operations or campaigns that were in support of a greater conventional warfare  
 
                                            
19 The starting point for this list, though incomplete, was Kinzer’s Overthrow, While not an 
academic work, the Economist selected this book as one of its ten “Books ofthe Year in 2003” in 
history. Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow, America’s Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq 
(New York, NY: Times Books, 2006) 
20 Note that the cases listed are not without debate. To definitively list and corroborate all 
cases of U.S. sponsored UW, through primary sources, is far beyond the scope of this research. 
However, it was only through the failed attempt by the authors to locate such an exhaustive list 
that warranted this expedient collection of alleged U.S. sponsored UW cases. Additional research 
by scholars, delving into this niche category, is necessary and one of the recommended findings 
of this research. 
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effort were also excluded.21 In addition to operations in support of greater 
conventional warfare campaigns, operations or campaigns of Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID) have also been omitted.22  
                                            
21 According to current doctrine the United States conducts two types of unconventional 
warfare, either with the anticipation of large-scale U.S. military involvement or without anticipation 
of large-scale U.S. military involvement. In UW support to GENERAL WAR: There are two 
possible goals of large-scale involvement. The goal is either to facilitate the eventual introduction 
of conventional forces or to divert enemy resources away from other parts of the operational area. 
In UW support to LIMITED WAR: The overall operation takes place in the absence of overt or 
eventual hostilities from the sponsor. Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional 
Warfare, Training Circular (TC) 18–01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 
2010), 1–7-1–8. 
The focus of this research specifically on stand-alone cases of UW also addresses the 
discussion of the value of SF (and SOF) roles either as a primary stand-alone effort or supporting 
effort for conventional warfare. This discussion best represented by authors James Kiras on one 
side and David Tucker and Christopher Lamb on the other. The Kiras’ proposal is that SOF 
operations are best used in support of CW operations. David Tucker and Christopher Lamb argue 
the opposite and contend that strategic choices will dictate whether SOF is employed directly or 
indirectly, as well as if SOF is employed in support of conventional operations or as the leading 
effort. They assert that SOF’s greatest strategic value is when they are employed independently 
because it frees CF to conduct other operations. See: James D Kiras, Special Operations and 
Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5, 63; David 
Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operation Forces (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 143, 158, 176–178, 161. This discussion formed the basis of comparison 
used in Professor Hy Rothstein’s History of Special Operations course, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 2011 See also; Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional 
Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006). 
22 According to terms defined in this research during Revolution, UW becomes the 
mechanism for change; it does not counter change. UW used to support Revolution therefore is 
offensive in nature. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) counters change. For example: When a sitting 
democratic government is being challenged but has not yet been overthrown, externally 
sponsored methods to defend the power base, no matter how conventional or irregular, fall within 
the operational task of FID, and are not UW. A Revolution can take place to install a new social 
system, and once complete, the operation will change to FID in order to secure, defend, and 
consolidate power. Discerning the operational context is necessary to understand the role of UW, 
specifically that it is by its nature, operationally offensive, and not defensive. Cases were viewed 
in this database as single iterations of offense or defense to simplify validation.  
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Figure 1.  Cases of U.S. sponsored UW. 
B. SEPARATING THE CASES BY PERIODS: THE THREE MAJOR ERAS  
In order to further refine the process of case selection the cases were 
divided across three major time periods, with the demarcation lines marked by 
significant, global shaping events. These three time periods used for this study 
are: the Colonial Period, Cold War, and Hegemony of Power. The Period of 
Hegemony is further divided into uncontested and contested periods. The time 
periods are delineated by the global shaping events. While debates exist in 
international relations theory and political science, concerning the division of the 
U.S. time periods, the delineation of time periods in this work do not proscribe to 
one argument or another. They are simply identified as a means to divide cases 
by context of time (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Periods of U.S. sponsored UW 
1. The Colonial Period 
During this period, the world saw the industrial revolution make or break 
powerful countries. Raw materials, resources, and labor forces became ever 
more important. The desire for power heightened. Further justification for 
colonization ensued, and conflict increased. The Colonial Period saw the U.S. 
emerge as a regional power. It also marked the first time the U.S. used UW, 
conducted in a foreign country when the U.S. backed a revolution in Hawaii that 
would lead to its annexation. More episodes would follow leading up to World 
War II. After the conflict, the world would see the end of colonialism as parent 
countries struggled to maintain control and cover the expenses of reconstruction 
at home and in their colonies.23 
2. The Cold War 
Two super powers emerged from World War II, the USSR, championing 
the global communist revolution, and the USA, beacon of democracy and free 
markets. The two powers carved up the world by influence, aid, and treaties, thus 
beginning a new era of proxy war and alliances that would touch nearly every 
state. The Cold War was an interesting time period for the United States in its 
new role. The world was in awe of the recently exhibited power of nuclear 
weapons and largely concerned with the massive and still mobilized standing 
                                            
23 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2009” Journal of Peace 
Research 47 (2010) 501–509, identify four categories of warfare:  Interstate War, Intrastate War 
(civil wars), Internationalized internal war (insurgencies), and Extrasystemic War – between a 
state and a non-state group outside its own territory, most typical cases being colonial wars. The 
last case identified in the study ended in 1974.   
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armies of the USSR in Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, Soviet communists were 
stoking the flames of nationalism and class warfare. They attempted to dominate 
the world in global revolution. The U.S. developed a strategy of containment to 
curb the spread of the Soviet Bloc and began an arms race to deter the USSR. 
World War II also had a large effect on the average world citizen. A large 
majority had been affected by the war machines, which sought through attrition 
warfare, a decisive victory. In America, as with most of the remaining world, 
nobody wanted to fight another war anytime soon. However, the USSR caused 
paranoia when, after the war concluded and most of the world’s armies 
demobilized, they maintained their standing army. Later, when the USSR 
revealed its achievement and possession of nuclear weapons, it further 
escalated the schism and distrust between the two emerging superpowers.  
This period of history was marked by several crises that escalated to near 
war and threatened the mutual destruction of both countries by the use of nuclear 
weaponry. However, despite the many risks of escalation, both countries 
continued to maneuver throughout the world to expand their respective influence 
and assure the security of their own interests. Author Cole Blasier, while 
describing the superpowers’ intervention during the Cold War, writes in The 
Giant’s Rival, due to “huge power disparities between large and small countries, 
temptation to intervene is irresistible. Since 1945 the U.S. has been cautious 
about acting directly against the USSR as has the USSR against the U.S..”24  
Therefore, intervention, proxy wars, and some manifestations of open conflict 
between a non-super power country and the U.S. or USSR occurred numerous 
times during the Cold War.   
Each of the two super powers competed to out-maneuver the other, 
diplomatically, technologically, and economically. The ideologies of each were 
juggernauts, fixed and unshakeable, yet both countries continued to spread their 
influence across the globe. In spite of this, the end of this period would not come 
                                            
24 Cole Blasier, The Giants Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 156–157. 
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as a result of direct confrontation. Instead, the end came because the high cost 
of competition was unsustainable.    
3. Hegemony of Power–Uncontested to Contested 
As the USSR collapsed, the new period began in which the U.S. 
consolidated power. The Cold War was won. The U.S. role as beacon for 
democracy now evolved into world police. In its effort to attain global dominance 
during the Cold War, America developed a reliance on UW to affect foreign 
policy. UW was cost efficient, required less manpower, was more easily hidden 
through covertness, and allowed for deniability of actions counter to American 
ideals. Despite total conventional military dominance, the U.S. continued its 
practice of UW during the period of Hegemony of Power. This period lasted 
through the new millennium. The threshold, however, is unclear.   The attacks on 
9/11 are merely the spike in the crescendo of ever increasing violence through 
terrorism. After 9/11, the subsequent U.S. involvement in wars in Afghanistan, 
the Philippines, and Iraq set economic conditions that allowed Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China to close the gap with the U.S. economically. Although no 
country can yet directly challenge U.S. military power, contestation has occurred 
indirectly by non-state actors and regional powers. This asymmetric challenge 
reflects the work of Author Emily Goldman of Power in Uncertain Times, who 
theorizes that adapting can deliver a win if direct competition cannot.25 
C. THE “GOLDEN ERA” OF UW 
Once the span of time in which all cases of U.S.-sponsored UW had 
occurred was divided into the three periods, it is easy to observe the high 
concentration of UW cases (37) that occurred in the Cold War period. To frame 
the concentration of cases per period, this study examined the frequency of 
cases per decade. The colonial period, spanning 5.5 decades with 6 total cases, 
had a frequency of 1.1 cases per decade. The period of Hegemony, combining 
                                            
25 Emily O. Goldman, Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace. (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2011).  
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both sub-periods, had 9 cases and spanned 2 decades with a frequency of 4.5 
cases per decade. The Cold War period saw 37 cases over 4.5 decades 
resulting in a frequency of 8.2 cases per decade. There was a clear spike in the 
number of cases in this period. Due to this observation, this research focused on 
this high-density period (See Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  Cases of U.S. Sponsored UW by Period 
D. CATEGORIZING CASES BY TYPE-THE DYNAMIC TYPOLOGY 
During the research, a significant difference in the nature of the movement 
and the origins between cases began to emerge.  This led to the development of 
a dynamic typology in which cases could be sorted and to further understand the 
environments in which they occurred.  The typology allows the data set of UW 
cases to be cast into the four quadrants in order to more clearly differentiate the 
cases by type. The cases are differentiated by the nature and motivation of 
movement: either revolutionary or resistance. Secondly, the typology categorizes 
the cases by the degree of indigenous genesis, contrasting organic inception to 
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external synthesis. By identifying the difference, researchers can better 
understand the role of the sponsor (U.S.) and its relationship with the 
movement26 The value in viewing historic cases in this perspective allows 
comparative analysis between historic cases or between historic cases and 
current conditions in an emerging crisis. Finally, the methodology provides an 
ontological typology in which all cases of UW will fall in (see Figure 4). To 
proceed further, defining the poles of the axis is necessary.   
 
Figure 4.  The Dynamic Typology of UW 
                                            
26 Another additional value of categorizing each case and placing it into the appropriate 
quadrant, several cases in this study, which were thought to be UW, were in fact identified as 
FID, or, in other cases the end dates were adjusted to reflect the completion of UW and the 
transition into FID. Department of Defense, Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication 3–22 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 12, 2010). 
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1. Revolution Versus Resistance  
While Revolution and Resistance are often used interchangeably, this 
study will differentiate the two based on the nature of the movement.27 Revolution 
can be defined as social disequilibrium manifesting into a catalyst that forms the 
nucleus of the movement as internal causation. These types of movements 
express themselves through, but are not limited to, political activism and 
subversion, coups d’état, and armed conflict. If the problem originates internally, 
as a result of poor leadership, bad politics, or the failure to adapt to a new 
paradigm, this study categorizes the movement as simply “revolution.” 
Resistance is the opposite of revolution. This type of movement occurs as a 
result of an invading external force. Therefore, a movement reacted, or 
manifested as resistance. The resistance can formulate as a nation as a whole or 
by a small group or band. However, key to the nature of resistance, the source of 
the problem is typically derived by an outside force or organization.28 
2. Organic Inception versus External Synthesis 
Organic movements are hatched and executed from within the territory or 
country. This speaks to self-organization and leadership, as opposed to being 
convinced or coerced by an outside entity to mobilize. Foreign sponsorship may 
result due to common interest. Organic movements are not always void of 
external support or influence. The common adage of “my enemy’s enemy is my 
friend” dovetails nicely with organic movements and the modus operandi of 
external supporters with common interests with a movement. Once the goal of 
                                            
27 Throughout this work the movement is used to reference any organization that engages in 
revolutionary or resistance activity. Movements include, but are not limited to, social movements 
that conduct political activism and subversion, networks of military officers or government officials 
that conduct coups d’états, bands of partisans or insurgents that have escalated activity to armed 
conflict, terrorism, guerilla warfare. Movements, in this work, will include U.S. Army UW 
doctrinally labeled organizations that fill the role of the auxiliary, underground, and guerilla force. 
28In Resistance, as a stand-alone methodology, or in support of conventional warfare, UW is 
used to disrupt or attrite the effects or will of an invading force. A great example is the partisan 
operations of World War II.   If a country is faced with an invading force, beyond the capacity of its 
military to defend itself, the government may utilize UW to force the invader to withdraw. Although 
strategically, UW is used to defend the sovereignty of the country being invaded, operationally 
and tactically, the movement conducting UW will be on the offensive. 
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the movement has been explored, in terms of motivation and initiative, the 
movement’s degree of indigenous genesis will identify the source of leadership, 
planning, and organization.   
Outsiders, motivating potential participants and leaders alike through the 
support of material, political, or monetary aid can initiate formation of 
movements. When such promise, coercion, or influence occurs, a movement is 
pushed into action by external synthesis. “Synthetic” movements would never 
have “gotten off the ground” without critical support, leadership, or organization 
provided by an outside entity.  
However, conditions must be present in the environment that will nurture 
the movement and allow for popular support or local buy-in to occur. One could 
not synthesize a movement in utopia; no one living under such conditions would 
risk their contentedness and security, nor would there be a sufficient cause to 
counter effective governance. The risks that accompany mobilization must be 
outweighed by the rewards of potential gain and the likelihood of 
success.29Relating back to the adage of the organic movement’s “my enemy’s 
enemy,” a synthetic movement is a result of convincing my friend that my enemy 
is his enemy.  
E. UW CASE SELECTION 
Of the 37 cases of U.S.-sponsored UW occurring in the Cold War, four 
have been selected for further analysis. A case was selected from each of the 
quadrants: Externally Synthesized Revolution, Organic Revolution, Organic 
Resistance, and Externally Synthesized Resistance. The Dynamic Typology of 
                                            
29 Author Eric Hoffer posits in The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass 
Movements, that “for men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be 
intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that…they have access to 
a source of irresistible power. They must also have an extravagant conception of the prospects 
and potentialities of the future. Finally, they must be wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved in 
their vast undertaking.” Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass 
Movements (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1951), 11.  
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UW Model was used again, not as a vetting tool or to gain further understanding 
of a specific case, but to balance case selection from amongst the larger field. 
Aside from motivation and composition of leadership, the four cases are 
representative of different regions of the world. The cases selected took place on 
the continents of Asia, the Middle East, and Central America. Finally, the cases 
represented different timeframes within the Cold War period. The Cold War 
period lasted roughly 45 years. Cases were selected from different timeframes 
within the period to balance between the earlier days of parity through the final 
days before the collapse of the USSR. 
The UW cases selected are those conducted in Iran during 1953, Tibet 
from 1957–74, Laos from 1957–73, and Nicaragua from 1981–90 (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  Cold War Cases plotted on the Dynamic Typology of UW 
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F. NEGATIVE CASE SELECTION 
Likely there are a multitude of options that U.S. decision makers could 
undertake in order to achieve foreign policy. For the sake of this work, a 
generalization will be made that there are three grand strategy options at the 
decision point prior to any warfare campaign:  Conduct unconventional warfare, 
conduct conventional warfare, or do not conduct warfare. Selecting a negative 
case was necessary to understand factors that led to deciding for a “non-UW 
option.” By following the “Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in 
Comparative Research,” posited by Mahoney and Goertz, identifying and 
analyzing a plausible case in which UW was not conducted, but could have been, 
was necessary to balance this work.30 Goertz and Mahoney challenge 
researchers to look for the line between plausible and implausible negative 
events.  
As such, identifying the factors that led decision makers to choose 
unconventional warfare over conventional, or the opposite, is what this study is 
trying to achieve. Therefore, conventional warfare is one way to look for plausible 
negative cases of UW. Finding cases representative of the third option in the 
above decision point is a challenge. Surely scenarios have played out in this 
manner, however, these cases are likely less similar to cases in which the first 
two options are decided upon. Rather, the road that leads to intervention or 
confrontation is derivative of a decision to embark on warfare. There may be 
plausible negative cases of UW that end up in peace, but these are much more 
difficult to establish ex post.   
According to “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 
1798–2009” Congressional Research Service, there are 54 cases of use of U.S. 
                                            
30 Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, “Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in 
Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (2004) 
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military forces abroad during the Cold War (1945–1991).31 Of those 54, 13 cases 
are conventional warfare ranging from declared war to precision strikes, colored 
red (see Figure 6). The challenge was to identify a conventional campaign that 
did not have UW in a supporting role. This eliminated the Korean War, Vietnam, 
and Desert Storm, these all having partisan or guerilla operations in support of 
the conventional operations (United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea, aka White 
Tigers during the Korean War32; Projects SIGMA, OMEGA, and the Phoenix 
programs during the Vietnam War33; and Kuwaiti Resistance Forces during 
Desert Storm34).   
                                            
31 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of U.S. 
Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2009, by Richard Grimmett, CRS Report RL32170 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 2010), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32170.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2012). 
32 Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s 
Inc., 2003). 
33 James E. Acre, Project Omega: Eye of the Beast (Ashland, OR: Hellgate Press, 1999); 
John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam, (New York: New 
American Library, 1998); Shelby L. Stanton, Special Forces at War: An Illustrated History, 
Southeast Asia 1957–1975, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zenith Press, 2008). 
34 John M. Levins, “The Kuwaiti Resistance” Middle East QuarterlyMarch (1995), 25–36, 
http://www.meforum.org/238/the-kuwaiti-resistance (accessed 26 October 2012).   
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Figure 6.  “Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad,”  
During the Cold War 
G. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN UW CASES AND NON-CASE 
Ideally, each case study of UW would be matched with a comparable non-
case of UW. The result would be four cases (one from each quadrant of the UW 
Model) and four non-cases, totaling eight qualitative case studies. However, the 
field of non-UW cases with no supporting UW campaign is limited. In the 
observation of non-cases of UW during the Cold War, the challenge of identifying 
non-cases to compare to cases of UW was limited by non-cases having no tie to 
a UW campaign during the conventional campaign. This limited the field of 
potential non-UW cases  
After examining the remainder of the conflicts, Operation JUST CAUSE 
appeared an ideal non-UW case. Not only did Panama’s conventional operation 
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hinge on mass mobilization, deployment, maneuver, and overwhelming 
firepower, a classic vignette of U.S. military tactics resulting from its dominance, 
it had no UW campaign supporting the conventional operation. 
The next chapter will begin the case studies, starting with TP AJAX in Iran. 
The fifth and final case study will be Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, a non-
UW case. Each of the case study chapters will provide further explanation for 
case selection, a synopsis, and an analysis of the decision point and variables 
that enabled or constrained the decision to conduct operations. The final 
chapters will be a comparison of all variables to induce the factors that lead to 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. CASE I:  IRAN–195335 
1. Introduction 
The unconventional warfare operation to replace Mohammed Mossadegh 
and appoint General Fazlollah Zahedi as the Prime Minister of Iran under the 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi represents an example of a Synthetic-
Revolution, as defined by the dynamic typology of UW developed in Chapter II. 
External actors, namely the UK and U.S., orchestrated the revolutionary coup 
d’état from start to finish.36 The operation, thought to be the first successful 
                                            
35 While this case is dated 1953 the year the coup was executed, the network development 
started in 1947–1948 with TP BEDAMN, the networks value to the success the coup is of less 
importance to this research than identifying it was a contributing factor that allowed elements of 
the plan to be feasible to the decision makers thus contributing to the approval of UW as a valid 
course of action. 
36 One of the most definitive accounts of the 1953 coup is the history written by Dr. Donald 
N. Wilber who was one of the leading CIA planners of the coup. Other sources use this account 
as the corner stone of research into the operation. While an excellent primary source Wilber’s 
account does not cite additional sources or go into detail on much of the backstory or context as 
well as some later researchers that built on his material and also referenced additional primary 
source accounts. See Donald N. Wilber, Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier 
Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952–August 1953, March 1954. A summary of Wilber’s 
declassified account was published in James Risen “How a Plot Convulsed Iran in ‘53 (and in 
‘79),” New York Times, April 16, 2000. 1, 16, 17. Currently one of the most well researched 
accounts of the coup, comes from a professor of political scientist from Louisiana State 
University, Mark Gasiorowski “The 1953 Coup d’État in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 19, (1987), 261–286; another primary source, although considered biased toward 
the official narrative is Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979); Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American 
Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: Jon Wiley and Sons, 2008) a chapter 
overview is covered by John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, Revised and Expanded Edition, 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1986), 91–98. 
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“regime change” run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),37 made use of in-
place clandestine networks for propaganda and political destabilization through 
agents provocateurs,38 relationships between U.S. and Iranian military officers, 
secret royal decrees, a princess, and a king all carried out by the grandson of 
President Theodor Roosevelt, with the father of U.S. General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, and the founder of U.S. Army Special Forces and PSYOPs both 
playing a role. 
The operation in Iran reflects a time period at the beginning of the Cold 
War. The existential battle between democracy and communism was just stirring 
as the world began to shake off the last remnants of the Colonial Era and recover 
from World War II.39  
2. Background 
Since the 18th century, Persia had been a part of the strategic conflict 
                                            
37 What current SF doctrine defines as a unconventional warfare “overthrow” campaign, see 
definition in Chapter I, and TC 18–01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, November 2010, 
1–1 also John Perkins was one of the first to propose that Iran was the first successful CIA coup 
in his book Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (San Francisco, CA.: Berrett-Koehler, 2004). 
While the majority of the research into early Cold War CIA operations supports this claim, several 
others dispute it claiming that CIA operations in Syria ousting President, Shukri al-Kuwatli, 
predate TP AJAX by several years. Joseph Massad, a professor of Modern Arab Politics and 
Intellectual History at Columbia University, and other historians including Douglas Little, 
Professor, Department of History, Clark University, agree based on primary source interviews and 
declassified CIA records. Irene Gendzier, states that “Known CIA agents Miles Copeland and 
Stephen Meade were directly involved in the Syria coup of 1947.” While in fact the Office of Policy 
Coordination (OPC) an organization that bridged the end of the OSS and the formation of the CIA 
may have conducted the Syrian coup it is just a matter of semantics. See: Miles Copeland, The 
Game Player: Confessions of the CIA’s Original Political Operative, (London: Aurum Press Ltd, 
1989) Irene Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the 
Middle East, 1945–1958. (New york, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 98. And Douglas 
Little, 1949–1958, Syria: Early Experiments in Covert Action, from 
http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/issue51/articles/51_12–13.pdf, (accessed on 06 November 
2012). 
38 French term meaning “inciting agent” generally, the term may refer to a person or group 
that seeks to discredit or harm another by provoking them to commit a wrong or rash action. 
39 Donald N. Wilber, Declassified CIA Historical Paper No. 208 Clandestine Service History: 
Overthrow Of Premier Mossadegh Of Iran November 1952 – August 1953 Archived from the 
original on 8 June 2009, (accessed on 06 November 2012). 
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known as the Great Game.40 This was the original Cold War between the British 
Empire and the Russian Empire, who competed for influence of the region, which 
included Central Asia, the Himalayas, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Persia. At 
the turn of the 20th century, Persia was one square on the chessboard where the 
two powers, vied for position, Russia in the north and Britain in the south.41 In the 
early 20th century, after the British discovered oil in Persia, petroleum assumed 
an important role in the great power rivalry. The practice of the Persian ruling 
class was to sell concession rights to both of the powers, playing them against 
each other while making themselves rich. As anti-colonial nationalism began to 
take hold of the region this practice upset the Persian people who felt their rulers 
were selling them out for their own interests. This led to a series of revolts and 
revolutions that lasted until World War I. 
Persia hoped to avoid entanglement in World War I by declaring its 
neutrality, but ended up as a battleground for Russian, Turkish, and British 
troops. Germany believed that they could get ahead of the great powers by 
organizing and exploiting a unified Islam. Well schooled in unconventional 
warfare, the Germans sent their own version of Lawrence of Arabia, Wilhelm 
Wassmuss, to Persia train the southern tribes against the British. In response 
Britain created a local surrogate as well, the South Persia Rifles, to protect its 
interests.42 At the end of the war, because of Russia’s preoccupation with its own 
                                            
40 The “Great Game,” describes the clandestine struggle between Russia and Britain for 
mastery of Central Asia, has long been regarded as one of the greatest geopolitical conflicts in 
history. Many believed that control of the vast Eurasian heartland was the key to world dominion. 
The original Great Game ended with the Russian Revolution, but the geopolitical struggles in 
Central Asia continue to the present day. See generally, Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The 
Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York, NY: Kondansha America, 1992)  
On 21 March 1935, Reza Shah Pahlavi changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Christopher Sykes, Wassmuss The German Lawrence, (New York, NY: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1936); Donald M. McKale, War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle 
East in the Era, (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2008), Spencer C. Tucker, The 
Encyclopedia of World War I, A Political, Social and Military History Volume 1 (A-D) ABC-Clio Inc. 
(2005), 583. 
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revolution, Britain became the dominant influence in Tehran.43 Britain’s continued 
exploitation of the oil fields began to create insurgents who demanded their rulers 
stand up for the Persian people. A former officer from the Persian Cossacks 
Brigade,44 Reza Khan marched into Tehran and seized power in February 
1921.45  In 1925, he declared himself Reza Shah and adopted the reign name 
Pahlavi.46 In 1935, Reza Shah instructed foreign embassies to call Persia by its 
ancient name, Iran, inaugurating a new phase in the country’s modern history. 
While the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) controlled Iran’s oil 
resources, most of its technical assistance came from Germany. This created 
problems for Iran after 1939, when Germany and Britain became enemies in 
World War II.47 Following the Germans, Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran 
and arrested and exiled the Shah because of his support for the Germans. In 
1942, the U.S. established two military missions to balance the British and 
Russian presence. Brigadier General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was sent to 
Tehran by President Theodore Roosevelt to take the lead as the military advisor 
to the Gendarmerie Mission. General Schwarzkopf was famous in Iran due to his 
                                            
43 The Bolshevik Revolution, specifically the Red Russian fear that exiled White Russians 
would utilize Iranian sanctuary and continue harassment of the newly consolidating Soviet Union, 
led to the signing of the 1921 Russo-Persian Friendship Treaty.   Article 5 and 6 of the treaty 
allowed Soviets to, essentially, deploy forces into Iranian territory to eradicate any threat. The 
treaty also gave the Soviets rights to intervene if any third party military mobilized in Iran, 
threatening Iranian or Soviet sovereignty. See Mehdiyoun, Kamyar. “Ownership of Oil and Gas 
Resources in the Caspian Sea.” The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 94, No. 1 
(January 2000). 
44 Persian partisan Cavalry unit stood up and trained by Russian military advisors to fight the 
British in the Great Game 1917. Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes, A History of Persia, Volume 2, 
(Charleston SC: Nabu Press, 2011), 478. 
45 The Russo-Iranian Friendship Treaty was signed shortly after Reza Shah took power on 
26 February 1921. While the treaty seemed to be in Iran’s favor, article 6 had a sinister clause 
giving the Soviets right to introduce troops on to Iran’s territory in case of necessity for self-
defense. Years later, in 1941 the Russians chose to interpret this article as the right to unlimited 
military intervention. Mehdiyoun, Kamyar. “Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian 
Sea.” The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 94, No. 1 (January 2000), 179–189. 
46 Shah or Shahanshah (“King of Kings”) was the title of Persian and Indian emperors or 
kings. See William R. Polk, Understanding Iran, (New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 2009), 103. 
47 Britain demanded that Iran expel all German citizens as spies, but Reza Shah refused. 
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dedication and professionalism in building the Gendarmerie and leading them in 
the battle of Azerbaijan in December 1946 against the Soviets.48  
In order to avoid the insurgencies that plagued occupation in the past, the 
U.S. and Britain supported Reza Shah’s son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to 
assume the throne as the new Shah. Widely viewed as a British puppet, the new 
Shah supported the existing trade agreements keeping in place the British 
concessions for oil, and refused to nationalize the AIOC. Large demonstrations 
against the Shah and to the British ensued and a pro-nationalist organization to 
form, called the National Front Party, or Jebhe Melli. It was formed as the voice 
of the opposition. In 1949 Iran had elections for the 16th Parliament or Majlis, the 
oil rights renegotiations and popular support for nationalization were leading 
issues. The National Front Party, led by European-educated lawyer and former 
Member of Parliament, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, emerged as a dominant 
power in the Majlis. Mossadegh authored a bill, which the Majlis passed, 
establishing that there would be no concessions and demanding that the AIOC 
be renegotiated.   
As the British influence in Iran began to wane, the U.S. stepped up its own 
efforts in the Great Game against the Soviet threat, utilizing the neighboring 
country of Iran. In 1947 and 1948, the U.S. embassy staff grew considerably in 
size, enhancing diplomatic, commercial and cultural interactions between the two 
nations. More importantly, because of the long border with the Soviet Union, Iran 
became a greater post war U.S. interest for espionage and other covert activities. 
These covert operations included cross border intelligence gathering using 
recruited Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and other ethnic groups living on both sides of 
the border. As well as the development of escape and evasion routes and 
organization of “stay-behind” guerrilla networks from the Amini and Qashqai 
                                            
48Azerbaijan People’s Government, a puppet government set up by the Soviets declared 
northern Iran as a separate Azerbaijan state backed by Soviet forces. The issue of Iranian 
Azerbaijan became one of the opening skirmishes of the Cold War, and, largely under the 
Western powers’ pressure, Soviet forces withdrew in 1946. Louise L’Estrange Fawcett. Iran and 
the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992),177–178. 
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tribes in southern Iran to conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet 
invasion. One network designed for use against the Soviets that would become 
key to the coup was codenamed TP BEDAMN.49 The TP BEDAMN network had 
two operational arms, one for propaganda, and one for political action.50 The 
propaganda arm enflamed anti-communist sentiment spreading rumors and 
leaflets as well as publishing articles and cartoons in Iranian newspapers. The 
political action arm carried out attacks on communist’s supporters by hiring 
criminal street gangs to break up communist meetings and funding anti-
communist organizations. They also used false flag, or “black operations,” such 
activities as the infiltration of agent provocateurs into communist demonstrations 
to incite violence, the bombing of mosques, and attacks on public figures, all 
while posing as members of the Communist Party. 51 
The gradual reemergence of the Tudeh communist party, growing unrest 
caused by the oil dispute with the British, and a severe recession within Iran due 
to economic sanctions led U.S. policymakers to become increasingly concerned 
about Iran. By 1951, the British failure to negotiate oil concessions led to wide 
spread Iranian sentiment for nationalization. Newly appointed Prime Minister 
general Ali Razmara who was against nationalization was assassinated in March 
1951 by a member of the militant Fedayan-e Islam. The Shah’s leadership was 
publically questioned. Iran was described as “dangerous and explosive,” and a 
possible “second China.” Because of this unrest the Shah begrudgingly 
                                            
49 TP BEDAMN a counter Soviet network was developed by Roger Goiran the station Chief 
in Tehran for years prior to the coup. According to the declassified reports Joe Goodwin replaced 
Goiran as station Chief a few weeks before the coup. Several sources report this was due to 
Dulles relieving Goiran because of his opposition to the operation. Additionally, cryptonym’s are 
code words used to reference projects, operations, persons, agencies, etc. Each contains a two-
character prefix called a digraph, which designates a geographical or functional area. This 
network is alternately referred to Operation BEDAMN without the TP diagraph or TP/BEDAMN 
depending on the source. See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men. 164. and others. 
50 Propaganda and Political Action is the terms used in source material for the networks 
mission design, however current military terms would likely define the two as Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPS) and Pseudo Operations (Pseudo-ops). 
51 False Flag operations are deception operations designed to deceive in such a way that 
the operations appear as though they are being carried out by other entities. The name is derived 
from the military concept of flying false colors; that is: flying the flag of a country other than one’s 
own.  
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appointed Mossadegh to replace Razmara as Prime Minister in April 1951.52 
Mossadegh’s first task was carrying out the recent law that nationalized Iran’s oil 
industry. Britain protested, and began political and subversion efforts to remove 
Mossadegh from power. After the nationalization law was enacted, the Truman 
administration pursued two main goals regarding Iran. First, Iran was to remain a 
Western allied nation. Its location was too strategic to allow the Soviets to invade 
due to British involvement. Second, the world oil market vital to the British and 
U.S., had to remain stable. U.S. policy towards Iran was to support the 
Mossadegh’s government and convince the British to end the oil dispute through 
diplomacy. The British continued to attempt every means to get rid of Mossadegh 
stopping short of a conventional invasion only after the U.S. insisted they would 
not support it. The U.S. feared a British military action would spark a Soviet 
response; the region could quickly become battlefield for World War III. Instead 
the British, well schooled in the game, began to incite friction among the leaders 
of the National Front through agents that the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) 
recruited for their own networks. Asadollah Rashidian; was a key asset in the SIS 
network who would later play a key role in the coup.53 
After a failed British-sponsored uprising, in which at least 69 people were 
killed and 750 were injured,54 Mossadegh broke diplomatic relations with Britain. 
On 1 November 1952, the British embassy closed in Tehran, ending the era of 
British dominance in Iran. Although they were on the way out, the British still 
maintained many developed intelligence assets in Tehran. British SIS had drawn 
up plans to take Mossadegh out, and now suggested that the U.S. continue with 
                                            
52 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Mohammad Mossadegh and the 1953 Coup in 
Iran, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (New York, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004), 267. 
53 Asadollah Rashidian and his two brothers (Seyfollah and Qodratollah) had important 
contacts in Iranian society (including the armed forces, the Majlis, and the press). They helped 
the CIA during the coup and were a communication link to the Shah after the coup. Stephen 
Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men. 159,160,199,211. 
54 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Mohammad Mossadegh and the 1953 Coup in 
Iran, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (New York, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004). 
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them.   In order to help facilitate the plan, the Rashidian network and several 
local assets were passed over to the CIA.55 The new U.S. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill finally agreed to 
work together toward Mossadegh’s removal.   In March 1953, Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles directed the CIA, which was headed by his younger brother 
Allen Dulles, to draft plans to overthrow Mossadegh. The CIA’s plan, codenamed 
operation TP AJAX,56 was to use a military coup to take out Mossadegh and 
install former General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister.57 The plan was 
presented to CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, his brother and Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, and the U.S. 
Ambassador to Iran, Loy W. Henderson. Chief of CIA’s Near East and Africa 
division, Kermit Roosevelt who was not only an OSS alumni, he was also the 
grandson of former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt presented the plan and 
would take the lead for the operation. Although not at the meeting himself, 
President Eisenhower later approved the plan. The SIS presented the plan 
separately to the British Foreign Office; approval came from the various offices 
by 11 July 1953. 
With the plan approved, execution began within days. The TP BEDAMN 
assets prepared the environment with targeted propaganda and the political 
action arm began to selective attacks public figures that were known to be pro-
Shah while claiming to be members of the National Party or Communist Tudeh 
supporters.58 Criminal gangs, dissidents, and sports clubs were hired to be 
                                            
55 Gasiorowski, …1953 Coup, 270. 
56 The SIS kept the name of their original plan that was never executed Operation BOOT. 
The coup is known in Iran as the “28 Mordad Coup” which is the date on the Persian calendar. 
See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 163. 
57 General Zahedi was the former Minister of the Interior under Mossadegh, but was relieved 
after being accused of fostering plans for a coup after the failed British sponsored uprising. His 
actual role in the previous British coup is argued by separate sources.  
58 This practice of beginning UW campaign would become doctrine for Special Forces. 
Propaganda or Psychological Operations were considered Phase 1 of the seven Phases of U.S. 
sponsored unconventional warfare. Department of Defense, Psychological Operations, Joint 
Publication 3–13.2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 7, 2010), Section 1–
5, 1–2. 
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protesters on demand. Police and military officers were paid off to allow the 
protesters to go unchecked as select Mullahs and members of the Majlis were 
paid to support them. The tension in the environment, helped set the conditions 
for the coup.59  
Once the propaganda and political action began to have effect and the 
country was close to chaos, the next step was for the Shah to come forward and 
issue two royal decrees or firmans, dismissing Dr. Mossadegh and appointing 
General Zahedi Prime Minister. These would be key in getting the Iranian Army 
to switch sides at the crucial moment. After numerous secret meetings over a 
period of days with everyone who held an influence on the Shah: his sister, 
Asadollah Rashidian, General Schwarzkopf, and Kermit Roosevelt, the Shah 
finally gave in and signed the decrees. On 15 August, the planned day of the 
coup, the political action arm drove Iran to the brink of chaos. The people, led by 
religious leaders, were demanding Mossadegh’s resignation. Bought or loyal 
                                            
59 The military attaché worked closely with/for the CIA station and had developed 
relationships within the Iranian military and police. This relationship was much more common in 
the early Cold War, perhaps due to the closer relationship between CIA and State Department. 
Although it can not be confirmed in this case, it is well documented, and seen in this paper in 
following cases where the position of military attaché is little more than a cover for military officers 
assigned to the CIA.  
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police and military units, controlled by the military attaché Robert McClure60, who 
provided over-watch and guided the mobs to promote the largest eruption of 
“spontaneous” crowds and riots possible. CIA paid rioters played on one side or 
the other to incite the crowd, thousands more joined in spontaneously. As 
planned, the capital was in chaos and Mossadegh’s control began to slip. This 
was meant to be the tipping point of the coup. However, Mossadegh was 
prepared and resisted arrest rallying forces still loyal to defend his position and 
secure the capital. The sun rose on the morning of 16 August to display a still 
smoldering capital, crushed but not entirely broken, with Mossadegh still very 
much in power. The Shah, fearing Mossadegh’s reaction to the decree’s and his 
role in the coup, fled the country with his wife. 
As reports of the previous night’s activities got back to Washington the 
coup was deemed a failure. Washington sent a message to withdraw which did 
                                            
60 It is perhaps no coincidence that Robert McClure was the military attaché assigned to Iran 
in 1952. While several accounts of TP AJAX list McClure simply as the military attaché and 
several acknowledge some of his participation in the aspects of the coup, no published material 
found by this research has made the connection to who McClure was or his previous military 
assignments. Several obscure military histories not related to TP AJAX have identified McClure 
as the driving force behind the establishment of U.S. Army Special Forces and Psyops but those 
few that do, fail to link him to the operation in Iran. Because their focus was on his development 
of SF and PSYOPs they seem to miss this important link. Several other sources mention after his 
work establishing SF he was assigned to Iran, but again no link to the coup made. Based on 
exhaustive research, it is believed that this paper is the first to make this historic connection. 
During Word War II, Robert McClure ran the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) manned by 
officers from U.S. Office of War Information (OWI), the U.S. OSS, and the British PWE. After 
Korea McClure stood up the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in Washington, the 
Psychological Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg, and the 10th Special Forces Group. McClure 
recruited officers with World War II or Korean War experience in unconventional warfare to man 
the unit including: COL Aaron Bank, LTC Russell Volckmann, and CPT Donald Blackburn. Bank 
had been assigned to the OSS and fought with the French Maquis. Volckmann and Blackburn 
had both been guerillas in the Philippines, and Volckmann had also led UW operations in Korea. 
Bank would be later credited as the father of SF because McClure chose him to be the first 
commander. Blackburn would be the SF Group commander in charge of OP WHITE STAR in 
Laos, see Chapter III - C. See, Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: 
Revised Edition (Lawrence Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2002), Aaron Bank, From OSS 
to Green Berets the Birth of Special Forces (New York, NY: Presidio Press, 1986), Mike Guardia, 
American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann, (Philadelphia, PA: 
Casemate Pub, 2010), and Mike Guardia, Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D. 
Blackburn-Guerrilla Leader and Special Forces Hero,(Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Pub, 2011). 
Primary source identifying this is the same McClure can be found in the Presidential Papers of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, courtesy of the Johns Hopkins University Press, Document #814; (April 2, 
1954) online at: http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-
term/documents/814.cfm, (assessed 15 November 2012). 
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not reach Roosevelt for another two days. Roosevelt unaware of the orders 
decided to try to the plan a second time. In order to get the military on board for 
the next attempt, Roosevelt sent the military attaché McClure to the Iranian Army 
units, one by one, speaking to each commander and showing them a copy of the 
decree. If the Shah’s decrees did not convince them to join, he offered them 
payoffs.61 Roosevelt also had copies of the decrees published in local and 
international newspapers and had them read over local radio. For both recruiting 
the Army, and gaining popular support, it was the dissemination of the decrees 
that proved decisive.  
The street protests, this time backed by pro-Shah army units, defeated the 
remainder of Mossadegh’s forces. The Shah was brought back in country as the 
fighting died down, he would publically return. Mossadegh was arrested, tried 
and convicted of treason by the Shah’s military court. On 21 December 1953, he 
was sentenced to three years in jail, after wards he spent the rest of his life under 
a liberal house arrest. The remainder of Mossadegh’s supporters were rounded 
up, imprisoned, tortured or executed. Finally, and according to plan, General 
Zahedi was installed as prime minister. 
In the end, TP AJAX became the blueprint for covert operations and 
unconventional warfare that would be utilized often throughout the Cold War. 
Similar methods were used in Guatemala in 1954, Syria in 1958, and Cuba in 
1961.62 As a result, the newly created CIA was able to establish itself as a key 
                                            
61 Kinzer’s version of these events (171) have McClure a very strict military man who is 
easily angered and bothered to deal with the Iranian officers, however the declassified CIA 
documents written by Wilber say that Roosevelt directed McClure to “act angry” with the officers if 
they showed any loyalty to Mossadegh. While both versions describe the same events, in light of 
McClure’s background in unconventional warfare and PSYOPs, that Kinzer did not identify, it is 
highly unlikely he was the caricature of a stiff military officer Kinzer portrays him as. Kinzer’s 
source reference for that section is credited to the New York Times article whose source is 
credited as the declassified Wilber papers. See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American 
Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Jan 2, 2008) 171 also Donald N. Wilber, Declassified 
CIA Historical Paper No. 208 Clandestine Service History: Overthrow Of Premier Mossadegh Of 
Iran November 1952 – August 1953 Archived from the original on 8 June 2009. (accesed 6 
November 2012), 28. 
62 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Mohammad Mossadegh and the 1953 Coup in 
Iran, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East, (New York, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2004), xv. 
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U.S. foreign policy tool.   These types of operations came to be regarded as a 
low-cost, low-risk way to change and shape the world in support of U.S. 
interests.63 
3. Analysis 
The following sections of this chapter will highlight significant factors that 
were influential in the decision to embark on unconventional warfare operations 
in Iran in contrast to the other two general options of no military action, or 
conventional military action. These factors are categorized into internal enablers, 
external enablers, internal constraints, and external constraints.   
Enablers are arguments for action, either oppose no military action, or 
support UW over conventional military action. Constraints are arguments for no 
action, or they argue for the use of conventional military action over UW.   The 
internal domain is that which is driven by the U.S.. This is a function of popular 
opinion or support (important due to the U.S. status as a democracy), capability, 
capacity, or leadership. The external domain is that outside of the U.S.. This 
includes the “targeted country’s” internal activities and circumstance, world 
events and reaction, and, perhaps the most heavily weighted, peer competitors’ 
actions, capacity, and capability. When identifying constraints, the actions that 
are precluded will be listed, as well as an explanation of how the constraints may 
have been overcome. 
a. Decision Point 
To understand how the events, conditions, environment, and 
context influenced the decision makers and shaped their decision, it is necessary 
                                            
63 Darioush Bayandor a former Iranian diplomat and official who worked for the government 
of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi argues in Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mossadegh Revisited 
(Apr 13, 2010) that the CIA coup attempt TP AJAX failed and that a popular uprising, instigated 
by Shi’ite clerics in fear that Mossadegh was taking the nation toward religious indifference led to 
the street riots to return the Shah to power. While many researchers have been critical of the 
theory calling it revisionist, the Economist and World Affairs while doubtful still noted that 
“Bayandor’s skepticism is a useful antidote to Roosevelt’s self-aggrandizing, which some later 
writers have mimicked uncritically” See http://www.economist.com/node/16103846 (accessed on 
04 November 2012). 
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to identify the decision point. Ideally, a specific day and hour would emerge as 
that moment in time, and analysis could be made on all variables that affected 
that specific moment in time. However, more realistic is that a series of events 
result in a “ratcheting up” of activity that cumulatively results in UW.   Therefore, 
a month or even a year will suffice as a period of time defined as the decision 
point in which analysis can help better understand the context in which a decision 
was made. The decision may not be as clear-cut and simple as beginning UW, or 
not. More likely, it is a decision, or a series of decisions that result in an increase 
of resources or activities, bringing the operation from intelligence gathering and 
preparation to a level above a threshold that evolves into a UW campaign.  
Through the retrospective lens of case study, two points in time should mark an 
indication of a decision point.    The pre-decision time, in which a steady state of 
intelligence collection, relationship building, and infrastructure development is 
occurring, and a second period of time, post-decision, that illustrates a marked 
increase in resources allocated from the sponsor (input), training, recruiting, 
organizing activity (throughput), and operations conducted that bring the 
movement closer towards their goal of coercion, overthrow, or disruption (output).   
In the case of Iran in 1953, the decision point is quite transparent:  
it is captured by the approval of TP AJAX by both the U.S. and British 
governments. The pre-decision time period is marked by events, both internal 
and external, that show preparation and necessitate action. When British efforts 
to foment an uprising failed PM Mossadegh broke diplomatic ties with the UK, 
forcing the British to recall its diplomatic mission. This initiated a hand over of 
lead role with the requisite assets and agents from the SIS to the CIA. Ultimately, 
Secretary Dulles ordering the CIA to begin planning an overthrow campaign to 
remove Mossadegh initiated the campaign.   As this was externally synthesized, 
no immediate external shaping events preceded the decision point. To the right 




output indicate a decision had occurred. Since the methodology to effect change 
was the coup d’état, the final preparation and execution of the coup itself show 
both (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.  Decision Point Timeline for Iran 
b. Internal Enablers 
A Strategy Existed that Supported the Development of a 
Network.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the newly formed Office of Policy 
Coordination with two missions to support the Defense Department’s strategy for 
countering the expected Soviet military invasion of Europe. The first mission was 
to establish a network of “stay-behind” agents in Western Europe who would 
remain in place as Soviet forces attacked west. The second assignment was to 
organize and support resistance groups in Eastern Europe and Russia that could 
help retard the advance of attacking Soviet forces. With a clearly defined mission 
from the JCS and State Department advocating action, OPC began operations to 
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probe the Soviet perimeter.64 This was the mission that allowed TP BEDAMN to 
establish anti-Soviet networks in Iran, which were essential to spreading 
propaganda and inciting the riots that shaped the environment for TP AJAX to 
succeed. If those mechanisms were not already in place it is doubtful the mission 
would have been approved. 
The Operation had a Marketable Narrative.  Eisenhower had 
made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, accusing the 
Democrats of being soft on communism and of having “lost China.” Once in 
power, the new administration quickly sought to put its views into practice: the 
State Department was purged of suspected communists, steps were taken to 
strengthen the Western alliance, and initiatives were begun to bolster the 
Western position in Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia.65 When the 
situation in Iran continued to sour Eisenhower viewed the issue in the same black 
and white terms of the Cold War, and even wrote to a friend that Iran looked as 
though China did “only a few years ago,” before it was lost to the communists.66 
These, combined, helped feed into the accepted narrative that demanded U.S. 
action to “counter communism.” 
 
 
                                            
64 U.S. Congress, Final Report, 1: 147, and 2: 31–32. The Senate Select Committee, 
commonly referred to as the “Church Committee” after Senator Church, conducted an exhaustive 
investigation of all CIA covert activity since the inception of the Agency. Books one and four detail 
the rapid expansion of OPC its missions and roles. 
65 Among the most prominent studies of escalation during the Cold War are Kahn, 1965; 
Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1966); Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1977); and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
However, escalation was a prominent concern in practically every analysis of nuclear strategy 
and deterrence. See Schelling 1960, 1966. For an overview of nuclear escalation issues, see Karl 
P. Mueller, “Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy: New Theory for a Not-Quite-So- New 
Apocalypse,” in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, 
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997). 
66 Moyara De Moraes Ruehsen, “Operation Ajax Revisited: Iran, 1953” Middle Eastern 
Studies Vol.29 No.3, (London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1993) 467–486, From On-line excerpt 
http://dcr.csusb.edu/dny/395/articles/Ruehsen%20-%20Operation%20Ajax.pdf,  (accessed 24 
November 2012), 470. 
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New Decision Maker Inherits a Course of Action Leading to 
UW.  The National Security Council gave approval, if not direction, for covert 
operations by issuing NSC 20 in August 1948. The directive described the 
ultimate objective of American foreign policy as “the overthrow of Soviet power.”  
The document provided recommendations for supporting anti-Communist 
resistance efforts, suggesting that the U.S. pursue a program of broad-based 
rather than selective support for resistance groups.67 Later, the National Security 
Council organized the Dulles-Jackson-Correa committee to study CIA operations 
and the National Organization for Intelligence. The committee report, dated 1 
January 1949, recommended the integration of CIA’s Office of Special 
Operations, the espionage function and the OPC’s, the covert operations function 
under a single Operations Division. 68   U.S. activity in Iran increased by 1952, a 
result of the posturing dictated by policy and organization as much as the 
external events occurring in Iran. Eisenhower replaced Truman in January of 
1953. The actions by the British to start an uprising and PM Mossadegh’s 
reaction by cutting diplomatic ties, had already taken place. Eisenhower inherited 
the Iran situation, which by that time had already achieved significant 
momentum, set on a course dictated by Truman’s NSC through policy and 
organization.     
A UW Experienced Organization Existed.   Key personalities 
from the legacy of OSS, and the institutionalized knowledge that was handed 
down to the CIA, led to a UW experienced organization. Kermit Roosevelt, Allen 
Dulles, Wilbur, Goiran, McClure, and others were all veterans with service from 
the OSS and were either members of the CIA, or were in key positions to 
influence Eisenhower’s decisions. This shared background created a fraternity or 
network in which relationships and reputation facilitated planning and followed 
the institutionalized methodology favored by the OSS, which became an 
                                            
67 Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Containment: Documents on American Policy 
and Strategy, 1945–1950, (New York: Columbia University Press) 173–203. On-line excerpt of 
NSC 20/1 http://www.sakva.ru/Nick/NSC_20_1.html (accessed 15 November 2012). 
68 William M. Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa, 
AL.: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 132. 
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influence on selecting a methodology in which the end state in Iran could be 
achieved. The OSS legacy would have lasting effects on U.S. policy of 
intervention throughout the 20th century. More important, a network of trusted 
advisors with a background in UW would shape the decision maker’s choices. 
c. External Enablers 
External Conditions Necessitated U.S. Action Based on an 
Interventionist Strategy.  After World War II, Communism loomed as the 
challenge to U.S. interests. This threat began to intensify during the late 1940s 
with the Czechoslovakian coup, the Berlin Crisis, the fall of China, the Soviet 
development of nuclear arms, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. 
Further, this led to the battle of ideology that became the Cold War. The Cold 
War was, according to historian and period expert John Gaddis, “a struggle for 
people’s minds as well as for their bodies and their possessions.”69  The U.S. 
could not resort to isolation due to its need to protect the vitality of its own 
economy by expanding global markets and alliances and to deter the expansion 
of Soviet influence. Action was needed, but the challenge for the U.S. was to 
have a balanced approach in accomplishing objectives without forcing the 
Soviets into open war.   
Conventional Strategic Options were Impractical.  When the 
case of Iran is viewed in comparison with other events in the world impacting the 
U.S., it adds perspective on what may have shaped the decision to use UW over 
conventional warfare. In the context of the time, the most significant event 
internationally for the U.S. was the ongoing Korean War. While Kermit Roosevelt 
was planning the overthrow of Mossadegh, on the other side of the world the 
U.S. was engaged in one of the most heated battles of the Cold War. For 
                                            
69 John Lewis Gaddis, “On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History,” Ethics & International 
Affairs, Volume 10 (1996). From website: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/gaddis.htm , 
(accessed 15 November 2012). 
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instance, The Battle of Pork Chop Hill,70 the two separate battles in April and July 
of 1953. 71  Together were the longest and most costly battles of the Korean 
War.72 Compared to the total end strength of the U.S. military, the Korean War 
accounted for the highest percentage of U.S. forces deployed at any one time in 
the Cold War.73   As of 1953, the U.S. had suffered more than 33,741 killed in 
action. The war was at a low point in popularity at home in the U.S., and among 
allied nations. Korean War historians agree that the losses from numerous 
battles leading up to Pork Chop Hill and the effects of this major event were 
factors that led to the armistice being signed in July 1953.74 There is no source 
specific material that relates the Korean War and its effect on U.S. popular 
support for another conventional war, or its effect on foreign policy, specifically to 
the coup in Iran. However, it would be an omission to not take into consideration 
the weight of the Korean War upon the decision makers. Two weeks before the 
Iranian coup commenced, President Eisenhower addressed the U.S. on the cost 
of the war during a public radio broadcast,  “We have now gained a truce in 
Korea. We do not greet it with wild rejoicing. We know how dear its cost has 
                                            
70Pork Chop Hill was the nickname for a United Nations military outpost in the “Iron Triangle” 
sector of Korea along the 38th parallel. The hill, 255 meters in elevation, was officially designated 
“Hill 255,” but its contour lines on a map made it world famous as Pork Chop Hill. 
71 Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Volume 2 of The United States Army in 
the Korean War, (1966), Center of Military History, and also S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The 
American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring 1953 (1956) 
72 From the first battle U.S. casualties were 104 dead, including 63 in the 31st Infantry, 31 in 
the 17th Infantry and 10 among engineers and artillery observers, and 373 wounded. In the 
second battle four of the thirteen U.S. company commanders were killed. U.S. losses were 243 
killed, 916 wounded, and nine captured. 163 of the dead were never recovered. Hermes, Truce; 
Marshall, Pork Chop Hill 
73 Only 510 servicemen were based in South Korea in 1950, prior to the surprise attack from 
the North Koreans. Department of Defense (DoD) records show that in July of 1953 the troop 
strength rose to 326,863. All statistics on troop deployment of U.S. forces from 1950–2000 are 
available for researchers from this Heritage Foundation project website. Tim Kane, Global U.S. 
Troop Deployment, 1950–2003 Heritage Foundation, (October 27, 2004) From: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950–2003 
(accessed on 16 November 2012). Vietnam was the highest overall troop deployment during the 
Cold War (1968) but not the highest percentage. 
74 Hermes, Truce; Marshall, Pork Chop Hill. 
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been in life and treasure.”75 With the impact of the overall war, and losses from 
the recent battle hitting the American public within days of the decision point,76 it 
is unlikely a conventional warfare option in Iran was ever much of an option. 
Alliance and Treaty Commitments.  Aside from the close ties 
resultant of the Russo-Iranian Friendship Treaty of 1921,77 Soviet diplomats had 
drawn up several other treaties with neighboring countries that would, in effect, 
counter British influence. This stemmed from British support of the White 
Russians during the 1917–22 Bolshevik Revolution that would, despite UK and 
U.S. efforts, end with Lenin and the Red’s taking power. Although diplomacy 
between Iran and the Soviets continued, British influence took root in Iran, 
focused primarily on the AIOC and Iran’s oil fields.   The British were sided with 
the U.S. against Communism, likely persuading U.S. intervention on behalf of 
their allies in Iran. When British actions failed to overthrow Mossadegh, they 
were left with only the option to use conventional military operations or to do 
nothing. The first option would not work for U.S. strategy, possible drawing them 
in to aid the UK in the likely war that would draw in the Soviets. The second 
option did little for the British. As the web of treaties and alliances coupled with 
diminishing options forced action, the U.S. was obliged to intervene. Similarly, 
the Soviets, unwilling to have the British or American militaries mobilizing in 
neighboring Iran, would likely intervene under the auspices of the 1921 
Friendship Treaty.   
Treaties Necessitated Action, Conditions Did Not Predicate 
Immediate Conventional Response.  The U.S. had to prevent British 
escalation; the British potentially were about to use the 16th Parachute Brigade, 
recently sent to Cyprus, to secure their strategic interests, and had sent the 
                                            
75 Radio Report to the American People on the Achievements of the Administration and the 
83d Congress (3 August 1953) From: 
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/quotes.html, (accessed on 16 November 
2012). 
76 The meeting where final approval was given for TP AJAX, according to Kinzer’s account, 
clearly places the decision point as 24 June 1953, right in the middle of the two battles of Pork 
Chop Hill. See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 163. 
77 Mehdiyoun, “Ownership of Oil and Gas,” 179–189. 
 44
battleship HMS Mauritius off of the Iranian coast, “menacingly close” to the oil 
facilities in Abadan.78  After facing the loss of AIOC due to Iran’s nationalization, 
the economic losses would be staggering. British efforts to end Mossadegh’s rule 
by starting an uprising failed in 1952, ending with their embassy closing shortly 
after.   With no embassy to provide access, their covert action capability was 
significantly limited. According to Gasiorowski and Byrne, the subsequent 
economic sanctions placed on Iran, coupled with the production slow down from 
AIOC, and the naval blockade prevented the export of oil and crushed the Iranian 
economy only to hasten confrontation.79  Faced with either total loss or a military 
intervention, the British were left with few options. The U.S. prevented a British 
military invasion to preclude the likely confrontation between the Soviet Union 
and Britain. This left only one option, a UW campaign that would have to be 
conducted by the U.S. if it were to have any success (based on access inside of 
Iran via the U.S. Embassy). 
Supporting the Development of Networks in the Steady State.  
Military-to-Military relationships are the cash crop for synthetic coups. The CIA 
was able to capitalize on the knowledge and relationships the former military 
advisor to Iran, General Schwarzkopf, had cultivated during the pre-crisis period 
of time, also known as the “operational steady state.”  This was especially key for 
approaching the Shah, who trusted the General’s advice and judgment. That 
level of trust is not built overnight; the relationship was a culmination of years of 
interaction and follow through.80  While the mission may have been approved 
without that relationship, it was likely a key enabler to the overall success.  
                                            
78 Moyara De Moraes Ruehsen, “Operation Ajax Revisited: Iran, 1953” Middle Eastern 
Studies Vol.29 No.3, (London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1993) 467–486, From On-line excerpt 
http://dcr.csusb.edu/dny/395/articles/Ruehsen%20-%20Operation%20Ajax.pdf,  (accessed 24 
November 2012), 468. 
79 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Mohammad Mossadegh and the 1953 Coup in 
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Press, 2004), 263. 
80 General Norman Schwarzkopf worked in Iran in the Military Mission for six years from 
1942 until 1948. Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East, 
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 45
Additionally, the military attaché system, when used to support the 
CIA, gave planners insight to which commanders could be trusted and others 
who could be turned. This critical intelligence was used to develop an effective 
plan. The level of detail and viable intelligence were likely contributors to the 
approval to the plan.   
d. Internal Constraints 
Disagreement Within the CIA.  Iran specialists in the State 
Department and the CIA station chief in Tehran were opposed to a coup; 
therefore this constrained the use of UW. Several CIA officers and State 
Department officials did not regard Mossadegh as a communist and the Tudeh 
was not believed to be capable of seizing power at this time.81 Rather, the Tudeh 
was thought to be pursuing a “popular front” strategy by infiltrating the army and 
the government bureaucracy and trying to gain favor with Mossadegh and other 
National Front leaders. Moreover, the Iranian economy had become relatively 
stable by this time, so a general collapse was not viewed as imminent.   Despite 
the assessment that opposed the rationale for a coup, decision makers 
overcame this constraint, resulting in the resignation of the Tehran Station Chief 
Roger Goiran.82 
e. External Constraints 
Small Prize.  With more demanding issues around the world in 
Germany, Italy, Greece, and China, Korea, and Indochina, Iran was of little 
concern to the U.S. in the late 1940s. What strategic and economic interests the 
U.S. had in Iran were largely “covered” by the British. UK-U.S. strategic plans 
                                            
81 Including Former Ambassador Charles Bohlen who supposedly went on an emotional 
tirade over the planned coup. See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men. 164. 
82 Supra note 18 above. Former OSS officer Roger Goiran was replaced or resigned as 
station Chief a few weeks before the coup. Several sources report this was because of Goiran’s 
opposition to the operation. Kinzer’s Shah’s Men quotes Goiran as calling the operation a grave 
mistake of “Anglo-French colonialism” See Donald N. Wilber, Clandestine Service History: 
Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952–August 1953, March 1954, Also Kinzer, 
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were for Britain to defend Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion.83  This 
constrained the need for any action or intervention, as an ally of the U.S. could 
shape and influence matters to protect U.S. interests. However, this constraint 
was overcome with the ejection of the British diplomatic mission and access into 
Iran. 
Intervention, Grounds for Escalation.  U.S. or UK Military 
intervention would initiate the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship (1921), 
between the Soviet Union and Iran. Article 6 gave the Soviets rights to enter 
Iranian territory and intervene if “a third party should attempt to carry out a policy 
of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia.”84  Covert operations led 
by UK or U.S. forces could lead to the same if discovered. This constrained any 
action on the grounds of initiating a hot war between the USSR and the U.S.   
This constraint was overcome when the policy changes in the UK and Iran left 
U.S. interests exposed, or unguarded. This was the impetus that led to increases 
in U.S. activity; ultimately to the approved plan to overthrow Mossadegh.   
4. Summary 
As in all of the cases of UW in this study, in Iran the enablers outweighed 
constraints resulting in a decision to conduct UW campaign. From the early 
approval and preparations of TP BEDAMN that provided an initial foundation to 
build upon, the relationships that grew from the military advisors that provided 
critical intelligence and feasibility in the plan, the growing Anti-Communism 
Narrative within the U.S. that proved easy justification to subvert socialist 
countries, alliances between the U.S. and UK and their stance against the 
Soviets, existing and new policy set by the U.S. Presidents, and the momentum 
of the situation in Iran that grew prior to Eisenhower’s inauguration were all 
decisive enablers. Internal conflicts between analysts and the CIA station in 
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country, the initial small prize that Iran represented to the U.S., and the fear of 
intervention leading to escalation proved easy obstacles for TP AJAX planners to 
overcome.  The nature of the externally synthesized revolution saw an absence 
in external shaping events that drove the timing of the movement’s actions. The 
timing was by design alone. Furthermore, the importance of the existing 
infrastructure and networks for a synthesized revolution, demonstrated by TP 
BEDAMN and BG Schwarzkopf’s mission in training the Gendarmerie, cannot be 
underscored enough. 
The next case, the Tibetan Organic-Resistance against the People’s 
Republic of China, was very different in terms of the movement, existing 
infrastructure and capacity, and role of external events.   The difference in end 
states and methodology of both campaigns is dramatic:  a coups d’état in Iran for 
the relatively quick overthrow, versus a long-term resistance to disrupt the 
Chinese Communists in Tibet. However, the same policies of Eisenhower’s 
presidency, the organizations and personalities, and the external environment (in 
the global context) are all similar in both cases due to the proximity in history. 
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B. CASE II. TIBET, 1956–197485 
1. Introduction 
The unconventional warfare campaign supporting Tibetan resistance 
fighters in their struggle against the occupation by the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) is a representation of the Organic-Resistance typology.86  The 
Tibetan guerilla movement formed independently of the U.S. in response to 
hostile occupation by the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) invasion of their 
sovereign kingdom. While regime change or “overthrow” is the goal most 
associated with UW operations, the campaign in Tibet offers a case whose  
goal form the U.S. sponsor perspective, was disruption. Despite some opinions 
that the campaign was a failure on the part of the U.S., the operation was 
successful in what it intended to accomplish: disrupting the PLA, impacting  
the fledgling PRC economically, tying up a Chinese occupation force of  
up to 100,000 soldiers, forcing political concessions in the favor of U.S. interest, 
and creating an international awareness of China’s aggression toward  
 
                                            
85 While this case is dated 1956–1974 it is inclusive of all activities associated with the 
operation. Determination of the decision point, when the operation was a committed UW 
campaign by current doctrinal definition versus activities that may have led to or supported the 
decision in the steady state is important to the analysis of the case because it allows the study to 
identify possible independent variables that have a link to causation. It should be understood that 
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were no UW related/supporting activities that happened prior. Confusion occurs due to numerous 
sources listing different start dates for each operation, however, most of these dates indicate the 
start of any U.S. activity and do not filter activities that are planning, exploratory, preparatory or 
developmental in nature. 
86 See Chapter II 
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the sovereign nation of Tibet. 87 This operation took place relatively early  
during the Cold War and is framed by the U.S. war in Korea in the beginning 
and the war in Vietnam at the end.  
2. Background  
Tibetan independence and sovereignty has been disputed for the last two 
thousand years. Historically, Tibetans were a collection of several tribes spread 
out across the Himalaya’s that collectively were generally recognized as part of 
the Tibetan empire. Protected through numerous dynasties, the Lama’s of Tibet 
maintained a shaky independence through geographic separation and a priest-
patron symbiosis with the various rulers of empires that came and went across 
the Central Asian highlands. This all changed in early 1949 when China’s civil 
war ended with a clear victor and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began to 
make plans for a reconsolidation of China.88 The PRC agreed with the former 
Kuomintang (KMT) nationalists on one issue; that Hainan, Taiwan, and Tibet all 
belonged under the regional hegemony of a united China. 
The CIA began to see Tibet was key terrain in the post-World War II 
continuation of the Great Game and had established contacts in Tibet years prior 
to the Chinese invasion. CIA veteran John K. Knaus’ book Orphans of the Cold 
War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival details a secret 1942 mission 
                                            
87 Many critics of the operation judge it a failure on the basis of that the U.S. was not 
successful in driving the PRC from Tibet, and the continued exposure of the plight due in part to 
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after Chinese Communist rebels defeated the Nationalist Republican government in the 
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to Lhasa, Tibet’s capital, by members of the OSS, the CIA’s forerunner. 89  Two 
U.S. Army officers, Major Ilia Tolstoy (grandson of Leo Tolstoy) and Captain 
Brooke Dolan II, established the first official contact between the Dalai Lama’s 
government and Washington. Their expedition laid the groundwork for future U.S. 
involvement establishing contacts that would later prove valuable to the mission. 
In 1950, only three years after National Security Act of 1947 officially established 
the CIA, and months ahead of the Chinese invasion, Douglas Mackiernan was 
“shot dead on the borders of Tibet and Sinkiang.” He was the first CIA officer to 
die in a covert operation.90  
Within a month of the May incursion into Kham, the other side of Asia 
grew hot as North Korean troops spilled into South Korea. The PRC launched an 
invasion with a goal to “liberate the Tibetan serfdom from the oppressive 
aristocracy.”  Looking to make up for losses in Korea, China ordered 20,000 of its 
troops to “realize the peaceful liberation of Tibet.”91  The Tibetans offered little 
resistance; their small unorganized and undertrained army was woefully 
unprepared to protect the vast borders of the Tibetan frontier that reached from 
India in the south to just shy of Mongolia to the north.  
Two groups of emissaries representing Tibet’s interests were sent to 
Beijing in an attempt to appeal to peace and bring an end to the violence. 
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Reportedly unauthorized by the Dalai Lama, they were coerced by the 
communists to sign a seventeen-point agreement that the Chinese called the 
“Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” which virtually wiped out any prospect 
of an autonomous Tibetan identity.92 The Dalai Lama traveled to Beijing in an 
attempt to build awareness of their cause, he still maintained the hope that China 
would allow Tibet to remain as it was. Hopeful to find a middle path, the Tibetan 
Ruler visited Beijing and was ceremonially treated with respect while being 
paraded around and put on display. On the last day of his visit, Chairman Mao, 
who reportedly took a liking to the young lama, confided in him that a belief in 
religion was akin to poison.93 As the religious leader of his people, and as a 
person whose life devotion was in following the path he was born into, this 
comment brought forth a lightning bolt of realization to the young Lama: there 
would be no compromise with China until Tibet was gone.  
The armed resistance, separate from the Dalai Lama’s attempts to broker 
peace with China, began as a series of independent uprisings in the eastern 
region of Kham. A widespread popular revolt finally broke out in February 1956 
after the PLA attacked numerous ancient Buddhist monasteries and killed 
thousands of monks and civilians. Within a few years of Chinas occupation, an 
organized militia dedicated to expelling the PLA began to form and soon found 
CIA support.  
The prospect of supporting the Tibetans as part of a global anti-
Communist campaign appealed to U.S. interests, despite top levels of the U.S. 
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administration holding no pretense of commitment to Tibetan independence.94 
From the beginning the goal was for the movement to disrupt and cause  
China pain. While not disclosed to the naïve and idealistic Tibetans, there were 
never any real expectations by the U.S. that a successful realization of liberation 
of the occupied kingdom would come.95 
Tibetans began to mobilize into a resistance movement, though 
uncoordinated and poorly armed the rebels conducted a series of surprisingly 
successful raids and battles. A widespread popular revolt broke out after the PLA 
bombed thousand year old Buddhist monasteries killing thousands of monks and 
civilians massed there for protection. The Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Gyalo 
Thondup, contacted the U.S. asking for help. Although there had been contact 
with the Tibetans in the past the timing was ideal for the U.S. to become 
involved. President Eisenhower, while promoting the doctrine of containment, 
sought to counter communism through more active means. Working with 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother the director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Allen Welsh Dulles, Eisenhower’s direction gave the CIA the 
authority to begin a more aggressive UW campaigns around the world.96 This 
                                            
94 This view is consistent with researcher Lisa Cathey daughter of a former CIA officer on the 
Tibetan Task Force, with “unique access to first-hand accounts combined with rare and recently 
declassified archival media, recent events in the U.S. and India, and diverse perspectives from 
noted scholars and leading activists.” Cathey’s research for her ongoing work producing the 
documentary CIA in Tibet, has complied the largest collection of primary source interviews with 
Americans and Tibetans involved in the operation. From her perspective, “….support for the 
Tibetan op was essentially standard Cold War procedure: stopping the spread of Communism, 
and antagonizing Communist countries in whatever clandestine ways that were logistically 
possible and the budget allowed.” From e-mails between Lisa Cathey and Author. See Lisa 
Cathey, CIA in Tibet website, http://www.ciaintibet.com/index.php (accessed on 06 December 
2012). 
95 The CIA and military assistance was based on U.S. national security interest. On 
December 1 1994, the Dalai Lama stated that U.S. had ‘no courage’ to help and it was not a 
genuine assistance (Laird, 2002: 131). The objective of the operation was based more on the 
opportunity to wound the Chinese, even slightly, which was oblivious to the Tibetans and 
idealistic views of good and evil. The sudden cut off of all support was a shock to the naïve 
Tibetan guerrillas who had come to believe the U.S. would aid them in their cause indefinitely.  
96 NSC-68 was the starting point for President Eisenhower’s strategy. NSC-68 and NSC 
162/2 were an important part of an overall shift in American foreign policy to a comprehensive 
containment strategy that was confirmed by successive administrations. Stephen E. Ambrose, 
Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2012), 
172. 
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plan for a global UW network fit in perfectly with the events unfolding in Tibet and 
the fledging resistance to the Chinese. Washington recognized a golden 
opportunity was presenting itself, by that would allow the U.S. to do something to 
stem the spread of Communism, or at the very least slow it down. This set the 
stage for operations to begin. 
Working through the Dali Lama’s brother, the CIA recruited six Tibetan 
refugees to serve as their initial agents.97 There was little problem obtaining 
approval in Washington for this modest initial investment in the Tibetan 
resistance movement. Secretary of State Foster Dulles and Undersecretary of 
State Herbert Hoover Jr. gave full approval.98 The only note of caution came later 
from the CIA operations chief, Frank Wisner, who insisted that no commitments 
be made to the Tibetans that would arouse unrealistic expectations that the U.S. 
could not fulfill. He insisted the primary mission was to provide the “ground truth,” 
assess the strength of rebellion, and make contacts necessary to prepare for the 
creation of a planned larger resistance network.99 Not to engage in combat 
operations. In 1957 this “pilot team”100 of six Tibetan Khampas was clandestinely 
exfiltrated from India to the U.S. territorial island of Saipan. Once there, CIA 
paramilitary officers trained them for five months in modern weapons, 
communications, land navigation, map reading, codes, and guerrilla tactics.101 
The secondary, and more important, mission of the initial group was to gauge the 
                                            
97 Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s older brother made contact with CIA officers in India  
98 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New 
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99 Mikel Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors, The story of the CIA-backed Tibetan Freedom 
Fighters, the Chinese Invasion and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet. First Hardcover Edition, (New York, 
NY: Penguin Group, 2004), 194. 
100 Current UW doctrine defines “Pilot Team” as: A deliberately structured composite 
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skilled personnel, designed to infiltrate a designated area to conduct sensitive preparation of the 
environment activities and assess the potential to conduct unconventional warfare in support of 
U.S. objectives. Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, Training 
Circular (TC) 18–01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 2010), glossary-4. 
Historically the CIA’s use of the term more generally refers to the first element on the ground 
regardless of its make up and inclusion or lack of U.S. personnel.  
101 Roger E. McCarthy, Tears of the Lotus (2006), 240. 
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potential of success before Washington approved larger follow on missions. The 
first team was airdropped into Tibet via B-17s in October 1957.102  The 
subsequent ground operation was named ST CIRCUS103 while the air support 
program, used to parachute the teams back into Tibet and drop follow on 
supplies and weapons, was code-named ST BARNUM.104  
The success of the initial program encouraged the Eisenhower 
administration that the Tibetans had the will to fight and ability to carry on a 
guerrilla campaign against their Chinese occupiers. The program was expanded 
and the agency established a secret military training camp for the resistance 
fighters at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado in 1959.105  Once the former 
home of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, Camp Hale’s 10,000-foot Rocky 
Mountain peaks, alpine air, and dense forests better matched the Tibetan 
highlands compared to the tropical island training camp in Saipan.  
The Tibetan Resistance, comprised of those trained at Camp Hale, the 
rebels that were recruited and trained in country, and former members of the 
original Tibetan Army ranks, swelled to over 35,000 fighters.   As the movement 
grew in numbers, it failed to transition from small unit tactics, to more 
conventional operations. The rebels came under more and more attacks by the 
PLA as their camps were compromised and destroyed again and again. By early 
1959 the tension between the occupying PLA and the population had reached a 
boiling point. For the last three months the rebels and PLA had been in a series 
of battles leaving heavy casualties on both sides. Cracking down on civilians, 
because of attacks from the rebels, caused large riots in the streets of Lhasa. 
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104 ST BARNUM would use a seconded air wing from Kadena air bar in Okinawa Japan for 
major air operations and the CIA proprietary airline CAT air (later renamed Air America during 
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and James Morrison, The CIA’S Secret War in Tibet, (University Press of Kansas, 2002), 55. 
105 Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars.164. 
 56
The last straw was when the PLA began to shell ancient Buddhist temples and 
monasteries in order to ferret out rebels who might have used them for shelter.  
In response an all-out revolt erupted in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. 
Civilians formed a human wall around the Dalai Lama’s residence and were 
gunned down. On 17 March 1959, the Dalai Lama, realizing there would be no 
peace by attempting to appease the PRC, disguised his identity and escaped 
through guerrilla-held territory. Two CIA-trained Tibetans escorted him to the 
Indian border.106  In the meantime, the revolt in Lhasa rapidly escalated into a 
full-scale rebellion. The authorities in Beijing kept the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army in Tibet on the defensive for ten days, but on 20 March they 
ordered reinforcements and additional attack aircraft to crush the rebellion. In 
subsequent weeks, the PLA ruthlessly mopped up the resistance in Lhasa and 
many other parts of Tibet.107 
After the failed 1959 rebellion, their ranks decimated, the time had come 
to withdraw the surviving fighters to a base camp out of the PLA’s reach. In the 
summer of 1960 the Tibetan guerrilla base was relocated to “Mustang province,” 
a barren scrap and rugged land extending into Tibetan borders but belonging to 
the unwitting Kingdom of Nepal. Mustang encompassed 1,943 square kilometers 
of arid gorges and cliffs centered along Nepal’s northern border. Surrounded on 
three sides by Tibet, its population and culture was entirely Tibetan Buddhist. 
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Here the Chusi Gangdruk,108 a guerrilla army of some 2,000 ethnic Khampa, and 
the surviving resistance fighters from the original program, ran cross-border, hit 
and run, and intelligence gathering operations against the Chinese. 
In 1962, the CIA also began working with Indian intelligence services to 
provide training and supply agents in Tibet. Together they created a Special 
Forces unit made up of Tibetan refugees, which would become the Special 
Frontier Force. The CIA’s Tibetan operations continued until 1974 when strains in 
U.S.-Indian relations, the improvement of U.S. diplomatic ties with the PRC, and 
the Nepalese government’s occupation of the Mustang base brought the Tibet 
program to an end. 
According to Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’S Secret 
War in Tibet, “Tibet became a vital Cold War proving ground for CIA case officers 
and their spy craft.”109 Many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) 
for UW were combat-tested in this operation and would become standard 
procedures throughout the Cold War.  
3. Analysis 
The following sections of this chapter will highlight significant factors that 
were implicitly or explicitly influential in the decision to embark on operations ST 
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military action, or overt and conventional military action. These factors have been 
categorized into Internal Enablers, Internal Constraints, External Enablers, and 
External Constraints.110   
a. The Decision Point 
The decision point for Tibet is bracketed by two periods of time (see 
Figure 8). The first, an event that occurred in 1957, following the Pilot Team 
exfiltration from Tibet, ST CIRCUS began when CIA trained recruited Tibetan 
Resistance fighters in basic guerilla warfare were air dropped back into Tibet to 
assess the feasibility of recruiting and organizing a resistance movement. This 
marked the “trial stage” of the operation. Externally, the first batch of Tibetan 
Resistance proved their mettle against the PLA, giving President Eisenhower 
confirmation of their capability and the promise of success. This would lead into 
the decision point. Following the decision point are external and internal events 
that are indicative of increased throughputs and outputs. First, the addition of the 
Camp Hale training site in Colorado demonstrates the ramp up in the campaign. 
In the realm of output, the PLA suffered increased casualties resulting from 
clashes with Tibetan Resistance. This in turn led to a chain of events starting with 
the PLA’s decision to shell Buddhist Temples. This action by the PLA added to 
the discontent cumulating in the 1959 rebellion in the capital city of Lhasa, 
increasing PLA violence that was decisive to the Dalai Lama’s escape. An 
additional mark of ‘post-decision’ is the internal measure of effectiveness of  
ST BARNUM, when, according to Dunham, an estimated “minimum of 550,000 to 
nearly 800,000 pounds of material [was] being parachuted to the volunteers by  
 
                                            
110 Enablers are arguments for action, either oppose no military action, or support UW over 
conventional military action. Constraints are arguments for no action, or they argue for the use of 
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This is a function of popular opinion or support (important due to the U.S. status as a democracy), 
capability, capacity, or leadership. The external domain is that outside of the U.S.. This includes 
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perhaps the most heavily weighted, peer competitors’ actions, capacity, and capability. 
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the beginning of 1959.”111  This shows that the operation was well underway. 
Therefore, the decision point can be estimated to have occurred in the year 
1958.   
 
Figure 8.  Decision Point Timeline: Tibet 
b. Internal Enablers 
Tibet had a Marketable Narrative. The Anti-communism 
narrative in the U.S. gained momentum during the 1950s. This would provide 
popular support for any administration making a tough stance on containing 
communist holdings and curbing their further spread. Eisenhower ran his 
campaign against the Democrats on the platform that Democrats were weak 
on Communism. Ambrose writes, “The Republicans had just won an election, 
in part, by demanding to know ‘Who Lost China?’”112  After winning the 
election in November 1952, Eisenhower toured the Korean theater with some 
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of his future cabinet members. Shortly after his inauguration, Eisenhower’s 
“New Look” policy served as the backbone of U.S. strategy to counter USSR 
threats.113 This was further validated with NSC 162/2, signed 30 October 
1953, which emphasized U.S. policy to counter the threat of the USSR and 
Communist China.114 U.S. efforts in Tibet, specifically sponsoring a resistance 
to disrupt a communist enemy, were within the accepted narrative.  
Conventional Forces Impractical Strategic Option: 
The U.S. military had a change of focus and retooling under the 
New Look. The “New Look” policy shifted from Truman’s “short term” crisis 
response in an effort to face a protracted military and economic challenge. 
Herman Wolk captures the core of this policy in his article titled “The New Look,” 
published in Air Force Magazine, he writes:  “In December 1953, Radford, the 
new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that the new defense policy was crafted 
for the ‘long pull, not a year of crisis.’ The United States, Radford said, ‘must be 
ready for tremendous, vast, retaliatory, and counteroffensive blows in the event 
of a global war, and we must be ready for lesser military actions short of an all-
out war.’” Eisenhower considered economic factors while forging a military 
capacity to meet the Soviet threat by the lowest feasible cost.115  Aside from the 
economic factors, The New Look faced the challenge dictated by a new means of 
warfare: Mutually Assured Destruction. Before the U.S. and USSR race to the 
moon, other “races” in technological advances occurred.116  The interceptor 
aircraft and jet bomber race as well as the race for the quietest submarines were 
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all supporting mediums for nuclear war.117  By developing a capability to interdict 
and deliver a nuclear arsenal, deterrence could be used to thwart Soviet 
aggression.118  The report to the National Security Council of October 30, 1953 
(NSC 162/2) declared that the “risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by 
maintaining a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive 
retaliatory strength and defensive strength. This must be based on massive 
atomic capability.”119 
As conventional forces prepared for total war in a nuclear 
environment, the prediction for “limited war” appeared less likely. A confrontation 
with the Soviets would be nuclear or total war. According to Grimmett’s 
Congressional Research Study on Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces 
Abroad, after Korea, the next decisive combat was seen in Vietnam in the 1960s. 
Meanwhile, Conventional Military forces were used to defend against or deter an 
enemy, or to evacuate or protect American citizens.120 Therefore, the New Look 
and NSC 162/2 focused the use of conventional forces towards use for total war 
against the USSR or the Communists. The CIA and the newly organized Army 
Special Forces were filling the gap required to “take feasible political, economic, 
propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome 
problems for the USSR, [and] impair Soviet relations with Communist China.”121  
Ultimately making use of conventional forces impractical for anything but total or 
nuclear war. 
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Conventional Warfare Strategically Impractical.  With the Cold 
War ramping up, new conflicts on the Korean Peninsula at a boil and old conflicts 
in Europe on a slow simmer, U.S. military assets were limited.122  Due to the 
requirement to maintain balance in Europe and keep the USSR at bay, not only 
were there limitations in conventional forces for deployment to Korea, but also 
there were none available to support the Tibetan resistance. In addition to the 
lack of military forces, national interests were not aligned with deploying 
conventional forces to Tibet. However, Secretary of State Dulles described a 
requirement for versatility that drives the need to develop capability.   “If an 
enemy could pick his time and place and method of warfare, and if our policy was 
to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition, 
then we needed to be ready to fight in the Arctic and in the tropics; in Asia, the 
Near East and in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air; with old weapons and with 
new weapons.”123  The combined lack of forces and lack of national interests 
precluded conventional operations from taking place in Tibet. This left only one 
option of action remaining:  UW. 
UW Experienced Individuals Influential to Decision Maker.  
President Eisenhower was a supporter of covert operations and the utility of UW. 
Mitchell Fredurra posits “Eisenhower’s past experience as the Supreme Allied 
Commander during World War II also imbued him with a proclivity for “covert and 
psychological” warfare.”  He quotes Stephen Ambrose to describe Ike’s 
experience in World War II, “the success of the British Secret Service had 
impressed Dwight Eisenhower… simultaneously he commanded a series of 
covert operations that played a crucial role in the final victory. So, when 
Eisenhower became President, he encouraged the growth of the CIA…”124 In 
addition to this support, his cabinet enjoyed an uncommon collaboration between 
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the CIA and State Department, a result of brotherhood of the literal sense. John 
Foster Dulles, Secretary of State from 1953–1959, was the brother of Allen 
Welsh Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1953–1961. In 
addition to this closeness that would permeate to their respective subordinates, 
the collaboration started as early as TP AJAX in Iran in 1953 and extended 
through PB SUCCESS in Guatemala circa 1954.125  Although this is not a main 
factor, in cannot be ignored that this legacy of collaboration in the early days of 
the administration likely extended through the genesis of ST CIRCUS. 
Further indication of President Eisenhower’s support of UW, was 
Executive Order 10483, signed in September of 1953 that established the 
Operations Coordinating Board, also known as the “Board.” This organization 
was devised to report to the National Security Council, to advise on covert action 
and replaced the Psychological Strategy Board.126  The Chairman of the Board 
was the Under Secretary of State, other members included:  Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, Director of Foreign Operations Administration, Director of Central 
Intelligence, and one other member, rumored to be the President’s Special 
Assistant for Psychological Warfare. Also welcome to attend were Special 
Assistant to National Security Advisor, and the Director of the U.S. Information 
Agency. This network of advisors would support decision making for 
unconventional warfare campaigns.127   
UW Successes Increasing Influence on Decision Makers.  As it 
affected the rapid support and commitment to PB SUCCESS, the early 
successes in Iran during TP AJAX cannot be underestimated in terms of 
reputation and clout it brought the CIA within the beltway. The mid-1950s saw 
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great gains for relatively low cost and minimal U.S. bloodshed when the 
governments of Iran and Guatemala were overthrown and supplanted by U.S. 
sponsored entities. With the preparatory intelligence gathering and infrastructure 
development in Tibet approached the decision point to invest into operations 
under the plan of ST CIRCUS and BARNUM, the CIA was still enjoying a winning 
record and achieving national policy in arenas of less than all-out conventional 
conflict. Leaving the “big fight” to the Pentagon, the CIA was developing a 
reputation of waging and winning the “small fights” to counter communist 
expansion and influence.128   
Presence of a UW Experienced Organization.  The OSS lineage 
created key players that transitioned into the newly established CIA. The legacy 
of experience, coupled with the institutionalized knowledge and processes were 
instrumental in developing a successful post war intelligence and covert action 
capability. Several key agents or leaders, from case officers and trainers all the 
way up to the CIA leadership, were groomed by their earlier experience during 
the Allies’ partisan warfare campaign while serving in the OSS. This applied to 
Tibet in that a legacy concept of operation and strategy of partisan warfare was 
easy to transfer into the context of a PRC occupation in Tibet. Also, the 
institutionalized processes were key to developing a plan and gaining approval.   
c. External Enablers 
A Strategy Existed that Required the Development of a 
Network in the Steady State.  An atomic USSR, intelligence requirements, and 
the foundation of a network were all reasons to develop a strategy to aid Tibet. 
The threat of the Soviet Union becoming a nuclear power was very real. If the 
USSR became a nuclear power, it would make the complex Cold War even more 
dynamic. The CIA, only recently confirmed the mission of Douglas Mackiernan 
“to investigate Moscow’s access to local uranium deposits and report any sign of 
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nuclear testing in Soviet Central Asia.” 129 The CIA’s quest to assess and confirm 
or deny the capability of the USSR to attain nuclear weapons, through operations 
based in China, was cut short after the PRC consolidated power on the 
mainland. As the intelligence requirements grew, from originally monitoring 
USSR nuclear capability to understanding the PRC, so did the requirements to 
develop infrastructure and networks to attain it.   
After several British intelligence scandals, the uncovering of high 
level infiltrations of the British service and subsequent failures in Western led 
infiltration operations in Eastern Europe due to leaked operational details, the 
relationship was strained. 130 With Hong Kong being the only window into the 
PRC, and Hong Kong under the control of the British, ST CIRCUS was 
potentially, and later realized, the best means for U.S. intelligence to gain insight 
on the PRC.131 
The requirement to attain intelligence on the PRC was clear. Tibet 
offered the potential lead the CIA needed, and through its development of 
relationships with the Tibetan contacts that could potentially help them attain 
insight on PRC intentions, a network was fostered. The opportunity was later 
presented to the CIA to expand collection into disruption after the movement 
approached the CIA for support. The steady state activity that encompassed 
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developing a mechanism for intelligence collection, allowed for a transition, or an 
expansion into UW. Another way to view this is if an intelligence requirement had 
not existed, it would be unlikely that the CIA would have developed a network 
and/or infrastructure, and therefore would not be able to easily transition into UW 
activity. U.S. strategy demanded intelligence, leading the U.S. to Tibet, therefore 
making UW possible. 
UW as a Supporting Effort in Grand Strategy.  In Army doctrine, 
the main effort is where decisive action will occur; it is therefore where emphasis 
lies in support and resources. Units can switch from supporting efforts to main 
efforts as different phases of an operation transition. Additionally, supporting 
efforts are necessary to set conditions for the decisive action. UW, in terms of 
grand strategy, can set conditions for the main effort. During the late 1940s, after 
the Japanese surrender, the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek returned 
their main focus from resisting the Japanese occupation to defending against 
Mao Tse-Tung’s Chinese Communists. U.S. efforts to prevent the Chinese 
takeover were checked, and eventually Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese 
nationalists retreated to the island of Formosa, commonly known as Taiwan. This 
was became the Main Effort for the U.S. in the region. Then, after communists 
tried to push south on the Korean Peninsula to establish a unified communist 
Korea, the U.S. shifted focus and the Republic of Korea became the new Main 
Effort. With the PRC supporting the DPRK forces in the north, the international 
conflict further fouled relations between the PRC and the U.S.. The PRC stopped 
the U.S. and South Korean thrust into the north to consolidate the Korean 
Peninsula, and despite heavy losses to achieve their objective, the PRC was 
able to push them south to the present day DMZ. The United States was 
reluctant to embark on yet another total war, largely because the USSR had not 
weighed in yet and U.S. military power was necessary to maintain balance in 
Europe.   U.S. and ROK forces unwilling, or unable to push north to consolidate 
the peninsula, remain at a standstill at the DMZ still rooted to the same location 
today. 
 67
The Republic of China, the nationalists who were now occupied 
Formosa, became a supporting effort. The likelihood of the ROC establishing a 
beachhead and vanquishing the PRC to retake the mainland was unlikely.132   
However, from the perspective of Mao Tse-tung, the communist revolution 
remained unfinished. The ROC and its army still held on to Taiwan, and would 
not give up their struggle.  
Finally, a third regional contender and on the flanks of the PRC lay 
India. India was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of 
China. However, as a result of the PLA invasion into Tibet, Indian policy could 
reflect on a failure to maintain Tibet as a buffer between the two regional powers. 
Consequently, the Indian-China war of 1962 underscored the mistake.133  As the 
two regional powers began to square off, the CIA could capitalize on the tensions 
and gain support of their activities from India. Not only would disruption in Tibet 
force PRC action and attention to their newly occupied “province,” it would divert 
PRC attention from India, Formosa, and Korea.   
Therefore, as U.S. supporting efforts in the region ST CIRCUS and 
BARNUM offered a means to set conditions for the main effort, the Korean 
Peninsula. The situation there was all but stable and constantly threatened to 
erupt again. The supporting efforts in Formosa and the Indian border would also 
benefit from tying up PLA assets in Tibet. After all, the PRC had up to 100,000 
PLA troops committed to securing the occupation of Tibet, not to mention the 
costly casualties and expended munitions the conflict was racking up.134   
Conditions Did Not Predicate an Immediate Conventional 
Response.  Tibet had a time horizon that did not force the decision maker to act. 
The PRC stole the initiative by invading Tibetan sovereignty, and in terms of U.S. 
                                            
132 NSC 162/2, 3.  
133 The India-China war of 1962 would further open the door for the CIA to expand the 
Tibetan program to include working through the Indian intelligence services to run agents in Tibet 
and for the paramilitary to stand up and train a territorial Special Forces unit made up entirely of 
Tibetan refugees.  
134 Sources vary between 20,000 troops to 100,000. 
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national interests, there were no obligations to Tibet demanding an immediate 
conventional military response. PLA forces had already massed on the border 
and crossed over, and began their occupation. Any overt U.S. military response 
would have been too late; the crisis was over. Therefore, U.S. decision makers 
were free of a time constraint forcing action. With the advantage of stealing the 
initiative on their own terms, the movement and its subsequent sponsors were in 
a position of advantage.   The U.S. had the freedom to respond without haste. 
If conventional military options are the appropriate contingency 
force to meet an adversary’s invading force, and an obligation exists to use force 
to defend a strategic interest, then conventional military operations are preferred. 
UW can fulfill contingencies if the necessary preparatory activities have occurred 
before the crisis.   However, UW is also a suitable option when events do not 
predicate immediate contingency response, when time is not an issue. In the 
case of Tibet, time was on the side of the movement and its sponsors. PLA 
occupation methods were only further exacerbating the social fractures in Tibet, 
driving men and monks alike into the movement. 
d. Internal Constraints 
Diplomacy First.  Many in Washington felt a UW campaign 
supporting Tibet was of little value and risked threatening U.S. diplomatic efforts 
towards the fledgling PRC, or worse, could further escalate tension between 
India and China. John Roberts II, in his article titled “The Secret war over Tibet,” 
claims ST BARNUM’s supply “route involved over-flights of India, there was 
always a risk that a plane would go down in Indian territory.  [Indian and Chinese 
relations] were certain to be badly strained if China interpreted the over-flights as 
tacit Indian support for the secret war.”135 This constraint, an attempt to prevent 
UW, was overcome by the justification to intervene.   
                                            
135 John Roberts II, “The Secret War Over Tibet:A story of Cold War heroism -- and 
Kennedy administration cowardice andbetrayal.” website:  
http://www.mitbbs.com/pc/pccon.php?id=2306&nid=33279&s=all, (accessed on 01 November 
2012). 
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e. External Constraints 
Intervention and Escalation.  As seen already on the Korean 
Peninsula, the PRC ability to stall U.S. military advances caused reason to, at 
minimum, respect PRC military capacity. Furthermore, the fear that the USSR 
would militarily support their fellow communists in a regional-turned-global 
conflict was a significant factor in the U.S./ROK willingness to remain at the 
present day DMZ in Korea. 
If a conventional military campaign were used to support the 
Tibetans and disrupt the PLA, PRC reaction and escalation136 could bring 
another regional conflict to the brink of all out world war. The U.S. populace, with 
the rest of the world in agreement, was unwilling to rush into a third world war. 
Both Soviet and U.S. strategy and capacity was centered on mutually assured 
destruction through a complex nuclear arsenal developed by both sides. PRC 
regional escalation could, in turn, draw Soviet support, effectively raising the 
stakes and risking a potential nuclear war. This constrained the use of any 
campaign initiated by the U.S., conventional or unconventional, under the 
assumption that if detected, intervention and escalation were very real reactions 
by U.S. adversaries. This constraint was overcome by confidence that the covert 
nature of UW would keep U.S. actions undetected, or at least deniable. 
Historic Dispute and Similar Claims by an Ally.  Many inside the 
U.S. viewed China’s expansion into Tibet as an attempt to regain what was a part 
of its rightful sovereign territory. To complicate the matter, the KMT, now the 
Republic of China, had similar views towards Tibet: that it would fall under the 
                                            
136 Forrest Morgan, et.al. Dangerous Thresholds, Managing Escalation in the 21st Century, 
a Rand Study published for the Air Force, defines escalation as “an increase in the intensity or 
scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the 
participants. Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition. When 
competition involves military confrontation or limited war, the pressure to escalate can become 
intense because of the weight of issues that bring actors into violent conflict and the potential 
costs of losing contests of deadly force. Escalation can be unilateral, but it is often reciprocal, as 
each combatant struggles ever harder to achieve victory or avoid defeat. Left unchecked, 
escalatory chain reactions can occur, raising the costs of war to catastrophic levels for 
combatants and noncombatants alike.” 
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banner of a united China. However, this did not infer that the ROC would not 
support a Tibetan resistance, quit opposite, the ROC provided sanctuary and 
training sites for the CIA and the Tibetans. Additionally, the ROC and Tibetan 
resistance executed several bilateral missions against the PRC.137  The U.S. 
could not openly dispute PRC claims against Tibet with the knowledge that if the 
ROC regained control of China, a similar claim would be made that the U.S. 
would not oppose. This constrained intervention, in that this could be viewed as 
local matter that should be addressed by locals. In fact, the movement in Tibet 
was an organic-resistance. U.S. sponsorship of the movement allowed locals to 
address the issue. 
4. Summary 
The policies opposing Communism, fiscal constraints initiated by the New 
Look, the OSS legacy emerging in the new CIA and key personalities 
surrounding decision makers, coupled with the need to develop intelligence on 
the PRC, the ease in which this new “steady state” of activity could transition into 
a UW campaign, and the opportunity that such a campaign provided to disrupt an 
growing adversary were all key enablers for unconventional warfare in Tibet. 
These outweighed any constraints offered, as history proves by the existence of 
this case. The case of Tibet captures the essence of Organic-Resistance and 
embodies a campaign of disruption. The benefits of the Organic-Resistance are 
in their self-motivation and their willingness to fight; one shortcoming of these 
types of movement, in reference to sponsorship, is the frustration when the policy 
of the sponsor diverges from that of the movement. The next case, a Synthetic-
Resistance, occurs in Laos. The timeline of events proves almost parallel, and 
many of the same shaping variables are evident in both Tibet and Laos. 
 
                                            
137 Conboy and Morrison, CIA’s Secret War in Tibet. Ch.7 
 71
C. CASE III:  LAOS, 1958–1973138 
1. Introduction 
The unconventional warfare campaign conducted in the Kingdom of Laos 
against the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh communist invaders represents an 
example of a Synthetic-Resistance movement, identified by the UW typology 
methods in this work.139Regional events between neighboring countries and 
world powers turned the small neutral country, with no real defense capabilities, 
into a contested battleground in a violent war spanning over two decades. During 
that period Laos endured several regime changes, marked by coups and 
counter-coups, cross-border operations, secret airfields, the use of indigenous 
and third nation surrogate fighters, and an ongoing battle to slow the Viet Minh 
from rolling through Laos into Thailand all which made this UW campaign vital to 
U.S. interests.   
Finally, Laos provides this research a specific case of Special Forces and 
CIA cooperation. The operations conducted in Laos, both with the Royal Army 
and the indigenous tribes, complemented each organization’s strengths and 
design. It spans from covert, to clandestine, to overt use of UW and COIN, all in 
the same campaign. Perhaps most important lesson is that the “Secret War” in 
Laos provided a bridge that linked the first generation of unconventional warfare 
practitioners, found in the legacy of the OSS, to the next generation. Both the 
CIA and Special Forces developed methods and experiences that created a 
capability for future UW campaigns. 
2. Background 
Before the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, there was already an ongoing 
unconventional warfare campaign in the remote, jungle-covered mountains of 
Southeast Asia. Spanning over fifteen years, the CIA and U.S. Army Special 
                                            
138 While this case is dated 1958–1973 because of the determined decision point, it is 
inclusive of all activities associated with the operation. 
139 See Chapter II. 
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Forces ran a “Secret War” that disposed three regimes, as well as trained, 
organized and led indigenous tribes against communist forces occupying 
northern Laos and across the border in North Vietnam.140  With expenditures 
exceeded $300 million a year; Laos was reportedly the largest U.S. covert 
operation prior to the Afghan-Soviet War.141 
From the beginning of U.S. involvement in Indochina, two separate 
missions were initiated in Laos:  the counter insurgency campaign to support the 
Royal Lao government in the south, and the unconventional warfare campaign, 






                                            
140 The term “secret war” describing CIA and Special Forces operations in Laos was coined 
by T. D. Allman an American freelance journalist best known for his exposés of the CIA’s “secret 
war” and for his later interviews with world figures (Yasser Arafat, Helmut Kohl, Boris Yeltsin, 
Manuel Antonio Noriega) as foreign correspondent for Vanity Fair. For recent studies of the war in 
Laos, see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao 
Government (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Jan Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic 
Mountains: The Hmong, The Americans, and Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1993); Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA’s 
Secret War in Laos (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995); and Roger Warner, Shooting at the 
Moon: The Story of America’s Clandestine War in Laos (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 
1996), which is the revised edition of Back Fire: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos and Its Links to the 
War in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). 
141 Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America’s Clandestine War in Laos, 
(Hanover, NH: Steerforth, 1998). Separate source calls Laos “The largest paramilitary operations 
ever undertaken by the CIA” William M. Leary, CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955–1974: 
Supporting the “Secret War” From the CIA website:  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99–00/art7.html#rft12, (accessed 
22 October 2012). 
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North Vietnamese Viet Minh in the North.142 Laos also served as a staging 
ground for cross border operations in North Vietnam itself. 
In the early 1950s Laos as a nation did not yet exist. The French created a 
new South East Asia by dividing the various kingdoms and principalities that 
formed “Indochina” into three new autonomous states: Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos. Drawing lines on a map, the French created Laos by merging the kingdom 
of Luangprabang, the monarch of which became King of Laos, with its rival 
kingdom of Champassak.143 After the Japanese withdrew following World War II, 
King Sisavang Vong declared Laotian independence, and a nationalist resistance 
movement took shape, known as the Lao Issara (Free Lao). The Lao Issara 
formed an interim government, under one of the king’s cousins Prince Phetsarat. 
For the first time since the early 18th century, Laos was a country. This 
independence was short lived and, bowing to politics, the king began to protest 
an independent Laos in favor of support from the French. The newly formed soon 
nation became divided. The king passed a decree dismissing Phetsarat as Prime 
Minister, and the newly formed Nationalists’ government declared Laos no longer 
subject to royal laws. The French ended this standoff by seizing control after the  
 
                                            
142 The name “Pathet Lao” (Land of Laos) referred to the communist movement that 
occurred in Laos beginning in the 1950s and was the Laotian equivalent of Cambodia’s Khmer 
Rouge and Vietnam’s Viet Cong. Prince Souphanouvong in North Vietnam formed the movement 
during the first Indochina War between France and the Vietnamese communists. The Pathet Lao 
was committed to the communist struggle against colonialism. In 1953, the Pathet Lao guerrillas 
accompanied a Viet Minh invasion of Laos from Vietnam and established a government at 
Samneua in northern Laos. From http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/laos.htm, 
(accessed 22 October 2012).  
While some current studies classify operations in Laos (specifically OP WHITESTAR) as 
COIN due to the U.S. aid to the Royal Lao government (see Derek Jones, Ending The Debate: 
Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter, 19–20), there are 
numerous first hand accounts that document the two missions as separate operations (see 
Shelby L. Stanton, Special Forces at War: An Illustrated History, Southeast Asia 1957–1975, 
(Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2008), 22.  
Research indicates that the U.S. operations in Laos were not limited to COIN: there were 
numerous operations (OP ERAWAN, the Auto Defense de choc and Maquis programs, etc.) that 
pre-date the COIN operations that were UW operations, by current doctrinal definitions. See 
Timothy Neil Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao 
Government, 1955–73, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1991) and others. 
143 “Laos: 4 Phases to Nonexistence” Time Magazine, (June 8, 1962).  
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Japanese departure. The Issara government under Prince Phetsarat was 
unwilling to accept a Lao return to subjugation as a French colony, and self 
exiled to Thailand and Vietnam. 
In the northern Lao provinces a movement began that continued 
resistance to the French and supported the Lao Issara nationalist ideals. This 
movement became known as the Pathet Lao (Land of the Lao) and began to 
receive support from another movement allied against the French, the Viet Minh. 
Joint Lao Issara–Viet Minh forces resisted the French reoccupation. Prince 
Souphanouvong, former Prime Minister Prince Phetsarat’s brother, brokered the 
Lao Issara–Viet Minh alliance from safe haven while in exile in Thailand. He later 
broke all ties with the Lao Issara movement when his connection with the Viet 
Minh began to be questioned. 
After their military defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French ability to 
stem the spread of communism in Indochina waned. Popular support for the 
French occupation in the region was also declining. The Geneva Conference of 
1954 effectively ended the first Indochina war; the U.S., USSR, PRC, and France 
all agreed that Laos should be independent and more importantly neutral.144 
Laotian independence suited U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, as long as the new 
government remained non-Communist. Laos, remaining neutral, acted as a 
buffer between Thailand and North Vietnam representing one of the “dominos” in 
the region that President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles  
 
 
                                            
144 Although the U.S. agreed to the accords it did not sign them to prevent being legally 
bound to them.   John P. Glennon, United States Department of State Foreign relations of the 
United States, 1952–1954. The Geneva Conference Volume XVI, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1952–1954, from http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195254v16 (accessed 
on 22 October 2012). 
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were concerned might fall.145  Although the small country had little intrinsic 
strategic value, its geographical location was ground zero for the spreading Cold 
War in Southeast Asia.  
While the Geneva Agreements hastened France’s departure, it also ended 
its funding of the Lao National Army (Armée Nationale Laotienne or ANL) in 
1955.146 When the French declared Laos independent, it was not prepared to 
stand as a separate nation and defend its sovereignty. The small country was 
divided and controlled by the former royal princes. The northern provinces were 
run by the communist Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong while the 
remainder of the country and central government fell under the newly appointed 
Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma his half-brother.  
Anticipating that the communist powers (USSR, PRC, NVN) would not 
honor the accords and limit support to the Laotian Communists, the U.S. began 
to fill the void from the French withdrawal and increased its financial aid 
earmarked for military assistance.147  To manage this increased support the U.S. 
increased the size of the country team and Embassy mission. The United States 
Operations Mission (USOM) was established in the embassy in Vientiane, in 
order to manage the funding it was providing to the newly independent Laotian 
government and the ANL. To assist in the transition the French would leave a 
small contingent of military advisers to help train the ANL, but it would be the 
U.S. who provided the funding.148 
                                            
145 The “domino theory” was a theory during the 1950s to 1980s, that speculated that if one 
state in a region came under the influence of communism, and then the surrounding countries 
would follow in a domino effect. The domino theory was used by successive United States 
administrations during the Cold War to justify the need for American intervention around the 
world. Referring to communism in Indochina, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower put the theory 
into words during an April 7, 1954 news conference. Public Papers of the Presidents, (1954), 382. 
146 Alternately referred to as the Royal Lao Army (FAR), Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: 
The CIA’s Secret War In Laos, (University Press of Kansas, 1995), 17. 
147 Douglas Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Unconventional Warfare in Laos, 1962–
1970. Rand, Santa Monica Ca.  1972. PDF archived on Rand website:  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R919.html, (accessed 16 November 2012). 
148 Shelby L. Stanton, Special Forces at War, 21. 
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In December 1955, as communist forces consolidated power in two 
northern provinces of the country around Prince Souphanouvong, U.S. support to 
the central government grew accordingly. A threatened military coup from the 
communists allowed U.S. backed General Phoumi Nosavan the acting Defense 
Ministry to take power as prime minister. This solidified the U.S. role as the main 
sponsor, effectively replacing the French. The U.S. established a second 
organization to meet the requirements of the new role, the Program Evaluation 
Office (PEO). This new office expanded the nature of the U.S. support to include 
more active, though covert missions.149  Under the 1954 Geneva Accords, an 
overt military organization similar to the Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) in Vietnam was prohibited.150  The PEO filled the role of a Military 
Assistance Advisory Group while still maintaining an outward civilian 
appearance. The PEO was staffed by reserve or retired military personnel and 
active duty military officers given U.S. State Department Foreign Service 
Reserve Officer (FSRO) rank while seconded to the CIA.151  While assigned 
under USOM, the mission of the PEO was to allow the U.S. to assume more 
direct roles against the communists by providing advisors to two efforts:  the 
counter insurgency (COIN) campaign with the ANL in the south, and the UW 
campaign against the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh in the north using indigenous 
                                            
149 Victor Anthony and Richard Sexton, The War in Northern Laos. Air Force History Office, 
1993. PDF archived at website:  
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB248/war_in_northern_laos.pdf, (accessed 16 
November 2012). 6; Stanton, Special Forces at War, 21. 
150 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is a designation for American military 
advisers sent to assist in the training of conventional armed forces of Third World countries. 
Before and during the Vietnam War, there were three of these groups operating in Southeast 
Asia. Though the term is not as widespread as it once was, the term MAAG is still used (as well 
as MILGRPs) in numerous countries. 
151 Older military term used to denote a transfer (of an officer) to another post, often away 
from his parental regimental position [from French en second in second rank (or position)] 
Intelligence term for camouflaging or disguising the true identity of equipment or individuals, 
especially for the use of military equipment or services--including personnel--in clandestine 
intelligence activities, generally under the direction of a nonmilitary sponsor. 
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tribes.152 Using the indigenous tribes was an extension of the French Marquis 
program the CIA-PEO referred to as the Auto-Defense forces. One early PEO 
UW program was project ERAWAN in 1957 designed to covertly train Laotians in 
guerrilla and anti-guerrilla tactics. The training was done at CIA established 
camps across the border in Thailand.153 Thai Special Forces units, especially the 
Police Aerial Reconnaissance Units (PARU), who were organized, trained, and 
advised by the CIA and Special Forces would continue to support UW operations 
in Laos as a third country surrogate.154  
One of the issues in the COIN efforts with the ANL was their reported poor 
training and the lack of willingness to fight on the part of the Laotian soldiers. 
However, the UW campaign, using the Hmong to fight the communist in the north 
and conduct cross border attacks into Vietnam was successful by all reports.  
In November 1958, U.S. Army Brigadier General John A. Heintges 
assumed command of the PEO. His plan, approved by Washington, called for a 
                                            
152 “CIA never promulgated a formal doctrine for operations in the Third World. The working 
assumptions that guided such activity in Laos and Vietnam were shaped first by the tradition of 
OSS support to partisan warfare in World War II and second by the experience of Edward 
Lansdale, an air force officer detailed to CIA, in the campaign against the Huk rebellion in the 
Philippines in the early 1950s. Agency practice in Third World conflict often featured a search for 
a charismatic leader who could mobilize his country’s political and military resources to defeat the 
communists.” Thomas L. Ahem, Jr. UNDERCOVER ARMIES: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos 
1961–1973, (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 
2006), 5. 
153 Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War, 24. 
154 Thailand assumed the role as a conduit for covert CIA operations in Southeast Asia. 
Largely through a dummy business firm, the “Southeast Asian Supply Company,” the CIA began 
training Thai police units in guerrilla warfare by the end of 1951. The Thai National Police (TNP) 
and Police Aerial Reconnaissance Units (PARU) were indispensable liaisons between the 
Americans and Laos, and helped the CIA develop an anti-communist paramilitary force in Laos. 
By 1953 there were some 200 CIA officers (former OSS Asia hands) in Thailand, training the Thai 
in everything from sabotage operations to airborne infiltration. Arne Kislenko, “A Not So Silent 
Partner: Thailand’s Role in Covert Operations, Counter-Insurgency, and the Wars in Indochina,” 
The Journal of Conflict Studies XXIV, No. 1, (2004) This relationship with the Thai led to 
President Eisenhower’s approval of the National Security Council Policy Statement 5429/2 on 20 
August 54, that recommended the U.S. Government provide military and economic assistance to 
the Thais and “concentrate efforts on developing Thailand as a support of U.S. objectives in the 
area and as a focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia.” Timothy 
Neil Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 
1955–73, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1991), 20. 
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drastic expansion of support to the ANL.155  Included in the expansion was the 
authorization for teams of Special Forces who would rotate in on a temporary 
duty cycle,156 working under a CIA front company named Eastern Construction 
Company in Laos (ECCOIL).157  More than a hundred Filipino guerrilla fighters 
working as “construction contractors” accompanied the SF teams.158  The 
Filipinos were former CIA and Special Forces trained Scout Rangers, guerrilla, 
and counter-guerrilla fighters seasoned by a recent anti-communist war in their 




                                            
155 Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) (December 29, 1958) . Office of 
the Historian, Department of State website: 
http://www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958–60v16/d203, (accessed 05 November 
2012).  
156 “Unfortunately, the six-month tours hampered efforts to build foreign language 
proficiency and important professional relationships between the Special Forces soldiers and 
their trainees.” Timothy Neil Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the 
Royal Lao Government, 1955–73, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1991), 49. 
157 “Eastern Construction Company [Filipinos] is a private, Filipino-run employment agency 
designed for unconventional warfare It now furnishes about 500 trained, experienced Filipino 
technicians to the Governments of Vietnam and Laos, under the auspices of MAAGs (MAP) and 
USOMs (CIA activities). Its cadre is mostly either former guerrillas against the Japanese in World 
War II or former Philippine Army personnel. Most of the cadre had extensive combat experience 
against the Communist Huk guerrillas in the Philippines. Excerpts from memorandum from Brig. 
Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 
President Kennedy’s military adviser, on “Resources for Unconventional Warfare, SE. Asia,” 
undated, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, 643–649. 
158 Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Unconventional Warfare in Laos, 9. 
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Lansdale while working for the CIA in the Philippines, and were later brought to 
Laos and Vietnam as third nation U.S. surrogates.159 
General Heintges DoD plan to increase support to the ANL was matched 
by the CIA’s own plan developed by former OSS Para-military officer James “Bill” 
Lair. Earlier while assigned to Thailand, Lair advised the Thai police in a CIA 
program to enhance the organization’s ability to deal with threats from the 
Vietnamese and Lao communists. While working with the Border Police, Lair 
realized the difficulty in getting Thai officers to the remote border areas where the 
Communists owned the territory. When there was an attack by Communist 
guerrillas in the jungles border outstations, it often took a week or more to get 
reinforcements there. In order to solve the problem Lair worked with the Thai 
government to create a para-military police unit the Police Aerial Reinforcement 
Unit (PARU).160 Through the PARU the CIA increased the support, training, and 
advisors to the indigenous tribes. The CIA had begun reaching out to the Lao 
tribes in the hand over from the French Maquis and Auto Defense Programs. 
Called Montagnards “mountain people” by the French, the indigenous tribes were 
made up of Hmong (Meo), Kha, Yao (Lu-Mien), and Lao Theung (Lao 
                                            
159 The man widely believed to have been the model for Alden Pyle in Graham Greene’s 
The Quiet American, Edward G. Lansdale was a Cold War legend. A former advertising executive 
who worked for the OSS and CIA, he was credited during the 1950s with almost single-handedly 
preventing a communist takeover of the Philippines and with helping to install Ngo Dinh Diem as 
president of the American-backed government of South Vietnam. Adding to his notoriety, during 
the Kennedy administration Lansdale was put in charge of Operation Mongoose, the covert plot 
to overthrow the government of Cuba’s Fidel Castro by assassination or other means. Generally 
see Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia 
(New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1991); Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold 
War (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005); Sterling Seagrave, The 
Marcos Dynasty, (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1990). 
The Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946–1948) was a rebellion staged by former HUKBALAHAP or 
Hukbong Laban sa Hapon (Anti-Japanese Army) soldiers against the Philippine Government. It 
started in 1946, after the liberation of the Philippines from Japanese occupation during World War 
II. Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New 
York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1991); Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War 
(Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005). 
160 William M. Leary, CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955–1974, Supporting the “Secret War” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/winter99–00/art7.html#top (accessed on 20 November 2012). 
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Saetern).161 After two months of basic militia training the tribes would form into 
battalions of irregular troops called Special Guerrilla Units. SGUs, normally 
formed along ethnic lines, underwent an additional three months training by 
PARU in Phitsanlok, Thailand. The key to the program was General Vang Pao. A 
talented and ambitious officer, Vang Pao had earlier come to the attention of 
Americans in April 1957, the PEO had selected him to attend a six-month 
counterinsurgency training program at the Scout Ranger Base in Manila. Vang 
Pao’s natural leadership made him ideal to become the head of the CIA and 
Special Forces indigenous army that would be collectively be called the Armée 
Clandestine. 
In order to conduct an operation of this scale the CIA turned to its 
Department of Defense counterpart in unconventional warfare, the U.S. Army 
Special Forces. In July 1959 as part of General Heintges PEO expansion OP 
HOTFOOT (alternately called OP MOLECULAR, OP DISALLOW, and OP 
AMBIDEXTROUS) was approved and tasked to support both the COIN and the 
UW missions.162  LTC Arthur “Bull” Simons a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, 
was selected as its first commander. LTC Simons would become best known as 
the commander of OP KINGPIN, the attempted rescue of American POWs from 
a North Vietnamese prison camp in Son Tay.163  
                                            
161 Hmong (also called Mong or Meo) are an Asian ethnic group from the mountainous 
regions of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Hmong are also one of the sub-groups of the 
Miao ethnicity in southern China. Hmong groups began a gradual southward migration in the 18th 
century due to political unrest and to find more arable land. Because the Hmong lived mainly in 
the highland areas of Southeast Asia and China, the French occupiers of Southeast Asia gave 
them the name Montagnards or “mountain people,” but this should not be confused with the 
Degar people of Vietnam, who were also referred to as Montagnards. 
162 While under current doctrine these two missions are separate and clearly defined during 
the 1950s and early 60s the terms were often used interchangeable. Therefore, while some 
accounts and documents refer to the operation as COIN and others refer to it as UW, research 
can now can delineate between them based on the missions goals and recognize that it was not 
one or the other but both. 
163 Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid: The Son Tay Prison Rescue Mission, (New York, NY: 
Ballantine Books, 2002). 
 81
Simons recruited Special Forces soldiers from the Fort Bragg; NC based 
77th Special Forces Group164 to man the operation. After a period of selection 
and training for the mission, seven SF “A-Teams” (ODA’s) deployed, 
accompanied by a support staff. They left sans fanfare, in civilian clothes by way 
of CIA proprietary Air America airlines to Laos and began conducting operations.  
As attack and counter attack began to happen throughout the country, 
moral objections began to be raised against what had become in fact a Laotian 
civil war. On 9 August 1960, the commanding officer of the elite Second 
Paratroop Battalion of the ANL seized power in Vientiane. Captain Kong Le 
announced to the world powers involved that Laos was returning to a policy of 
neutrality demanding that Prince Souvanna Phouma be reinstated as the rightful 
Prime Minister. The king agreed to his demands but the U.S. backed General 
Phoumi former defense minister refused to acknowledge Prince Phouma as the 
rightful ruler and withdrew to central Laos where he fomented opposition to the 
new government. Kong Le began to receive support from the USSR, showcasing 
a Soviet brand of spreading communism looking to become more proactive in 
South East Asia. The U.S. continued to back General Phoumi now consolidating 
power in central Laos and four months later, in December of 1960; U.S. Special 
Forces advised ANL units under General Phoumi recaptured the capital. In a 
violent three-day battle, the U.S. backed units forced Kong Le to retreat. Kong Le 
escaped, via Soviet aircraft, to the communist controlled sanctuary of northern 
Laos.165 
As the fighting with the communists increased, and the U.S. Special 
Forces and CIA advisors became more directly involved in combat operations, 
the difficulty in hiding U.S. involvement became more difficult as combat 
casualties began to raise questions. In 1961 the U.S. publically acknowledged 
                                            
164 Redesigned as the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) on 20 May 1960 COL Donald 
Blackburn, one of the founders of Special Forces along with McClure, Volckmann, and Banks, 
commanded the 77th SF Group and choose Bull Simmons for the first rotation in to Laos. Mike 
Guardia, Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D. Blackburn-Guerrilla Leader and 
Special Forces Hero, (New York, NY: Casemate Pub, 2011). 
165 Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Unconventional Warfare in Laos, 4. 
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the military advisory efforts in Laos. An overt Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) was established, effectively replacing the clandestine PEO. The MAAG 
was openly assigned to the embassy and, to the public, its mission focused more 
on COIN than the UW side of the operation. OP HOTFOOT was renamed OP 
WHITE STAR.166 In December 1961, in an effort to harass the enemy’s bases 
and primary overland resupply route in the Laotian plateau, the Special Forces 
advisors shifted away from their primary mission with the ANL and began training 
Kha tribesman under Operation PINCUSHION.167 
One year later, in 1962, a second Geneva accord was signed by the 
stakeholders agreeing to cease open military involvement in Laos. This forced a 
return to a more low visibility approach by the U.S.. The week before the 
deadline to remove its troops, 666 U.S. military personnel left Laos through UN 
checkpoints manned by International Control Commission (ICC) observers. This 
ended the acknowledged U.S. military operations in Laos. The overt MAAG was 
replaced with an organization similar to the former PEO, the USAID 
“Requirements Office,” which continued the ongoing clandestine activities. 
Following the MAAGs departure, all remaining military advisers were attached to 
the U.S. embassy in Vientiane as military attachés under a CIA program called 
“Project 404.”  
In 1963, in response to an increase of NVA regulars in Laos, the Kennedy 
administration authorized the CIA to increase the size of the Hmong army. 
Almost a year later, 20,000 Hmong, led by CIA paramilitary (PM) officers and SF 
soldiers, conducted guerrilla operations:  destroying Viet Minh supply depots, 
ambushing trucks, mining roads, and generally harassing the stronger enemy 
force. This increase allowed for follow on operations designed to interdict 
Communist logistical lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail under the Studies and 
                                            
166 The terms “operation” (OP) and “project” were interchangeable in both HOTFOOT and 
WHITE STAR, existing records and first hand accounts use both depending on the time period 
and the source. This would become more standardized with the CIA developing cryptonyms for 
country codes and operations in the following years.  
167 Stanton, Special Forces at War, 22. 
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Observations Group (SOG).168  Made up of select Special Forces volunteers, 
many who transferred from OP WHITESTAR, SOG’s initial mission was to take 
over the clandestine agent cross-border program that the CIA had been running 
for several years against North Vietnam. Ultimately the CIA ended its operations 
in Laos after the 1973 peace agreements were signed. 
History is inconclusive if the “Secret War” in Laos was the tipping point for 
the U.S. in Southeast Asia. Laos was the unconventional warfare operation that 
became a successful handing off point, passing the baton from the OSS legacy 
officers to the next generation of men who would fill the CIA and Special Forces. 
With over a decade of involvement, the shared experiences from Laos became 
the pool of knowledge for techniques, tactics, and networking that would shape a 
new legacy of unconventional warfare capabilities.  
3. Analysis 
The following sections of this chapter will highlight significant factors that 
were influential in the decision to embark on unconventional warfare operations 
in Laos in contrast to the other two general options of no military action, or 
conventional military action. These factors are categorized into internal enablers, 
internal constraints, external enablers, and external constraints.169   
a. Decision Point 
In order to better analyze the environment in which decision makers 
supported unconventional warfare in Laos, the decision point must be identified. 
                                            
168 John Plaster, SOG: The Secret War’s of America’s Commandos in Vietnam, NAL Trade; 
Reprint edition (New York, NY: New American Library, 2010); Roger Warner, Shooting at the 
Moon: The Story of America’s Clandestine War in Laos, 1st. paperback edition (Hanover, NH: 
Steerforth; 1998). 
169 Enablers are arguments for action, either oppose no military action, or support UW over 
conventional military action. Constraints are arguments for no action, or they argue for the use of 
conventional military action over UW.   The internal domain is that which is driven by the U.S.. 
This is a function of popular opinion or support (important due to the U.S. status as a democracy), 
capability, capacity, or leadership. The external domain is that outside of the U.S.. This includes 
the “targeted country’s” internal activities and circumstance, world events and reaction, and, 
perhaps the most heavily weighted, peer competitors’ actions, capacity, and capability. 
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In the case of Laos, the two periods that surround the decision point are 1957, 
and 1959 and are representative of two different levels in input, throughput, and 
output. The left of the decision point, captures the essence of a continued 
steady-state level of activity, initiated with the establishment of the Program 
Evaluation Office in 1955 and continued through 1957. Although not a definitive 
shaping event, in 1957 the PEO initiated project ERAWAN to train Laotians in 
guerilla and anti-guerilla tactics in Thailand. This marks a point prior to increased 
allocation of resources on behalf of the U.S. Additionally, an external event that 
shaped or necessitated a decision was the increased activity in Laos by the 
Pathet Lao to support Viet Minh efforts in building a logistical support structure 
that affected the on-going insurgency in South Vietnam. The two routes to move 
personnel between the North and South Vietnam, primarily used by the north to 
prepare for the upcoming elections, were by sea on the east coast and by land 
through Laos. As the U.S. Navy began interdictions, the overland route in Laos 
saw an increase in activity. The post-decision period is marked by the 
deployment of Special Forces “A” teams, led by LTC Simons, and the initiation of 
Operation HOT FOOT in 1959. In 1960, the short lived success of the Kong Le  
coup marked an increased in enemy activity, but SF advised units cleared the 
capital and drove Kong Le from power, marking an increase in capability for the 
ANL.  
The two operations, ERAWAN in 1957 and HOT FOOT in 1959, 
serve as bookends, framing the decision point that occurred roughly during 1958. 
The first actions taken that indicate a decision was made were the appointment 
of General Heintges to take over the PEO, and the approval of the plan he 
carried in hand. This was subsequently recorded in history by the memorandum 
from the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Kocher, to the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Robertson, dated December 
29, 1958. The “Heintges Plan” marks an increase in activity in Laos, on behalf of 
the U.S., however, it was a supporting effort to CIA and DoS efforts. The same 
year CIA PM officer Bill Lair also proposed the increase of the indigenous tribal 
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operations started by the French. The recruitment of Vang Pao and increase 
from the Maquis or Auto-Defense militias into the SGUs and the Armée 
Clandestine show a marked increase as well (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Decision Point Timeline for Laos 
b. Internal Enablers 
Establishing an Interventionist Strategy.  The outbreak of 
Korean War on June 25, 1950 marked a sustained U.S. commitment towards 
containment. The North Korean attack on South Korea increased the U.S. 
determination to resist communism. It brought U.S. attention towards Asia and 
also Southeast Asia. The French struggle in Indochina began to be seen as an 
integral part of the containment of communism. 
The decision to increase U.S. involvement in Indochina was put in 
motion on April 24, 1950 when President Truman approved National Security 
Council (NSC) 64. The policy took the position that the U.S. should take all 
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practicable measures in order to prevent any further communist expansion in 
Southeast Asia. Indochina, the key area of Southeast Asia, was perceived to be 
under immediate threat. Under Eisenhower’s administration NSC 162/2 was 
made policy on 30 October 1953. It reiterated that Indochina was of such 
strategic importance by stating that an attack on it would “compel the United 
States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack, or generally 
against the military power of the aggressors.”170 Additionally, President 
Eisenhower’s policy underscored by NSC 162/2 would deemed U.S. influence in 
the third world as critical in countering the growth of Soviet expansion and 
influence. Identifying neutral countries and convincing them to join the U.S. in a 
stand against Communism was a prime effort for the DoS. NSC 162/2 identified 
Indochina as key terrain and had shaping effects on the operations that would 
begin in Laos.171  
The Operation Supported A Marketable Narrative.  The “second 
Red scare,” occurred in the United States from 1950–56 and was led by 
Wisconsin’s Senator Joseph McCarthy. Thousands of Americans were accused 
of communism, subversion, and espionage, indicative of the fear the public held 
that the Soviets were winning the ideological battle against democracy and 
capitalism. The anti-communism narrative clutched the American public and 
supplemented U.S. national policy that was aimed to counter and meet the 
challenges posed by the Soviets and the Communist Chinese. In Laos, the 
neutralist faction was being challenged by the pro-communist faction, an easy 
fight to justify American support. Based on the popular stance against 
communism in the U.S., it was not a hard sell to the American public that the 
U.S. should support this fledgling country in its confrontation with communism.172 
                                            
170 A report to the National Security Council, dated October 30th, 1953, 9 section 13.b 
Retrieved from website: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162–2.pdf, (accessed 06 
November 2012). 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ellen Schrecker, The Age Of Mccarthyism: A Brief History With Documents “The Growth 
of the Anti-Communist Network,”(Boston: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) 
http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/anticom-network.html, (accessed 25 November 2012). 
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UW Experienced Individuals Influential to the President.  The 
Dulles brothers both held key positions within the Eisenhower cabinet. In addition 
to the ease in cooperation that would trickle down to their respective 
subordinates, many who were part of the OSS legacy, their collaborative efforts 
brought successes from TP AJAX in Iran in 1953 and continued through PB 
SUCCESS in Guatemala circa 1954 and beyond.173   
UW Successes Increased Influence on Decision Makers.  The 
“successful” covert operations led by the CIA began with the coup in Iran in 
protection of British and French oil companies named TP AJAX. Following Iran 
was the more challenging but equally successful PB SUCCESS, waged in 
Guatemala from 1952–54.174   Operations ST CIRCUS and BARNUM in Tibet, 
developing simultaneously with the operations in Laos, were another sign of CIA 
capability.   This building reliance brought credibility to the agency and their 
abilities, and, coupled with Eisenhower’s policies (such as NSC 162/2), these 
types of operations were just the answer for a tough stance on Communism and 
ratcheting down on U.S. spending. Edward Lansdale’s success in the Philippines 
fighting the Communist Huk Rebellion and the third party Filipino Scout Ranger 
surrogates the ECCOIL, Bill Lairs success in Thailand (with Wild Bill Donovan as 
Ambassador) led to the development of the Thai PARU another key third nation 
surrogate force used in Laos. 
Experienced UW Organization Existed.  As discussed in the 
analysis of Tibet, the decommissioning of the OSS provided a large body of 
civilian and military personnel, with institutionalized knowledge and experience, 
to migrate into the CIA and other military units. Key personnel, from case officers, 
regional desk officers, and directors in the CIA were shaped by their experience 
during the partisan warfare campaign of World War II. Similarly, Colonel Aaron 
Banks, former member of the OSS, became the first commander of the Army’s 
                                            
173 Nicholas Cullather. Operation PBSUCCESS:  The United States and Guatemala 1952–
1954.  (Washington DC: History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1994). 
174 Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS. 
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Special Forces in 1952.175  Banks, as well as Volckmann and Blackburn, brought 
World War II and Korean War partisan warfare experience to the new unit.176  
Laos would become one of the first testing grounds for the new military unit. The 
resident knowledge that transferred from the OSS to the CIA and Army Special 
Forces would enhance the viability of a UW option in Laos, namely by the 
credibility that most of these men had from their World War II days. Many of the 
CIA Para-military officers, Bill Lair, Tony Poe and others as well as many of the 
Special Forces soldiers; Donald Blackburn, Jon Singlaub were in the OSS or 
resistance groups in Word War II. 
A New Army Capability.  By expanding throughput, a greater 
potential output is generated. By developing Army Special Forces, and specific 
capabilities, it is said the intentions to use them are built too. In 1952, Colonel 
Aaron Bank assumed command of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). 
This unit, and the subsequent SF Groups that would follow, was designed to 
maximize capability in partisan warfare. Current day fact sheets from U.S. Army 
Special Forces Command (Airborne) state, “The cornerstone of the SF Group’s 
capability is the Operational Detachment-Alpha or ODA, a team of twelve Special 
Forces “Green Berets.” Cross-trained in weapons, communications, intelligence, 
medicine, and engineering, the ODA member also possesses specialized 
language and cultural training.”177 Since the Army had developed this new 
capability, its own “para-military” force to fight alongside or against guerilla 
forces; the concept was only waiting to be proven in battle. Laos would prove an 
opportune environment.  
                                            
175 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Beret:  The Birth of Special Forces.  (Presidio, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1986). 
176 Mike Guardia, American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann, 
(Casemate Pub; 2010), and Mike Guardia, Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D. 
Blackburn-Guerrilla Leader and Special Forces Hero, (New York, NY: Casemate, 2011). 
177 U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) Fact Sheet 
http://www.soc.mil/UNS/Fact%20Sheets/USASFC.pdf, (accessed 05 November 2012). 
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c. External Enablers 
External Conditions Necessitated U.S. Action Based On 
Interventionist Strategy.  U.S. State and Defense Departments assessment 
was that the Russian, Chinese, and North Vietnamese, were not honoring the 
Geneva Agreements of 1954, therefore, the Eisenhower administration decided 
to bolster American influence in Laos with a substantial influx of foreign aid, and 
also not honoring the accords. As early as 1958, the Pathet Lao and North 
Vietnamese Army forces began seizing key terrain in Laos to support a vast 
resupply network to infiltrate men, supplies, and equipment into South 
Vietnam.178  The Ho Chi Minh Trail bypassed the direct route over the border 
from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Instead, the trail system traveled 
westward, through the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia. The numerous 
offshoots then spilled into South Vietnam, crossing the border from “neutral 
countries” and, designed or not, legally precluded the direct interdiction by the 
U.S. due to sovereignty issues. The trail system would receive more use by the 
North Vietnamese due to U.S. naval interdiction in the Gulf of Tonkin, limiting 
maritime resupply routes into South Vietnam.   As the neighboring Vietnam 
Conflict was gaining more U.S. attention, force escalation grew. After the first 
introduction of U.S. advisors under President Truman in 1950, the expansion of 
advisors tripled from 760 in 1959 to 3205 in 1961, and again in 1962 reaching a 
total of 11,300 advisors. U.S. forces began a “combat role” in 1965, and reached 
a high water mark during 1968, with over 536,000 U.S. troops on the ground in 
South Vietnam.179   
In 1958, roughly the decision point to expand operations in Laos, 
the Vietnam Conflict was gaining momentum. According to Douglas Blaufarb in a 
Rand sponsored study for the Department of Defense, “U.S. goals were to unify 
all non-Communist political groups and to strengthen them militarily and 
                                            
178 John Prados, The Blood Road, (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 24. 
179 Allied Troop Levels: Vietnam 1960–1973. From 25th Aviation website:  
http://25thaviation.org/facts/id430.htm#allied_troop_levels___vietnam_1960_to , (accessed 05 
November 2012). 
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economically to a point where Laos would become a firm Anti-communist 
“bastion” on the border of China and Vietnam.”180 
The Covert Nature of UW Allows U.S. Circumvention.  UW 
remained a military option in Laos and was favored based on the 1954 Accords. 
While the U.S. did not sign the Geneva Accords of 1954 that ushered France out 
of the colonial business in Indochina, it did agree to respect the terms of the 
agreements. Overtly, the U.S. could not provide the support it believed was 
required to stop the spread of communism to neighboring Thailand, Cambodia, 
and South Vietnam, precluding mass mobilization and deployments of 
conventional forces to deter the Communists. UW could affect conditions 
necessary to achieve this; it allowed the United States, in Laos to circumvent the 
1954 Geneva Accords. Reasoning to self impose the agreements may have 
been out of fear that other signatories of the 54 accords would use U.S. actions 
as grounds to break agreements. Nevertheless, the U.S. was able to continue 
shaping/influencing conditions in Laos via the covert nature of UW. 
d. Internal Constraints 
U.S. Capacity.  Due to the requirements of standing forces in 
Western Europe to keep the USSR at bay, and maintaining a force capable to 
answer any resumption of military activity on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. 
conventional military forces were stretched thin. The New Look policy was 
shifting the emphasis of new growth into nuclear deterrence and capability away 
from cost prohibitive standing ground forces.181  This led to limitations in 
conventional ground forces available for deployment in Laos.   Additionally, the 
public was largely unwilling to openly engage in another war on the “Asian 
Landmass.”  Many Americans were uncomfortable with the “draw” in Korea and 
believed all wars should end like World War II –unconditional surrender. 
                                            
180 Douglas Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Unconventional Warfare in Laos, (Santa 
Monica, CA: Advanced Research Projects Agency, Rand,1972), 2. 
181 Wolk, “The New Look.” 
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e. External Constraints 
Legality.  The signatories of the 1954 Geneva Accord pledged to 
respect Laotian neutrality, to refrain from interference, direct or indirect, in the 
internal affairs of Laos, and to refrain from drawing Laos into military alliance or 
to establish military bases in Laotian territory.182    
Escalation.  The Soviet and U.S. strategy and capacity was 
centered on mutually assured destruction through a complex nuclear arsenal 
delivered by both sides. Communist regional escalation could, in turn, draw 
Soviet support thus effectively raising the risk of potential nuclear war. This would 
limit U.S. activity in Laos to unconventional warfare and preclude the introduction 
of conventional ground forces to the situation.   
Instigating China.  U.S. conventional forces, if introduced in Laos, 
could have prodded PRC massing on their shared border with Laos. As seen in 
the Korean conflict, PRC intent to maintain a buffer between their own and U.S. 
conventional forces in Laos could further strain regional powers, pushing them 
closer to a conventional clash. The introduction of U.S. conventional forces in 
Laos, therefore, came at additional costs-beyond those of mobilization, 
deployment, and logistic demands. 
4. Summary 
In Laos, unconventional warfare was approved for internal reasons such 
as policy, specifically NSC 162/2, as well as the same fiscal constraints seen in 
the case of Tibet, imposed by the modernization initiated by Eisenhower’s “New 
Look.” Further, the winning record enjoyed by the CIA since Iran, the opportunity 
to battle-test the Army’s new Special Forces capability, and the OSS legacy, now 
emerging also in the ranks of the Special Forces, potentially drove decision 
makers to embark on a UW campaign in Laos. Externally, the increased regional 
U.S. activity in Southeast Asia, the legal imperative precluding conventional 
                                            
182 Douglas Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Unconventional Warfare in Laos, (Santa 
Monica, CA: Advanced Research Projects Agency, Rand,1972), 1. 
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military intervention, and the need to set conditions in Laos to shape the greater 
region provided ample justification for intervention by unconventional warfare.   
In this chapter, a case of synthetic-resistance has been examined, the 
next chapter will follow the case selection of UW in Nicaragua, an example of 
Organic -Revolution. Nicaragua occurred late in the Cold War, after the Vietnam 
War, and after changes in legislation altered the way unconventional warfare was 
waged by the U.S. 
 93
D. CASE IV:  NICARAGUA 1981–1986183 
1. Introduction 
U.S. support for the Contra rebels in their efforts to overthrow the 
Sandinista Nicaraguan government is a well-known chapter in U.S. history, and 
yet is often overlooked as a case of U.S.-sponsored unconventional warfare. 
Many lessons learned and operational experience from the U.S. unconventional 
warfare campaign and support of the Nicaragua Contras is overshadowed by the 
questionable activities that are associated with this operation. This case was 
selected as representative of Organic-Revolution movements, and is the only 
Latin American case in this work. The Nicaraguan rebels had a long legacy of 
internal power struggles and revolts prior to the U.S. involvement. However, 
despite being an internal conflict, U.S. sponsorship was provided in order to 
shape regional affairs in support of U.S. interests. 
The Nicaragua UW operation happened toward the latter part of the Cold 
War, giving the study a wider range of possible variables that may not have been 
present in earlier cases. By the start of Nicaragua, both the CIA and Special 
Forces were at the height of their levels of experience in unconventional warfare. 
Both organizations still had their share of “old Asia hands” those who earned 
their experience in Vietnam and Laos, as well as those that participated in a 
number of other UW operations in the Cold War. Unlike earlier cases in this work, 
which followed closer to the victory of World War II Nicaragua takes place after 
the U.S. withdrew from South Vietnam.  
2. Background 
Located midway between Mexico and Colombia, Nicaragua is a small 
nation bordered by Honduras to the north and Costa Rica to the south. 
Nicaragua had a violent history of external powers vying for control of its natural 
                                            
183 While the dates listed 1981–1986 reflect the dates of the U.S. sponsorship in the UW 
campaign, the relationships developed prior with the Hondurans and Argentinians allowed for 
safe havens and third nation advisors who were vital to the initial plan. 
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resources and attempting to break the will of its population. First conquered by 
the Spanish in the early 16th century, it became a protectorate of the United 
Kingdom from 1655 to 1850, was ruled by an American that declared himself 
king in 1856, and then occupied by the U.S. from 1912 to 1933. Nicaragua 
entered the 20th century with a legacy of revolutionary warfare.184 
When the U.S. military departed in 1933 they left behind a loyal U.S. 
trained Guardia Nacional (National Guard), a combined military and police force. 
Together with the Somoza family dictatorship, the National Guard kept power for 
the next fifty years through brutal methods. The 1979 assassination of a 
journalist, who was critical of the regime, set off a protest that could not be put 
down. Backed by the Cubans, the Sandinista National Liberation Front  (Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, or FSLN), commonly known as the 
Sandinistas, ousted the Somoza regime in a violent revolution and established a 
new communist government in the city of Managua.185 Within the first year, 
several opposition groups sprung up to revolt against the communist Sandinista 
government.186 The largest of these groups was made up of former National 
                                            
184  William Walker was a U.S. lawyer, journalist and adventurer, who organized several 
private military expeditions into Latin America, with the intention of establishing English-speaking 
colonies under his personal control, an enterprise then known as “filibustering.” Walker became 
ruler of the Republic of Nicaragua in 1856 and ruled until 1857, when he was defeated by a 
coalition of Central American armies, principally Costa Rica’s army. 
By the definitions outlined in this research the U.S. sponsored UW operation against the 
Nicaragua FSLN is categorized as organic and revolutionary, throughout this chapter source 
terms such as insurgency or guerrilla may be used to keep integrity with source material, 
however, these terms are not to be confused with the definitions as explained in the methods 
section of this research. 
http://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-nicaragua.php 
(accessed on 28 October 2012). 
185 Cuban assistance was involved in uniting the Sandinista movement, providing arms, 
training and intelligence and played a significant role in building an internal security apparatus 
modeled after the Cuban system under Castro. See John Norton Moore, The Secret War in 
Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order (Frederick: University Publications of 
America, 1987), p. 11. Edgar Chamorro, International Court Justice Case Concerning Military And 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States of America), 5 
September 1985, 2. 
186 Christopher Paul, et al. “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers,” Detailed Counterinsurgency 
Case Studies, (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 67. 
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Guard soldiers, exiled and living across the border in Honduras.187 Poorly 
equipped and unorganized, the former guardsmen survived by raiding small 
villages and stealing cattle.  
The U.S. saw the FSLN takeover of Nicaragua as a stepping-stone for a 
larger Communist expansion in Latin America. The potential for Communists 
establishing a base on the mainland of Central America, if realized, represented 
the worst of Cold War fears.188 President Carter initially tried to influence the new 
Nicaraguan government by providing $99 million USD in foreign aid as an 
attempt to turn them pro-U.S.. The FSLN responded by openly signing economic, 
cultural, technological, and scientific agreements with the USSR. President 
Carter, prompted by the FSLN agreements, then authorized the CIA to take 
limited steps in organizing any organic resistance movement, through the use of 
propaganda, and specifically prohibited armed action.189  
In 1981, Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as the 40th president of the 
United States. Clear on his stance against Communism, President Reagan took 
two steps towards Nicaragua; first, he cut off all foreign aid from the U.S. to the 
Sandinista Government, and second, he signed a Presidential finding authorizing 
paramilitary covert action.190  While there were those in the administration that 
felt otherwise the Presidents biggest supporter was his former campaign 
                                            
187 It is generally acknowledged that as of 1980 there were five separate Sandinista 
resistance groups. While most sources claim the National Guard (Somoza Guardia) was the 
largest, other sources claim MILPAS (Militias Populores Anti-Sandinistas) was larger and better 
trained. See Timothy Charles Brown, The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in 
Nicaragua, (University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 4. 
188 Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA, (New York, NY: Scribner, 
1997), 195. 
189  In November 1979, President Carter issued a covert action finding authorizing training 
and other resources for moderate elements in El Salvador resisting these guerilla elements. 
Derived from Global Security website, “Central America 1979–86.”  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/centam.htm Accessed 12 November 2012. Also Bob 
Woodward, Veil: Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987, (New York NY: Simon and Shuster, 1987), 
113. 
190 Ronald Reagan, Secret Presidential Finding, from the National Security Archive’s 
Nicaragua collection, Dated 1 December 1981, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/nicaragua/nicaragua.html#LIST, (accessed on 22 
October 2012). 
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manager and director of the CIA William Casey.191 Shortly after taking office, 
Reagan appointed Casey as Director of Central Intelligence. Stansfield Turner, 
the former director who Casey replaced dubbed it the ‘Resurrection of Wild Bill’, 
referring to Bill Donovan, the head of OSS in World War II192 Casey was the last 
OSS member to lead the CIA and drove a re-expansion of the funding, 
personnel, and covert activity levels greater than those existing in the preceding 
Carter Administration.   
Given the green light under Casey, the CIA established contact with the 
Union Democratica Nicaraguenese (UDN) a Nicaraguan political group in exile, 
actively lobbying for support in Miami. The CIA convinced them to help the CIA 
merge the numerous resistance groups, all fighting the Sandinista FSLN forces, 
into one entity. The Nicaraguan Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ADREN) and 
its military arm, the 15th of September Legion,193 was made up of former 
National guardsmen and the Segovian highlander peasants, known as the 
Militias Populares Anti-Somolistas (people’s Anti-Somoza Militias, or MILPAs).194  
In early 1982 the UDN and the ADREN joined to become the Fuerza 
Democrática Nicaragüense or Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). Initially, the 
new organization continued to use the name 15th of September Legion for the 
organization’s military arm, but would soon refer to themselves as Comandos. In 
the U.S. they would be known as the Contras.195 
                                            
191 Secretary of State Alexander Haig was a supporter of conventional warfare actions 
against Nicaragua. See John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, (New York, NY: William Morrow & 
Co, 1986), 398. 
192 Turner was critical of Casey and intended the comments to be an insult rather than a 
compliment. From Stansfield Turner, Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret 
Intelligence (New York: Hyperion, 2005),191, 195–196. 
193 15th of September is generally celebrated as Nicaraguan Independence Day. 
194 Brown, Contra War, 13. 
195 The term “contra” comes from the Spanish contra, which means against but in this case 
is short for la contra-revolucion, in English “the counter-revolution.” Some rebels disliked being 
called contras, feeling that it defined their cause only in negative terms, or implied a desire to 
restore the old order. Rebel fighters usually referred to themselves as comandos (commandos); 
peasant sympathizers also called the rebels los primos (the cousins). From the mid-1980s, as the 
Reagan administration and the rebels sought to portray the movement as the “democratic 
resistance,” members described themselves as la Resistencia. 
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Initially the CIA worked through third nation proxies. Argentina provided 
trainers and combat advisers, Honduras allowed the Contras to use its border 
areas as safe haven operating base for the guerrilla force, and Israel provided 
both trainers and the contacts for arms sales.196 The initial Contra operations into 
Nicaragua consisted of hit-and-run missions. Their first success, in March of the 
same year, FDN saboteurs blew up two vital bridges in northern Nicaragua at Rio 
Negro and Ocotal.  
Although outside of the local area of Nicaragua, the Falklands War began 
on 2 April 1982, and was a shaping event. Argentine troops landed in the 
Falkland Islands in an effort to retake the island, resulting in a war against Britain. 
Argentine intelligence officers had been working with the CIA to help train, but 
not fund, the Contras in Nicaragua. The Argentine government believed it might 
be rewarded for this activity by non-interference on the part of the U.S. in the 
conflict. In the end the U.S. gave full support to the UK, critics of the U.S. role 
claimed that, by failing to side with Argentina, the U.S. violated its own Monroe 
Doctrine.197  When the Argentinians withdrew their support the CIA began to take 
a more active role in training and advising the Contras.198   
                                            
196 Israel has denied their official involvement however several of the known principles in the 
arms sales and contacts between the CIA and Argentina and later Iran were known “former” 
Mossad agents. See generally Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, Jane Hunter, The Iran-
Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era, (Cambridge: South End 
Press, 1987); Bob Woodward, Veil: Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987, (New York: Simon and 
Shuster, 1987), 117. 
197 BBC documentary, The Falklands War and the White House. David R. Mares, Violent 
Peace, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001),156. 
198 Edgar Chamorro, International Court Justice Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States of America), 5 September 1985, 
7. 
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There was a difference in how the President and Congress viewed the 
mission. According to the Reagan Doctrine,199 the U.S. could “roll back” and 
diminish Soviet influence around the world by providing overt or covert support to 
anti-communist movements, assisting them to “free themselves.”   However, 
Congress was fearful that increased support in Nicaragua would start an all-out 
war between the numerous Latin American states involved, reminiscent of the 
escalation in Vietnam. While Congress was unable to completely stop U.S. 
support to the Contras without passing new laws, they could amend legislation to 
limit the CIA’s funding and how it would be used. The Boland Amendment, 
named for the Massachusetts Democrat Representative who authored it, was a 
series of three U.S. legislative amendments passed between 1982 and 1984, in 
an attempt to reign in U.S. activity in Nicaragua. The first Boland Amendment 
was to the House Appropriations Bill of 1982, and was attached as a rider to the 
Defense Appropriations Act of 1983. The House of Representatives passed the 
Defense Appropriations Act 411–0 on December 8, 1982 and was signed into 
law by President Ronald Reagan on December 21, 1982.200  The amendments 
attempted to limit U.S. government assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua by 
limiting how money would be spent and the amount.   They limited the CIA’s 
involvement on interdicting the FSLN support for El Salvadorian rebel groups, 
specifically prohibiting funds to be used for overthrowing the Sandinista 
                                            
199 The Reagan Doctrine was a strategy orchestrated and implemented by the United States 
under the Reagan Administration to oppose the global influence of the Soviet Union during the 
final years of the Cold War. While the doctrine lasted less than a decade, it was the centerpiece 
of United States foreign policy from the early 1980s until the end of the Cold War in 1991. The 
counter argument to this doctrine was that most Third World struggles take place in arenas and 
involve issues far removed from legitimate American security needs. U.S. involvement in such 
conflicts expands the republic’s already overextended commitments without achieving any 
significant prospective gains. U.S. covert policy in Nicaragua was an application of the Reagan 
administration’s doctrine of “low-intensity-conflict” (LIC) that depended upon the successful 
integration and coordination of U.S. covert political, economic, diplomatic and military actions. 
The roots of low-intensity-conflict can be traced to the late 1950s and early 1960s, with full 
expression in the counterinsurgency doctrines of the Kennedy administration. In order to 
accomplish its containment tasks, the United States had to adopt a novel approach involving the 
entire civilian and military foreign affairs apparatus. Special Forces who have intensive training 
and experience in insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare have carried out the bulk of U.S. 
low- intensity-conflict missions. 
200 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) From: 
http://redbook.gao.gov/14/fl0067296.php, (assessed on 22 October 2012). 
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government. Until the withdrawal of the Argentinian advisers, the CIA’s support to 
the Contras was limited to training, directing operations, and air support. In a 
throwback to operations in Laos, the CIA used contracted “civilian” aircraft for 
reconnaissance, to move small elements around the dense jungle battlefield, and 
to airdrop supplies to Contras operating in Sandinista held territory the most well 
known of these air operations were run by Southern Air Transport (SAT).201 
Over the first term of the Reagan administration, the Contras grew from 
less than a thousand members, to a force of twenty thousand. The CIA brought 
in weapons and supplies, established logistical infrastructure, provided 
intelligence and training, as well as general overall strategic planning. The rebel’s 
first trial by fire was during major combat operations, launched from their 
Honduran safe haven, into northern Nicaragua. Although earlier guerrilla, small 
unit, and hit-and–run attacks were successful, the CIA’s attempt to transition the 
force to more conventional operations was a failure.202  The Contra offensive met 
heavy FSLN resistance. Despite the CIA-led training and planning of the 
operation, the Contras, over a thousand strong, were forced to scatter and 
retreat. FSLN regular forces pursued them to the northern border but did not 
cross into Honduras.203 
In February 1983, the U.S. began to conduct joint military exercises in 
Honduras; BIG PINE, followed by BIG PINE II and III, UNIVERSAL TREK, and 
                                            
201 Southern Air Transport (SAT) airlines. SAT was a CIA proprietary airline similar to the 
CIA Southeast Asia airlines CAT air, which began as a support mechanism for operations in Tibet 
in the 1950s (ST BARNUM), but is best known for the support for CIA operations in Laos under 
its newer name Air America. SAT airlines were the vehicle of choice for both the private contra 
aid operation, and the delivery of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985–86. John Prados, Presidents Secret 
Wars, 402. 
202 Numerous sources cite this fail to transition. Edgar Chamorro one of the principle leaders 
of the Contras wrote, “By the end of 1982, we were ready t o launch our first major military 
offensive designed to take and hold Nicaraguan territory, which the C.I.A. urging us to do. Our 
principal objective was the town of Jalapa in northern Nicaragua. More than 1,000 of our fighters 
were involved, and we used light artillery supplied by the C.I.A. in combat for the first time.” Edgar 
Chamorro, “International Court Justice Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua” (Nicaragua vs. United States of America, 5 September 1985), 7. 
203 Edgar Chamorro, “International Court Justice Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua” (Nicaragua vs. United States of America, 5 September 1985), 
7–8. 
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NEW HORIZONS. While these “exercises” helped to develop the relationship 
with pro-U.S. partner nations in the region, they also allowed the CIA to use other 
funding and authorities earmarked for Defense Department exercises to build 
critical infrastructure that could be used to support the Contras as well. Airfields 
for CIA-SAT air support, a radar communications site south of Tegucigalpa, and 
the Regional Training Center (Centro Regional de Entrenamiento Militar, or 
CREM) that would be home to the DoD’s semi-permanent presence in the region 
the Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo), were all funded under bilateral 
exercises.204 
The Regional Training Center was established to provide “ground force” 
training to pro-U.S. partner nations in the Southern Command (SouthCom) area 
of operations. In addition to the support personnel, CREM was assigned a 
hundred man Special Forces adviser Mobile Training Team (MTT) element.   
Normally broken down into four to six man operational teams, the MTT was 
tasked to support various guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations.205    
The CIA’s frustrations with the Contras’ inability to transition from small 
unit tactics into a conventional military force, capable of achieving strategic 
military objectives, became increasingly an issue.206  Coupled with growing 
resistance from Congress, U.S. activity led to more and more reliance on 
unilateral U.S. options. The early 1980s were a huge growth period for U.S. 
military Special Operations Forces, and there was no better place to put these  
 
 
                                            
204 Russell J. Hall, Joint Task Force-Bravo: A Case Study in Military Operations Other Than 
War, (U.S. Army War College Research Paper, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,1998), 8–9. 
205 The SF Military/Mobile Training Team (MTT) platform provided a vehicle for training and 
advisory assistance since the late 1950s; it also served as the ideal vehicle for low-intensity 
conflict operations (FID and UW) from Laos to Nicaragua. MTT’s became the tool of choice for 
the Cold War, more than 130 Special Forces MTTs deployed worldwide in 1982 alone. See 
generally; Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, 
Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990, online 
http://www.statecraft.org/chapter15.html, (accessed on 23 October 2012). 
206 John Prados, Presidents Secret Wars, 410. 
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units to the test than the Cold War heating up in their own backyard. Besides the 
SF MTT’s conducting training and advisory missions, several other SOF units 
joined the fight.  
The Pentagon’s newly formed covert Special Operations Division 
(SOD),207 and the U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity (USAISA, also known 
as ISA or ROYAL CAPE), were used to funnel covert military aid, funding, and 
personnel when the Boland Amendments’ restrictions forced too much oversight 
upon the CIA. SOD worked closely with the CIA, and was instrumental in ferrying 
Army Special Forces personnel under cover into Honduras. SOD ran Operations 
SEA SPRAY, YELLOW FRUIT, and ROOKS LANDING,208 and provided the 
agency with SF personnel for unilateral operations. Similarly, ISA ran OP 
QUEENS HUNTER (QUASAR TALENT, GRAZING LAWN, and GRID CIRCUIT) 
to monitor cross border movements of Sandinista forces and rebels in El 
Salvador.209 
The CIA also ran unilateral operations of their own through a covert unit 
known as the Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets (UCLAs). The UCLAs, in 
combination with the Special Forces teams, increasingly began to train, lead, and 
when specific results were needed, conduct unilateral combat missions, 
especially sabotage operations. One that would have unforeseen political 
blowback later was the mining operations in Corinto, Puerto Sandino, and El Bluff 
                                            
207 Special Operations Division (SOD) was the Pentagons attempt to stand up a unit 
specifically designed for “covert operations” It was disbanded after investigations of 
misappropriation of funds during Operation YELLOW FRUIT. See Alan K. Strait, The Dilemma Of 
Covert Action, (An Individual Study Project, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, U.S. Army War 
College, 1989), 23. 
208 Ibid., 21. 
209  Michael Smith, Killer Elite: Completely Revised and Updated: The Inside Story of 
America’s Most Secret Special Operations Team St. Martin’s Griffin; Second Edition, Revised and 
Updated edition (New York, NY: St. Martins Griffen, 2011) details ISA operations in Central 
America. Several sources also have members of 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-
DELTA popularly known as Delta Force operating with ISA in Honduras and Nicaragua, however 
while possible, this cannot be verified. See Eric Haney, Inside Delta Force: The Story of 
America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit, (New York, NY: Delta Press 2005). 
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harbors. In an attempt to target the Nicaraguan economy by attacking shipping, 
they indirectly deterred and prevented foreign aid from entering the country.210  
While President Reagan continued to publically support the Contras, 
opponents of U.S. Nicaraguan activities in the administration feared that any 
attempt to overthrow the FDLN could lead to a war between Honduras and 
Nicaragua. This could then, potentially force the U.S. into another Viet Nam 
scenario, this time in Central America. As a result of these concerns, and with the 
continued reports of human rights abuses by the Contras, brought to the forefront 
by the discovery of a CIA-written Contra manual on psychological warfare 
advocating “dirty tactics,” the second Boland Act passed in 1983. This legislation 
continued a limited amount of funding, but prohibited any aid earmarked directly 
for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista Government.  
 In early 1984 the CIA’s role in the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors 
became public knowledge as a result of exposure in the U.S. media. Congress, 
felt the operation lacked the notification to Congress as required by law. Public 
criticism mounted, and after vigorous debate, Congress exercised its 
constitutional power over appropriations and cut off all funds for the Contras’ 
military and paramilitary operations. Denied funding by Congress, the National 
Security Council aide, Lt. Col. Oliver North, turned to third party nations and 
private sources. This private effort to resource funding was code named 
                                            
210 Some researchers have speculated the UCLAs were SF/CIA paramilitary officers of 
Latino decent or third nation Latino assets staged out of the CIA Swan/Tiger Island base in the 
Gulf of Fonseca where staging for the invasion of Cuba (OP ZAPATA) known as Bay of Pigs was 
conducted. However, much of the information on the UCLAs has not been disclosed to date. 
Sources have SOD personnel and Task Force 160 air support participation in at least the harbor 
mining operations; the UCLAs are reported to have conducted at least 19 unilateral combat 
operations. William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States In Central America, 
1977–1992, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 331, E. Bradford 
Burns, At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia, (New York, NY: 
HarperCollins, 1987), 54–56 “Had we come to the economic approach, to warfare, earlier, and 
gone for the […] point, I think we could have finished it off, a lot earlier, probably with a lot less 
lives lost, you know. ...I think we could have reduced the number of casualties, had we just 
decided the economic was the way to go, a little earlier..” A transcript of CIA Latin America 
Division chief Duane “Dewey” Clarridge testimony to congress talks about mining the harbors as 
economic targeting. From, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/U.S.-mining-nicaragua-
harbors.html (accessed on 22 November 2012). 
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PROJECT DEMOCRACY. Under direction of CIA Director William Casey, Lt. Col. 
North recruited various, former military and CIA officers with experience in 
running “flexible” covert operations to help continue the operation. 211 
In order to secure the incoming funds, a private company was set up with 
supporting Swiss bank accounts, airplanes, ships, real estate and sub-
companies. ‘‘The Enterprise,’’ was more than a cover company, it was an 
unofficial, off the books, private organization designed to engage in covert 
activities. The Enterprise served as the secret arm of the NSC staff. They ran an 
unconventional warfare campaign by using private and non-appropriated funds, 
and incorrectly thought free of accountability or restrictions imposed by the laws 
written by Congress. Congress was ironically actively passing laws to limit those 
exact activities.212 
Ultimately, it was the funding that led to the exposure of the unsanctioned 
operation, which led to the end of the Enterprise. Initially funding came in from 
private donors, those who supported the Regan Doctrine and who wanted to 
support the stand against communism. Third party nations, including Israel, 
Taiwan, Brunei and Saudi Arabia, who were all traditional U.S. allies, followed 
suit. Later a plan was concocted to include “moderate” members of the Iranian 
government who, through Israeli contacts, would pay large amounts of money for 
U.S. weapons. The weapons that were sold included TOW anti-tank and HAWK 
                                            
211 A former OSS officer and President Reagan’s campaign manager, Casey oversaw the 
re-expansion of the Intelligence Community to funding and human resource levels greater than 
those existing before the preceding Carter Administration; in particular, he increased levels within 
the CIA. During his tenure, restrictions were lifted on the use of the CIA to directly and covertly 
influence the internal and foreign affairs of countries relevant to American policy. See: Joseph E. 
Persico, The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1991) Many of the key players were also involved in OP ZAPATA (Bay of Pigs 
Invasion), OP MONGOOSE (Plan to topple Castro government), and OP ICEX /PHOENIX (Viet 
Nam counter VC infrastructure); see also Bob Woodward, Veil: Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–
1987, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1987). 
212 Enterprise consisted of retired or on leave military and intelligence personnel, 
businessmen, professional criminals and right-wing millionaire financiers and operated without 
the sanction or knowledge of Congress. It formed an integral part of the Reagan administrations 
continued activity in Nicaragua after 1984 and was headed by the National Security Council. 
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missile systems.213  The plan deteriorated into an arms-for-hostages scheme, 
with the Enterprise acting under direct supervision of the NSC. Through Lt. Col. 
North, the Enterprise sold weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of the 
seven American hostages held by Hezbollah. The plan changed several times 
over the course of several years. As funds were diverted to support the Contras, 
a large percent went into private accounts. This made Enterprise, and some of 
those associated with it, a handsome profit. In the end, after thousands of 
missiles were given to Iran, the hostages were still not freed. 
The operation was exposed when former-Marine, CIA contractor, Eugene 
Hasenfus, was captured while delivering supplies to the Contras. His SAT C-123 
cargo plane was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5, 1986. After their plane 
came under fire, Hasenfus parachuted to safety, but was subsequently captured 
by FSLN authorities. The rest of the crew, two pilots and a radio operator, died in 
the crash. Hasenfus confessed that the plane was an unmarked, CIA aircraft 
resupplying the Contras. Documents found in the crash confirmed his story and 
implicated known CIA officers that were still directly supporting the Contras. The 
blowback in the media and Congress led to investigations and public trails. Both 
the NSC and CIA were implicated.   
In the end, the U.S. withdrew its support to the Contras due to the outcry 
of human rights violations. The question of the NSC securing outside funding and 
effectively bypassing Congress, along with the arms deals brokered with Iran, left 
a feeling of betrayal with Congress and the public. Unfortunately, the negative 
connotation that resulted from the public Iran-Contra trials over shadowed any 
good results of the operation. It is difficult to find material with an objective view 
of the mission, even decades later.   
 
                                            
213 The TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire command-link guided) missile system 
and the HAWK is an all-weather, surface-to-air, medium-range/medium-altitude missile system. 
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3. Analysis 
The following sections of this chapter will highlight significant factors that 
were implicitly or explicitly influential in the decision to embark on unconventional 
warfare operations in Nicaragua. The decision to conduct UW is in contrast to the 
other two general options: no military action, or conventional military action. Just 
as the other case studies, these factors are categorized into Internal Enablers, 
Internal Constraints, External Enablers, and External Constraints.214   
a. Decision Point 
In the case of Nicaragua, the two periods that bracket the decision 
point are in January 1981, and December 1981. The first event, before the 
decision, was in January of 1981 as the inauguration of President Reagan took 
place, an internal shaping event that echoed throughout the world.   Another 
shaping event prior to the decision point was an external matter, when the U.S. 
identified FSLN support to neighboring Communist revolutionaries in El Salvador 
in late 1980, feeding into a narrative that communists were destabilizing the 
region. These events were the crossroads that necessitated action. The events 
on the post-decision timeline were the Presidential Finding, signed by Reagan in 
December of 1981, indicating internal actions were now authorized to intervene 
in Nicaragua, and the operations in March 1982 in which the Contras destroyed 
two bridges to interdict FSLN resupply. These two events are indicative of an 
increase in resources allocated and in output from the movement. All four events 
surround the decision point that happened between January and December of  
 
 
                                            
214 Enablers are arguments for action; these either oppose no military action, or support UW 
over conventional military action. Constraints are arguments for no action, or they argue for the 
use of conventional military action over UW.   The internal domain is that which is contained in 
the domestic U.S. arena. This is a function of popular opinion or support (important due to the 
U.S. status as a democracy), capability, capacity, or leadership. The external domain is that 
outside of the U.S.. This includes the “targeted country’s” internal activities and circumstance, 
world events and reaction, and, perhaps the most heavily weighted, peer competitors’ actions, 
capacity, and capability. 
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1981. Of note, an additional event that had shaping effects on the UW campaign 
in Nicaragua was the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands  
(see Figure 10). 
  
Figure 10.  Decision Point Timeline for Nicaragua 
b. Internal Enablers 
The Operation Had A Marketable Narrative.  Ronald Reagan’s 
efforts to challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet Union spanned the globe, but the 
insurgent Contras’ cause in Nicaragua was particularly dear to him. Battling the 
Cuban-backed Sandinistas, the Contras were, according to Reagan, “the moral 
equivalent of our Founding Fathers.”215 Under the Reagan Doctrine, fighting 
                                            
215 PBS website, “General Article: The Iran-Contra Affair.”  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/reagan-iran/, (accessed 23 
November 2012). 
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communism was the only way to “roll back” the advances the USSR made since 
the beginning of the Cold War. In the case of Nicaragua and the story put out by 
the media, it seemed as though it was a calling that had to be answered by the 
American people, sponsoring the Contras was as American as baseball. 
UW Experienced Individuals Influential to the Decision Maker.  
Personalities with a Penchant for Covert Actions were surrounding the President. 
Former OSS alumni William J. Casey ran the CIA for the Reagan administration 
between 1981 and 1987. Casey was Reagan’s campaign manager during his 
election and had the Presidents trust as part of his inner circle. Casey had 
directed OSS operations to drop agents into occupied France and was seen by 
Reagan as one of the true heroes who could defeat evil. The Vice President 
under President Reagan was another CIA alumni and future President George 
H.W. Bush. This period was more active for covert operations than any time 
since the Eisenhower years. It was reported in 1984 that fifty major covert 
operations were in progress at that time as compared to ten during the final year 
of the Carter administration.216 This continues to demonstrate the case where the 
men surrounding the President were influential to the increased use of 
unconventional warfare and the activity in covert operations. 
Army SOCOM, Revitalizing Capability.  Operation Eagle Claw,217 
the aborted mission that resulted from failures at the covert landing site 
codenamed Desert One, led to casualties, embarrassment, and the continued 
captivity of American hostages.218  The consolidation of Army special operations 
capability, under a newly formed organization within the Army and housed in Fort 
Bragg, NC, brought a new priority to management of capability, and resulted in 
                                            
216 Covert Operations, Retrieved from:  http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-
D/Covert-Operations-Evolution-of-covert-operations.html#b#ixzz2B53gL9No, (accessed on 22 
October 2012). 
217 Operation Rice Bowl and Eagle Claw are interchangeable; Rice Bowl was the Air Force 
portion of the mission. Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special 
Operations Forces.  (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1997).   
218 Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces.  
(Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1997), 1–3. 
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the Army increasing manning and funding to the Special Forces Groups.  1st 
Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) was stood up within the Army and 
became home to Rangers, Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological 
Operations. These efforts occurred simultaneously to discussion and concern 
over American special operations capability, specifically in counter-terrorism, 
hostage rescue, and low intensity conflict.219  This new focus would drive 
increases in resources from within the services, but also capture interest of 
decision makers, namely to provide the U.S. with a capability that Operation 
Eagle Claw underscored was lacking. Soon, this work would have to be 
operationally tested. There was no public support for a conventional war by the 
public or the Department of Defense –both still suffered from the Vietnam 
Syndrome. 
Covert Nature of UW Allowed Circumnavigation of 
Accountability and Oversight.  National Security Advisor (NSA) Robert 
McFarlane, in his May 11, 1987, testimony at the Iran-contra hearings, stated 
that the president and his advisers “turned to covert action (in Nicaragua) 
because they thought they could not get Congressional support for overt 
activities.”220   
Conditions Did Not Predicate An Immediate Conventional 
Warfare Response.  Given the superior conventional military capabilities of the 
U.S. compared to the Sandinistas, the Reagan Administration could have easily 
invaded Nicaragua and overthrown the Sandinista regime. This capacity would 
be shown to the world in the 1984 invasion of Grenada, showcasing U.S. 
conventional warfare with success. However, Congress would have blocked 
military operations in Nicaragua.221 As the Legislative branch would have to 
                                            
219 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 73–75. 
220 Alan K. Strait, The Dilemma Of Covert Action, (An Individual Study Project, 
Pennsylvania, PA: U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, 1989), 17. 
221 Alan K. Strait, The Dilemma Of Covert Action, (An Individual Study Project, 
Pennsylvania, PA: U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, 1989), 17. 
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approve conventional military options, per the 1973 War Powers Act, and could 
ultimately block the sustained conventional military campaign, decision makers 
never pursued this course of action. Despite the overwhelming military 
dominance over the Sandinistas, this was overcome by Congress’ ability to block 
the use of conventional forces, leaving only one remaining option for action, UW. 
c. External Enablers 
Falkland Island War.  When the U.S. backed its long-standing, 
and closest ally, publicly supporting the UK during their defense of the Falkland 
Islands from Argentinian aggression, Argentina ceased their support as a third 
country enabler in Nicaragua. This, in turn, led to increased requirements for self-
sustaining activity on behalf of the U.S. in Nicaragua. The added autonomy and 
hands-on management resulted in more unilateral action, and a robust air-
support capability. Although this variable was not an argument during a decision, 
it does support the “ramp up” concept. This event shaped the type and level of 
support ongoing in Nicaragua, as opposed to causing a fork in the road, or 
decision. 
The Operation Supported a Marketable Narrative.  When the 
USSR invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, the U.S. responded with a UW 
campaign that supported the organic-resistance movement to counter Soviet 
occupation. The situation was complex; the covert UW campaign began in lieu of 
any conventional military option in fear of further Soviet escalation.222  U.S. policy 
of containment quickly returned to popularity when the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan. President Carter’s underscoring of human rights was the beacon of 
his foreign policy but was quickly supplemented after Soviet aggression. Direct 
support to Afghan mujahedeen and the Pakistanis would again facilitate U.S. 
policy to contain the USSR and prevent further spread of Communism.   To make 
                                            
222 The Carter Doctrine “committed America to war in the event of any threat to the strategic 
oil fields of the Middle East,” however; the Soviets likely had a similar response in mind if U.S. 
escalation was detected. (Charlie Wilson’s War.  p.15) This led to the necessity of covert 
operations, namely with non-attributable equipment being funneled into the Afghan resistance to 
ensure U.S. sponsorship was undetected. 
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matters worse, and bring the problem to the U.S.’ backyard, it was “discovered” 
that a Soviet Combat Brigade was in Cuba (although it was later revealed they 
had been there since the Cuban Missile Crisis).223   
In El Salvador a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement was underway 
and had gained the attention of the Reagan Administration. Author Tommie Sue 
Montgomery writes in Revolution in El Salvador, “in late February 1981 the 
Department of State issued a document that claimed to offer “definitive evidence 
of the clandestine military support given …by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and their 
Communist allies [(FSLN)] to …guerillas now fighting to overthrow the 
established government of El Salvador.” 224 This was enough to justify increased 
military support to the government of El Salvador; Military Advisory Groups 
included 56 advisors and instructors by the end of March 1981. Since the FSLN 
had taken power in Nicaragua, similar fears of a communist invasion 
necessitated prevention. At a minimum, U.S. intervention was needed to help 
counter the destabilization that was setting off in the region. President Reagan 
did just that; he took immediate actions in Nicaragua after his inauguration by 
cutting aid and initiating the covert action by signing a Presidential Finding.225   
d. Internal Constraints.   
Congressional Blocking.  Congress was fearful that increased 
U.S. support in Nicaragua would start an all-out war between the numerous Latin 
American states involved (El Salvador, Honduras, Cuba, and Argentina). As 
evidence by the Boland Amendments, Congress was determined to limit any 
U.S. intervention or activity in the region, specifically Nicaragua. 
 
                                            
223 John Gaddis. The Cold War: A New History. (New York, NY : Penguin, 2005), 203. 
224 Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: from civil strife to civil peace – 2nd 
ed. Westview Press, CO.  1995. p. 150–151 referencing the “white paper” titled “Communist 
Interference in El Salvador,” issued by the Department of State. 
225 Reagan, Secret Presidential Finding, Dated 1 December 1981. 
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Vietnam, Still Recent in the Minds of America.  The U.S. chalked 
up its first real “loss” in the 20th century in Vietnam.   The fact that U.S. blood, 
treasure, and credibility that was invested into South Vietnam’s sustained 
existence was seemingly lost when the struggling democracy fell in 1975 during 
the last fight for Saigon, leaving a significant impact on the American People. 
Additionally, the cost of twenty years of war was seen throughout society, scores 
of wounded soldiers struggled to reintegrate themselves at home.  The unpopular 
war was an episode in American history no one wanted to repeat.   
It was likely that in the early 1980s the American public and 
Congress would not support conventional military action. An open military effort 
by the U.S. in Nicaragua would likely have been too costly in terms of human 
lives and financial resources and American public would not have tolerated such 
loss, particularly after the failure of Vietnam.  
Hostages in Iran, Bittersweet.  America brought the hostages 
home, shortly after a tough against communism President was inaugurated in 
1981. However, the recent embarrassments of failure, continuing from the 
jungles of Vietnam to the deserts of Iran226, still need to be addressed.   Marquis 
states that the failures in Operation Rice Bowl were “clear evidence of the 
inadequacy of U.S. special operations capabilities…that began the turnaround in 
for SOF.”227  Not only did the Military need specific changes forced upon them to 
address the emerging threat global terrorism brought, but also the failure to 
develop a capability on their own left the DoD’s reputation tarnished. Although 
this may not have had a direct impact on the decision making process for 
Nicaragua, it did add to recent perceived failures by the Department of Defense, 
making UW more desirable due to its covert nature. 
                                            
226 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare. P. 1–3 
227 Ibid., 69. 
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e. External Constraints 
Regional Escalation.  U.S. intervention had the potential to disturb 
the balance of power, but more importantly provide the means and justification to 
ignite the powder keg of potential conflict in Central and South America. 
Unconventional or conventional means could have potentially similar second 
order effects, despite any short-term gains in Nicaragua. 
Bad Press.  World opinion would have lasting effects on U.S. 
alliances, treaties, and the international opinion that was so necessary during the 
final stages of the Cold War. The U.S. actions in Central and South America, 
regarding intervention and supporting internal instability within sovereign nations 
had a lasting effect on U.S. public relations image. In a war against ideology, 
essentially one of the lines of operation in which the Cold War held, defining the 
image of the U.S. as a country that supported legitimate conflict resolution was 
pertinent to spreading pro-U.S. sentiment.   Getting involved in Nicaragua, 
especially in supporting a rebel faction opposing the government, would do the 
opposite and potentially further tarnish American reputation. 
4. Summary 
Nicaragua, a form of Organic-Revolution, saw all variables that 
constrained the approval to wage unconventional warfare against the Sandinista 
Government overcome. Internally, the enablers of Reagan’s “roll back” ideology 
that was captured in his policy, the continued existence of OSS legacy encircling 
decision makers, the revitalization of military capacity in special operations, and 
the methodology of UW providing the only means to bypass Congress’ public 
objections proved enough to overcome restraint. Additionally, the external events 
of the Falkland Island War and how it affected operations in Nicaragua, as well 
as the aim to prevent a Soviet foothold in Central America further aided the 
decision to wage UW. The constraints laid forth by Congress, the diminished 
(although rapidly increasing) military capability and capacity, the recent loss in 
South Vietnam, and the black eye that resulted from the failure to militarily free 
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the hostages in Iran, coupled with external variables of potential bad press and 
regional escalation, all proved inadequate in deterring decision makers from 
using UW to achieve policy.    
Nicaragua was a milestone in U.S. history. The blowback of the Iran-
Contra investigations would have significant impact on decision makers during 
their debates on how the U.S. would wage war during the next crisis, covered in 
the next chapter:  Panama and Operation Just Cause. 
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E. CASE V: PANAMA, 1988–1990228 
1. Introduction 
The overthrow of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega’s regime by U.S. 
military forces provides the negative, or non-UW case to this study. This case 
represents the decision to use conventional, albeit limited warfare,229 in an 
operation focused on the direct removal of Noriega’s regime and the defeat of the 
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). The importance of this non-case is that it 
offers a basis for comparison in identifying which variables were present, 
missing, or less dominant than in the cases of UW. While the U.S. invasion of 
Panama in 1989 is a textbook case of conventional warfare, the events leading to 
the decision point and the environment indicate that UW was a possible option. 
The movement in Panama, had it been utilized for UW would have been 
classified into the Organic-Revolutionary quadrant of the UW typology.230 
Because the invasion force was an external power, therefore synthetic; it would 
be difficult to define an invasion from another nation as revolution in the context 
used to describe unconventional warfare.  
2. Background 
The history of Panama has always been influenced by its strategic 
location. The narrowest land isthmus in Central America, Panama is bordered by 
Costa Rica to the Northwest and Columbia to the Southeast. U.S. interest to link 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by means of a canal in Central America had 
existed for many years. Having built the canal under President Roosevelt, the 
                                            
228 The date of Operation JUST CAUSE was 20 December 1989 thru mid January 1990 
however there were activities leading up to the invasion in 1988. 
229 While there were numerous SOF units involved in the operation by the terms defined in 
this paper the operation was still “conventional.” The term limited war is used to identify a conflict 
in which the belligerents participating in the war do not expend all of each of the participants’ 
available resources at their disposal, whether human, industrial, agricultural, military, natural, 
technological, or otherwise in a specific conflict. Limited war is an opposite of the concept of total 
war. Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American 
Foreign Policy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 9.  
230 See Chapter II. 
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U.S. opened 14 military bases to protect its interest and took complete control of 
the Canal Zone.231 The period of U.S. enforced peace lasted until the early 
1960s. Clashes between Panamanians and U.S. students coupled with demands 
for an end to U.S. “occupation” led President Johnson to draft a new Canal treaty 
in 1967. Before the new treaty was signed, Colonel Boris Martinez, the head of a 
military junta, overthrew Panama’s President Arnulfo Arinas. Lieutenant Colonel 
Omar Torrijos Herrera, who maintained power through fear and violence, soon 
replaced Martinez. Torrijos’ efforts were made possible with the assistance of his 
U.S. trained head of military intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Noriega.232  
On 7 September 1977, General Torrijos and U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
signed the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which outlined the complete transfer of the 
Canal and the fourteen U.S. Army bases from the U.S. to Panamanian control by 
1999. 233 During the 1980s, stopping the Communist encroachment in Latin 
America dominated the regional focus of the U.S.. Panama provided bases and 
facilities that provided a base for U.S. activities in the region. Panama also 
provided the U.S. with a safe haven to facilitate training and support for the U.S. 
sponsored guerrilla force, the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, known in the 
U.S. as the Contras.234  Manuel Noriega was considered an essential asset in  
 
                                            
231 The Panama Canal Zone was a 553-square-mile U.S. territory located within the 
Republic of Panama, consisting of the Panama Canal and an area generally extending five miles 
on each side of the centerline. See Robert C Harding II, The History of Panama, (West Port, CT:  
Greenwood Press, 2006), 4. 
232 Noriega received intelligence and counterintelligence training at the later famous School 
of the Americas at the U.S. Army base Fort Gulick in 1967, as well as a course in psychological 
operations (Psyops) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. From Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military 
Intervention in Panama Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management June 1987–December 1989, 
(Contingency Operations Series, 2008), 10. 
233 For texts of the two treaties, see Sandra W. Meditz, Dennis Hanrath, Dennis Michael 
Hanratty Panama: A Country Study: Area Handbook Series, Library of Congress Federal 
Research Division, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 273–93. 
234 See also Chapter 6 and William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States In 
Central America, 1977–1992, (The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Chamorro, Edgar. 
“Running the Nicaraguan War: An Inside View of CIA as Master of the Contras.” First Principles 
11, 1 (1985), Stephen Kinzer, Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, David Rockefeller 
Center Series on Latin American Studies, and Sam Dillon, Commandos: The CIA and 
Nicaragua’s Contra Rebels (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co, 1992). 
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securing those interests. He leveraged his role as head of military intelligence to 
become a key partner for various U.S. interests and agencies operating in the 
region.  
On 31 July 1981, General Torrijos was killed in an unexplained plane 
crash in western Panama.235 In the political turmoil that followed, one condition 
remained constant: the National Guard continued to dominate Panamanian 
politics. In the following two-year brutal contest for power between politicians and 
military officers, Noriega emerged as the winner. In late 1983, following his 
promotion to general and commander of the National Guard, the guard was 
combined with the police, navy, and air force to create the Panama Defense 
Forces (PDF). The following year Noriega’s choice for president, Nicolás Ardito 
Barletta, won a narrow victory over the former President Arnulfo Arias. Barletta’s 
presidency did not last long. Once he initiated an investigation into Noriega’s 
involvement in the murder of a popular leader, he was removed from office. After 
assigning himself as the commander of the newly formed PDF in 1983, Noriega 
entrenched himself as the dominant power in Panama and gave no sign of 
willingness to return the government to civilian control. Noriega’s violent rise to 
power did not go unnoticed in the U.S.; but his support to U.S. covert operations 
rose as well.   
Under Noriega’s rule, the U.S. was allowed to set up clandestine listening 
posts in Panama, which monitored sensitive communications in all of Central 
America. In addition, Noriega continued to aid the U.S. efforts of support against 
the rebels in El Salvador and the unconventional warfare campaign against the 
government of Nicaragua. He used Panama’s flexible offshore banking laws to 




                                            
235 While there were numerous allegations that Noriega himself was behind Torrijos death, 
no research in this study validated those claims. 
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  brought to Panama to train. He also allowed unmarked, signals-intelligence 
aircraft from the CIA and DoD to stage from airfields in country and fly missions 
throughout the region.236  
The U.S. support to Noriega, public or private, began to decline after his 
implication in the Iran-Contra investigations brought a public awareness and 
closer scrutiny of his activities and drug connection. Lt. Col. North had used 
Panama’s off shore banking and Noriega’s assistance in setting up training 
camps for the Contras. A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigation 
report found numerous e-mails and notes from meetings between Lt. Col. North 
and Noriega, coordinating for sabotage of major economic targets in the capital 
of Nicaragua, including an airport, an oil refinery, electric and telephone 
systems.237 In June 1987 Noriega’s former chief of staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz 
Herrera, stated that Noriega had fixed the 1984 election and ordered the killing of 
an opposition leader who had publicly accused Noriega of drug trafficking. 
Herrera also said Noriega had been involved in planting a bomb on his former 
mentor, General Torrijos’s airplane. Panamanians organized protests demanding 
the removal of Noriega. He responded by declaring a national emergency. He 
suspended constitutional rights, closed newspapers and radio stations, and 
drove his political enemies into exile. In response to the negative media and the 
image of a U.S. backed dictator, the U.S. Senate called for Noriega’s removal. 
On 28 February 1988, SouthCom received orders from the JCS directing them to 
                                            
236 While the Newsweek article only says “Noriega allowed U.S. Spy planes to be based in 
Panama.” It likely refers to ISA Operation QUEENS HUNTER or SOD/CIA Operation SEA 
SPRAY see Chapter 6 on Nicaragua or Michael Smith, Killer Elite: Completely Revised and 
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Second Edition, Revised and Updated edition (New York, NY: St. Martins Griffen, 2011) 
Noriega’s connection from Fredrick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America’s Bungled Affair with 
Noriega, Putnam Adult; First Printing edition (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s sons, 1990) also 
“The Noriega Files” Newsweek (15 January 1990). 
237 The text of the Kerry subcommittee report pages 145–146 directly quote 15 pages of 
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number 12,10,7 From “The Oliver North File: His Diaries, E-Mail, and Memos” Kerry Report, 
Contras and Drugs, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 113 (February 26, 
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begin formal planning in a “crisis action mode” for possible military operations 
against the Panama Defense Forces. As a result the first plan titled CINCSO 
OPORD 2–88, code-named ELABORATE MAZE was ready on 4 March for 
transmission to the Joint Chiefs. On 11 March, the Joint Chiefs weighed in, 
formally approving continued development of the operation order.238 
On 16 March 1988, Panamanian Chief of Police, Colonel Leonidas 
Macias, organized a coup against Noriega. While it was suspected the coup 
failed due to loyal Noriega informants, it indicated that there were elements, even 
within his command, that were willing to try to get rid of their commander on their 
own. The notion was if there was an attempted coup, covert action and 
unconventional warfare might still be an option. This was explored further in 
August of 1988 when President Reagan signed a finding authorizing covert 
action against Noriega. The finding, in summary, provided funding for the power 
transmitter of a radio station and authority for the CIA to coordinate activities with 
Noriega’s former Chief of Staff, Roberto Herrera, now exiled from Panama and 
living in the U.S.239   One plan, discussed but not executed, was to send Herrera 
and other Panamanian exiles back into Panama and let them operate from safe 
houses on U.S. military bases. Once there, they would conduct sabotage 
operations, raid Noriega’s bases, and carry out propaganda operations. If 
Noriega discovered the rebels and attacked, it would also give further justification 
for a more direct military response, as any attack on a U.S. base would 
warrant.240 Unfortunately the CIA, post Iran-Contra, was limited by both policy 
                                            
238 The plan being labeled an operation order (OPORD) instead of an operation plan 
(OPLAN) speaks to the understanding from the planners that this was a mission that was going to 
be executed. Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama Origins, Planning, and 
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240 While this plan had some support from the CIA, the SouthCom commander refused 
based on his belief it would violate the Canal Treaties. Several other plans were developed and 
rejected by the administration as too risky or not politically acceptable. 
 120
makers and public support.241 In the end it was agreed to wait until after the 
election to attempt any action, covert or otherwise. The situation continued to 
deteriorate, by the end of 1988 there were over 300 incidences of U.S. military 
personnel and family members’ that were harassed, threatened, or assaulted by 
the PDF.242 
Although the planning started for a conventional invasion, no further action 
was taken for the remainder of President Reagan’s final term in office. George 
H.W. Bush was inaugurated as the 41st president on 20 January 1989. U.S.-
Panamanian relations were at an all-time low, marked with numerous incidents 
against U.S. service members. In May 1989 the U.S. sent officials to observe the 
elections in Panama to ensure they were run fairly. In an attempt to influence the 
political system, President Bush authorized the CIA to provide $10 million dollars 
to the opposition party. When Noriega realized that his candidate was losing, he 
ordered the PDF to seize ballot boxes and cancelled the election. The people 
took to the streets in protest and Noriega’s squads crushed them, killing dozens 
and injuring hundreds.243  In response the U.S. suspended military aid to 
Panama and the DoD reduced military contacts between SouthCom and the 
PDF. As violence grew in the streets of Panama tensions also grew in 
Washington.  
One final window of opportunity to use UW came and went, on 1 October 
1989; a day referred to as Black Tuesday.244  Surprising both the SouthCom and 
                                            
241 Three veteran covert operations planners Armacost, Stoltz and Armitage were brought in 
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the CIA, the wife of a PDF Major with access to Noriega’s inner circle, walked 
into SouthCom headquarters and announced that her husband was planning to 
execute a coup against Noriega the following day. Although her husband did not 
want direct U.S. military involvement, he asked that U.S. forces block the roads 
leading into Panama City so that PDF units loyal to Noriega could not come to 
his aid and stop the coup. U.S. reacted to the plan with skepticism. The decision 
was made to not support the coup, but instead, to have the blocking positions 
standing by in case they were needed. After a days delay waiting for Noriega to 
arrive at the headquarters, Major Giroldi executed the coup with his group of 
loyal officers and captured the General. While in discussion with SouthCom, 
letting them know his mission was accomplished, three companies loyal to 
Noriega flew past the U.S. blocking positions that were standing by and 
assaulted the rebel group at the headquarters. All the officers involved in the 
coup were captured, tortured, and killed.245 
The failure of the U.S. to support the coup drew criticism from 
Congressional leaders of both parties, reporters, commentators, and anonymous 
White House officials. Senator Jesse Helms called the administration “a bunch of 
Keystone Kops” and bitterly predicted that, “After this, no member of the PDF can 
be expected to act against Noriega.”246 U.S. reaction towards the attempted coup 
was chaotic and inconsistent. One of the possible reasons for the confusion was 
a near simultaneous change in two top military positions. On 30 September 
1989, three days before the coup, General Maxwell Thurman replaced General 
Woerner as SouthCom commander and one day later, General Colin Powell 
replaced Admiral Crowe as the chairman of the JCS. General Thurman was 
especially vocal against the coup. He thought it was a plot to test him as the new 
                                            
245 David Pitt, The New York Times “Widow of Panama Coup Leader Says Fellow Plotter 
Betrayed Him.”  Published 12 October 1989.  website:  
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commander.247 A very conventional minded officer, General Thurman came up 
through the ranks in the ordnance branch then was assigned to recruiting 
command. Called “Mad Max” by his men due to his rigidity, Thurman was 
brought out of retirement by Powell because of his strict military discipline. 
General Woerner, it was determined, was too soft on the Panamanians by 
looking for a non-violent way to end the growing trouble.248 In Thurman’s opinion, 
a coup was too simple with too many details left out.249 Thurman voiced his 
concerns to Powell, who reportedly responded that, “getting rid of Noriega was 
something that had to be done on a U.S. timetable.” Powell said he did not like 
the idea of a “half-baked coup with a half-baked coup leader.”250 The President 
was not so sure the coup should have been ignored, after being attacked by all 
sides in Washington for the military’s failure to respond to the coup, it resulted in 
a missed opportunity to remove Noriega. Bush reportedly chastised his advisors 
angrily saying, “Amateur hour is over” and “Enough is enough.”251  
On December 15, in response to the coup and the perceived U.S. acts 
against their country, the Panamanian General Assembly passed a resolution 
declaring that the actions of the U.S. had caused a state of war to exist between 
Panama and the U.S. In the late evening hours of 16 December, following the 
war declaration, four off-duty U.S. military officers were driving through Panama 
City when they were stopped at a roadblock. Pointing their rifles toward the car, 
the PDF demanded that the Americans get out of their vehicle. Not wanting to be 
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separated from their vehicle and mobbed by the crowd, the officers attempted to 
drive away. The guards fired at the car, killing the driver a U.S. Marine Corps 
Lieutenant.252   
Based on the incident, General Thurman requested to execute the military 
plan that had been revised over the last year. On 17 December 1989, General 
Powell briefed the Joint Chiefs and secured their agreement that this incident met 
the conditions to execute the military plan to intervene, depending on approval 
from President Bush.253 In the final meeting, which reportedly lasted less than 30 
minutes, President Bush asked if there were other options. Powell pushed the 
“Sledgehammer” approach on the President saying, “This was the only way to 
guarantee success rapidly, which an impatient American public would 
demand.”254  The President agreed and ordered OP Plan 90–2, called Operation 
BLUE SPOON, to execute as planned.255   As thousands of troops from all over 
the U.S. began to mobilize for the mission, last minute details were ironed out 
and Operation BLUE SPOON was renamed to Operation JUST CAUSE.256 
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Joint Task Force South commanded all branches of the military involved in 
the operation.257 While there were far more conventional forces in the operation 
than the special operations component, the Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) spearheaded the operation.258 The JSOTF, commanded by Major 
General Wayne A. Downing, was organized into smaller task forces: Task Force 
GREEN (Army Special Mission Unit, Special Forces Operational Detachment-
Delta), Task Force RED (the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment), Task Force BLACK 
(Army Special Forces), and Task Force WHITE (SEALs and Special Boat Units). 
Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units, Army Special Operations 
helicopters, and USAF Combat Control Teams supported these task force 
elements. The JSOTF’s principal H-Hour259 missions were the capture of Noriega 
and the destruction of the PDF’s ability to fight. Due to the lack of intelligence, the 
U.S. forces did not know Noriega’s location at H-Hour; accordingly, the JSOTF 
focused on the H-Hour missions against the PDF, the attack on the La 
Comandancia and the rescue of a U.S. citizen, Kurt Muse, held hostage in the 
                                            
257 Ground forces would have of combat elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82nd 
Airborne Division, the 7th Infantry Division (Light), elements of the 5th Infantry Division, 1st 
Battalion, 61st U.S. Infantry, 4th Battalion, 6th United States Infantry, 1138th Military Police 
Company of the Missouri Army National Guard, 193rd Infantry Brigade, 508th Infantry Regiment, 
the 59th Engineer Co. (Sappers), Marine Security Forces Battalion Panama, and elements from 
the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams, 2nd Armored 
Infantry Battalion, and 2nd Marine Logistics Group 39th Combat Engineer Battalion Charlie 
Company. 
258 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 
April 1998. PDF from: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc3.pdf, (accessed 
16 November 2012), 16. 
259 The term H-hour is used for the hour on which a military operation is to be initiated.  
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adjoining prison known as the Carcel Modelo.260 TF GREEN would execute this 
mission, dubbed OP ACID GAMBIT.261   
Across Task Force South the fighting continued for four days. U.S. troop 
losses were in the hundreds; the Panamanians lost thousands. Noriega escaped 
capture for a few days but was found hiding in the Papal Nunciature, a religious 
office of the Catholic Church. Under pressure from Vatican officials and an 
intense Psyops barrage of rock music, Noriega surrendered to the Vatican 
Embassy in Panama City on January 3, 1990. The Vatican and U.S. worked out 
an agreement; Noriega was handed over to U.S. authorities and brought to 
Miami for trial. In the end he was sentenced to forty years in a Miami prison and 
ordered to pay $44 million to the Panamanian government. 262 
While Operation JUST CAUSE may have demonstrated just how far 
Special Operations Forces had come in a conventional warfare campaign since 
the failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW.263  It was also a case where 
                                            
260 Some accounts (Woodward, The Commanders) claim Muse was a CIA officer however 
that has never been officially confirmed. What accounts agree on is he was arrested by the PDF 
while setting up mobile radio station transmitters in Panama City that were broadcasting Anti-
Noriega propaganda. Muse later claimed he was a businessman who had a hobby in radio 
transmission and wanted to harass Noriega because he was against his politics. The fact that his 
actions coincide with the Presidential finding for covert action allowing for radio station and 
propaganda transmissions may well be a coincidence. See Molly Moore, “U.S. Sought Premise 
for Using Military in Panama; Months Before 1989 Invasion, Bush Was Waiting for Noriega to 
Overstep,” Washington Post, (May 2, 1991) and Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 2002). 
261 TF GREEN executed this mission as planned with no casualties. Although two aircraft 
crashed during the operation (one on infil one on exfil) they were successful in rescuing the 
hostage. ACID GAMBIT normally is credited as the first successful military hostage by SFOD-D. 
Bob Woodward, The Commanders, goes into more details of the JSOC involvement in the 
operation to include JSOC force options NIFTY PACKAGE and GABEL ADDER which would 
have also included SEAL Team 6. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster, 2002), 138. 
262 In 2002 a parole hearing took place in Miami, which resulted in Noriega’s denial for early 
release from his U.S. prison sentence.   Eventually, a conditional release was granted on 
September 23, 2011. Robert Jackson, LA Times, “Noriega Gets 40 Years in Prison: Sentence: 
Penalty amounts to a life term, as former Panama strongman, now 58, is unlikely to win parole. 
He was convicted in April on eight drug-related counts.” (11 July 1992) website:  
http://articles.latimes.com/1992–07–11/news/mn-1481_1_prison-term, (accessed 16 November 
2012). 
263 Although SOF units played a major role in Operation JUST CAUSE by the definitions 
used throughout this paper the actions were in support of a conventional warfare campaign.  
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unconventional warfare may have been used to better effect and was not. It is 
impossible to speculate after the fact, or attempt to determine the results of a 
possible supported UW effort. Yet, an organic movement existed, indicated by 
the two coups that transpired, the goals of which were to unseat Noriega’s 
power. Aside from speculation, the UW option was not developed and 
conventional warfare intervention was deemed necessary. Events of December 
‘89 (the PDF assault against the four U.S. officers) became a tipping point in 
which the narrative was at the highest level of receptiveness. It served as a ‘last 
straw’ for a cause that was gaining momentum; the culminating event that 
justified U.S. action.  
3. Analysis 
The following sections of this chapter will highlight significant factors that 
constrained decision makers from choosing an unconventional warfare option in 
Panama. These factors are categorized into internal enablers, internal 
constraints, external enablers, and external constraints. In contrast to the 
previous cases, the constraints for UW outweighed the enablers, resulting in the 
conventional military operation. 
a. Decision Point 
In the case of Panama, the decision point appears to have occurred 
between August of 1989 and October of 1989. The pre-decision time period is 
marked by events, both internal and external, that show preparation, all be it in 
conventional military options, and necessitate action. The nullified elections of 
May of 1989 led to the U.S. suspending military aid to Panama. In the United 
States, President Bush and Secretary Cheney appointed General Powell as the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To the right of the decision point, events or 
activities that show increased throughput and/or output indicate a decision had 
occurred. During the post-decision period, the internal event was the JCS 
ordering final revisions to the Op Plan. The external event on the right of the 
decision point was the second coup against Noriega. The Black Tuesday coup 
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could have been supported by the U.S. if they had not already decided to forego 
unconventional warfare means and use the option of conventional military 
operations. Since the methodology to effect change was Operation JUST 
CAUSE, the final decision was marked by this output of the military complex  
(see Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11.  Decision Point Timeline for Panama 
b. Internal Enablers 
Policy Affected By Politics, Constraining Conventional 
Warfare.  The Reagan administration was split on the military option. The State 
Department supported military intervention but the Defense Department and the 
JCS opposed it. 264  Because of Vice President Bush’s background in the CIA, 
                                            
264 Demetrios James Caraley, The New American Interventionism: Lessons from Success 
and Failures: Essays Political Science Quarterly, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 
98. 
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and his previous connection to Noriega, then National Security Advisor to 
President Reagan, LTG Powell passed the word to SouthCom that everything to 
do with Noriega was on the back burner until after the election. The 
administration did not want any negative publicity to hurt Bush’s chance of 
election.265  On 25 April, however, Treasury Secretary Jim Baker said, “There are 
other things that you can do but they all involve putting our military assets into 
play, and we’re not going to do that.”266 Speaker of the House Jim Wright said, 
“obviously we don’t want to go [to Panama] with the force of military arms - that’s 
ridiculous.”267  Seemingly, the constraints put on conventional military options 
coupled with the need for action268 would be ideal conditions for UW options to 
be developed. However, the constraints below prevented this enabler from 
tipping the scales for UW. 
Narrative supported Organic Solutions.  Many high level U.S. 
military officers and politicians on both sides felt that the crisis in Panama was 
primarily an internal affair that should be resolved internally, if at all possible, by 
means of a Panamanian solution to a Panamanian problem. The situation should 
not be allowed to degenerate into a full-scale U.S.-Panamanian confrontation.269  
This set prime conditions to justify funding an organic-revolution, if one could only 
be identified. 
                                            
265 Fredrick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America’s Bungled Affair with Noriega, (Putnam 
Adult, 1990), 333. 
266 Demetrios James Caraley, “The New American Interventionism: Lessons from Success 
and Failures,” Essays Political Science Quarterly, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 98. 
267 Demetrios James Caraley, “The New American Interventionism: Lessons from Success 
and Failures,” Essays Political Science Quarterly, (Columbia University Press, September 15, 
1999), 98. 
268 Displayed by the drug related indictments in 1986, Senate’s nonbinding resolution to ask 
Noriega to step down, the riots at the American Embassy in ‘87, President Reagan’s signing of 
the findings in ‘88. 
269 Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama Origins, Planning, and 
Crisis Management June 1987–December 1989, Contingency Operations Series (Washington 
DC, Center of Military History, 2008), 21. 
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c. External Enablers 
Need for Intervention.  In spite of the Macias led coup attempt in 
1988, it seemed that Noriega would remain in power. Since other political means 
had been unsuccessful in ousting Noriega and congressional and public pressure 
to remove him was mounting, administration officials raised and debated the 
military option.270  Senator Alfonse D’Amato accused the Department of Defense 
and the JCS of being “cowards” for their lack of military decisiveness in Panama. 
D’Amato claimed he had been misunderstood, but he still continued to favor the 
use of force in Panama.271  After Noriega nullified the election of May 1989, 
sending the PDF out to crack down on dissidents and exact violence on political 
nominees, external circumstances were now necessitating intervention. Winner 
writes, “Many non-military options were considered, but after Panama’s 
fraudulent elections and several casualties attendant to them, the Bush 
administration found itself forced to consider military options. Noriega’s 
aggressive and incendiary rhetoric finally forced the hand of U.S. policy 
makers.”272 
Found–Organic Movement, Sponsor Needed.  The failed coup of 
16 March 1988 led by Panamanian Chief of Police, Colonel Leonidas Macias, 
showed promise that the organic movements were in place in which people were 
now willing to make risk in order attain change. The coup failed, not due to lack 
of willingness. Rather, the coup likely failed due to poor planning or double 
agents within the coup participants who informed Noriega. The failed coup led to 
Noriega soliciting and receiving support from U.S. competitors (Cuba, Nicaragua, 
and Libya), and ultimately was the impetus for military planners to develop and 
                                            
270 Demetrios James Caraley, “The New American Interventionism: Lessons from Success 
and Failures: Essays Political Science Quarterly” (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 98. 
271 Demetrios James Caraley, “The New American Interventionism: Lessons from Success 
and Failures”: Essays Political Science Quarterly, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 99. 
272 Don Winner, “Operation Just Cause’: A Historical Analysis,” July 2008. From Panama 
Guide.com, http://www.panama-guide.com/article.php/2008071811104739, (Accessed 18 
November 2012). 
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refine contingency operations. Reagan still encouraged the PDF to topple 
Noriega. Then, under the direction of Major Giroldi, a second plot to overthrow 
Noriega was kindled from within the Panamanian ranks. On 3 October 1989, a 
coup was initiated and foiled after Noriega was able to contact his special unit, 
Battalion 2000, who came to his aid. This resulted in more purging within the 
PDF ranks and increased security force repression on civilian dissenters. 
Furthermore PDF harassment of Americans intensified, ultimately proving a 
tipping point on 19 December 1989 four officers were attacked by PDF and one 
was killed. The two coups proved a potential for organic-revolution existed. If the 
movements were developed through U.S. sponsorship, an unconventional 
warfare solution may have been an option. This enabler was overcome by both 
events shaping subsequent U.S. policy and actions, but also the pre-existing 
conditions of post Iran-Contra America, and the political time horizon presented 
with the upcoming Presidential election in the U.S. 
The Soviets Lose In Afghanistan, U.S. Intervention Possibly 
Unchecked.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a response to the failures 
of the Communist puppet government installed after the fall of the Afghan 
monarchy. The Soviet’s 40th Army was sent to secure the country and provide 
time and space for the communist government in Afghanistan to consolidate 
control. What followed was a nine-year proxy war beginning on 25 December 
1979. The United States’ involvement in the resistance against the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan was partly borne from opportunity to attrite its main 
adversary, but also in an effort to limit the spread of Communism from Central 
Asia into Southwest Asia.273   
The U.S. headed a coalition of covert supporters of the organic-
resistance, or Mujahedeen, including Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and 
                                            
273 Charlie Wilson’s War.  165 
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China.274  The U.S. support to the Afghan resistance (starting at $20–30 Million 
per year in 1980, peaking to $630 Million in 1987)275 was relatively cheap 
compared to 13–15 Billion Rubles spent by the Soviets from 1979–1986 
(equating to $382 - $441 Billion USD).276 This low cost returned high value in the 
number of Soviet aircraft losses, casualties, and lost prestige. Steve Coll, author 
of Ghost Wars writes, “the money allocated secretly by Congress each year for 
weapons for the mujahedeen was destroying Soviet equipment and personnel 
worth eight to ten times that amount or more.”277 Much debate continues on the 
subject of whether the high cost of war in Afghanistan is directly attributable to 
the financial woes of the Soviets. No doubt, Afghanistan had an effect on the 
USSR budget, but many believe that the downfall of the Soviets was inevitable, 
even without a war in Central Asia. 
The war was costly for the Soviets, in both blood and treasure. 
Following the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, their ability to intervene in 
international matters was questionable. Through mirroring, reflecting U.S. 
constraints of waging war immediately following Vietnam or Korea, Washington 
may have deemed the Soviets as likely to be in a similar position. This could 
                                            
274 Pakistan demanded, quite to the liking of a Vietnam scarred CIA, absolute control of all 
weapons, finances, training, and handling of Afghan resistance. Additionally, the sanctuary 
provided by Pakistan was critical for rotating forces out of the fight, allowing for training and 
equipping, and the robust topography of the border area provided natural protection. Saudi 
Arabia, answering the call of their fellow Muslims but more scared that the Soviets would invade 
them next if unstopped, provided robust financial support, matching U.S. funding.274 They also 
provided covered airlift of supplies sent from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia, and then reloaded on 
Saudi aircraft and sent to Pakistan. China, who after a falling out with the Soviets in the 1960s 
became regional rivals and bitter enemies, supported CIA efforts to provide Afghan resistance 
with weapons non-attributable to the U.S.. Tens of millions of dollars in arms deals annually 
cemented a growing secret anti-Soviet collaboration between the CIA and Chinese Intelligence . 
Source: Charlie Wilson’s War. 165, 236–237.; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars:  The secret history of the 
CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York, 
NY:  Penguin Press, 2004), 66, 72–73. 
275 Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc.:  Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, (New York, 
NY:  Free Press, 2001), 68. 
276 Directorate of Intelligence Report:  The Costs of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan.  
1986. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us8.pdf, (Accessed 17 March, 2012). 
p.iii; Exchange rate data website:  http://rub.fx-exchange.com/usd/1986-exchange-rates.html, 
(accessed 17 March, 2012). 
277 Ghost Wars, 68. 
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prove two things of interest:  first, the Cold War could be ending soon and the 
once reliable and steady constraint to U.S. intervention was now potentially 
closing shop. U.S. military ventures could potentially go unchecked, or at least 
passively supported by the myriad of nations indebted to U.S. support against the 
Soviets. Secondly, U.S. UW efforts in Afghanistan were a success and would 
add to the influence on policy factor, providing the decision makers a recent 
example of the utility of UW. 
d. Internal Constraints 
Colin Powell Key Enabler to CW.  According to Michael Gordon’s 
New York Times article,278 Colin Powell was critical of existing military plans to 
overthrow Noriega. After taking his new position in August 1989, he initiated 
revised planning to quicken the timeline for the military to reach its objectives. 
This was an effort to make a high-tempo conflict more palatable by the American 
public, who still were reluctant to support potential repeats of the Vietnam War 
and its long duration.   Gordon writes, “There is an old saying in strategic 
philosophy that capabilities create their own intentions. By changing the war 
plans, General Powell made it more feasible for President Bush to order a full-
scale attack on Panama.”  In addition to the updated plans, Powell was able to 
sell the public on the plan as he handled the media with expertise, he “calmly 
explained the mission to a packed room of reporters, addressing them by their 
first names as the Bush Administration sought public backing for its 
intervention.”279   General Powell was a key personality, in both closeness to the 
President as the Chairman of the JCS, and also in his understanding of military 
capability and public consumption of white house policy. He was a key proponent 
of conventional military action. 
 
                                            
278 Michael R. Gordon, The New York Times, “Fighting in Panama: The Chief of Staff; Vital 
for the Invasion: Politically Attuned General,” (New York, NY), Published 25 December 1989. NY 
Times website:  http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/25/world/fighting-panama-chief-staff-vital-for-
invasion-politically-attuned-general.html, (accessed 16 November 2012). 
279 Michael R. Gordon, The New York Times, “Fighting in Panama.” 
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Weak Intelligence And Foundation To Build On.  Panama 
Defense Forces were the primary partner of the U.S. intelligence community in 
the country, if not the region. When the crisis began to erode the long-standing 
cooperative relationship between them, it left the U.S. Intelligence community 
with few options. While open sources remained available and valuable, other 
avenues of collection began to close down. SouthCom tried to adapt to the 
deteriorating situation, but, according to one Intelligence officer’s assessment, 
“The entire U.S. intelligence complex was ill‑prepared to initiate intensive 
collection operations against Panama.”280 For this to happen in a country where 
U.S. personal had complete freedom of movement, 14 military bases, and up to 
25,000 personnel is a harsh lesson learned. U.S. Intelligence in Panama DoD, 
DIA, CIA, etc., had grown so reliant on using the Panamanian’s that they failed to 
develop unilateral networks and sources adequate to collect either tactical 
intelligence281 or run covert UW operations as needed. This limitation, primarily a 
lack of a foundation of networks and infrastructure to build on or transition into 
UW would constrain the development of such a plan.282   
Political Capital Deficiency from Watergate.  According to Crile, 
in the post-Watergate period, the Carter Administration promised to reign in the 
                                            
280 Message from 470th Military Intelligence Bde to U.S. Army Intelligence and Security 
Command (INSCOM), dated 232235ZFEB89, quoted by Yates in The U.S. Military Intervention in 
Panama. 
281 Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama Origins, Planning, and 
Crisis Management June 1987–December 1989, Contingency Operations Series (Washington 
DC, Center of Military History, 2008), 22–23. 
282 Prior to the crisis U.S. intelligence officers enjoyed daily liaison with their Panamanian 
counterparts and had ready access to PDF bases and posts, as well as to the posted orders of 
the day. Panamanian forces also “tacitly cooperated” with American efforts to collect intelligence 
on other countries in the region, especially El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Cuba. When the crisis 
began to erode the cooperative relationship between U.S. intelligence personnel and the Panama 
Defense Forces, open sources remained available and valuable but other avenues of collection 
began to close down. The Southern Command tried to adapt to the deteriorating situation, but, 
according to one mid-crisis assessment, “the entire U.S. intelligence complex was illprepared to 
initiate intensive collection operations against Panama.” Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in 
Panama, 22. 
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CIA and “had all but promised an end to the CIA’s dirty tricks.”283 Carter’s 
handpicked CIA chief, Admiral Stansfield Turner cleaned house and purged the 
agency of many officers seasoned in covert operations.284  Momentum continued 
and many thought the CIA would be stripped of its authority to conduct covert 
operations altogether.285  Although this was overcome later during Reagan’s 
administration, specifically during the Iran-Contra affair, the cumulative effect of 
two significant blowback events left the organizations responsible for developing 
UW constrained. 
Fallout from the Iran-Contra Affair.  CIA Director William H. 
Webster (1987–1991) came from a legal background, including serving as a 
Federal judge and as the Director of the FBI. He was expected, with this 
background, to clear out all irregularities in legality at CIA and clean house 
following the Iran-Contra arms smuggling scandal. In terms of popularity, the 
Iran-Contra was the Vietnam War of UW; people did not want a repeat anytime 
soon. The fallout was an Agency, Administration, Congress, and public who were 
leery of any CIA covert operations. While numerous Presidential findings 
preceded the conventional invasion, they were limited in scope and several were 
exposed to the public immediately in order to avoid Iran-Contra like backlash. 
This constrained the freedom of maneuver on the ground for U.S. personnel, 
restrained the behavior within the organizations responsible for developing UW 
capabilities, and would curtail likely approvals for a UW operation even if it were 
developed. In fact, Congress and the Reagan administration agreed to guidelines 
that sharply restricted covert activities against Noriega. JCS, and CIA signed and 
made public an agreement that limited covert action in Panama.286  
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Congress and a rogue CIA agent changed the history of our times, (New York, NY:  Grove Press, 
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Personalities with a Penchant for Combat Actions.  Secretary of 
Defense Richard Cheney, GEN Colin Powell (who had also just assumed his 
position as chairman of the of Staff [JCS]), were both very conventional military 
minded and often openly opposed covert (UW) type actions.287  General Powell 
was the senior military advisor to Secretary of Defense Weinberger during OP 
URGENT FURY in Grenada and the airstrikes against President Kaddafi in 
Libya. These operations were both stepping-stones for the U.S. military complex 
as they retooled after the Vietnam War, delivering quickly achieved objectives to 
the American public.     
e. External Constraints 
Democracy Across the Region.  Recent successes in promoting 
democracy in the Philippines and Haiti (where the United States had facilitated 
the removal of Presidents Ferdinand Marcos and Jean‑Claude Duvalier, 
respectively), coupled by several South and Central American nations embracing 
democracy and ending dictatorships brought optimism to the problems in 
Panama. Chile’s election in 1988 ended Pinochet’s dictatorial presidency; 
Paraguay saw a military coup ending Stroessner’s 35-year dictatorship; Brazil 
saw the first democratically elected president in 29 years in the 1989 election; in 
February. This could have constrained any action, yet the conventional military 
option was ultimately enabled by the need to intervene (as stated above). 
4. Summary 
In contrast to the other cases, in Panama the enablers for UW were 
outweighed by the constraints resulting in a decision to conduct a conventional 
military campaign. With Politics and Policy demanding delays for intervention and 
                                            
287 As Powell said in an April 1, 2009 interview on The Rachel Maddow Show, the Doctrine 
denotes the exhausting of all “political, economic, and diplomatic means,” which, only if those 
means prove to be futile, should a nation resort to military force. Powell has expanded upon the 
Doctrine, asserting that when a nation is engaging in war, every resource and tool should be used 
to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing U.S. casualties and ending the conflict 
quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. Colin Powell, interviewed by Rachel Maddow, 
The Rachel Maddow Show, MSNBC, 1 April 2009. 
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providing time, as well as a U.S. desire to have Panamanians fix a Panamanian 
problem, conditions were set that would enable UW. However, from the influence 
of Colin Powell and other key personalities that preferred military action, coupled 
with the weak intelligence and lack of an existing foundation to transition into 
UW, as well as the fall out from Watergate and the Iran-Contra scandals, 
conventional methods would reign. Additionally, the potential that the USSR may 
not be able to check U.S. intervention at large, may also have driven home a 
desire to utilize the U.S. military complex. Ultimately, it was the constraints 
against UW that helped select military intervention through decisive battle. 
Interestingly, similar to events in Iran in 1953, the timing of this operation was by 
design alone and initiative was in the hands of the U.S. 
The next chapter will be the comparative analysis of all of the enablers 
derived from the case studies. These enablers will be examined and then 
determined if their presence is in multiple cases. From this, a theory of the 
factors that lead decision makers to select unconventional warfare options will be 








IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
“Without Revolutionary theory, there can be no Revolutionary Movement.”  
― Vladimir Ilyich Lenin 288  
A. ANALYSIS OF THE ENABLERS 
Author T. E. Lawrence in The Evolution of a Revolt claimed that he “would 
prove irregular war or rebellion to be an exact science, and an inevitable 
success, granted certain factors and if pursued along certain lines.”289 Lawrence 
was unable to prove rebellion to be an exact science, but his claim that certain 
factors influenced the outcome is a valid scientific concept that looks for the 
causal relationships in a process or phenomenon.290 In this analysis, an attempt 
has been made to identify conditions that led to decisions for or against the use 
of UW. In each of the cases that were examined, the policies, strategies, 
decisions, and events that led to a decision point were extracted. Those that 
leaned towards the decision to choose UW over no action or conventional 
warfare were listed as enablers. What follows is a comparative analysis of the 
enablers out of four cases. Enablers were reduced to their simplest form and 
generalized to allow cross case comparison.  
Seventeen separate enablers were identified that potentially swayed the 
decision to use UW in the four cases within this research. In this chapter, we 
focus on eleven enablers that are most commonly observed. Once simplified, the 
enablers were put into a chart to allow comparison across the cases (see Figures 
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12 and 13). Blue factors were identified during the case study analysis, red 
factors were found present after comparing cases, and black enablers were 
specific to only three cases or less. An analysis helps extract certain factors that 
may serve as a proposed model of UW. The next step will be to tentatively 
propose some general propositions regarding UW decisions that will require 
further testing in future research.  
While this selection rationale is not yet tested, the findings from this study 
demonstrate that the frequency of occurrence deserves a more thorough 
examination. The eleven enablers were checked for validity and confirmed to be 
present across all four cases. Four enablers were also located in the non-UW 
case Panama. These particular enablers were no longer ‘factors’ that led to 
choosing UW as an option and were subsequently removed. The seven 
remaining enablers that became generalized into factors are: 
 
 F1. A strategy exists that supports the development of an UW 
mechanism in the steady state. 
 F2. A UW experienced organization exists. 
 F3. UW experienced individual(s) had direct access or influence on the 
Decision Maker (DM) 
 F4. New Decision Maker inherited a course of action (COA) leading to 
UW. 
 F5. UW successes increased influence on DM. 
 F6. When conditions do not predicate an immediate CW response UW 
remains an option. 




Figure 12.  Enablers Consistent in All Four Cases and Identified  




Figure 13.  Enablers Specific to Particular Cases, Insufficient  
to be General Factors 
The final step in analysis was to group and combine the factors to form 
variables. These variables, explained in detail below, propose a conceptual 
framework related to the decision to use UW as a strategic option.   
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1. Variable 1. Extant UW Capability  
A UW capability, as defined by this study, is a combination of three 
elements:  the mechanism, authorities, and organizations. Variable 1 is a 
combination between F1 and F2 (F1, “A strategy exists that supports the 
development of a UW mechanism in the steady state,” and F2, “A UW 
experienced organization exists”).   
A mechanism manifests as growing relationships, networks, and 
infrastructures in the target country that supports a UW campaign. The UW 
mechanism was developed in all four of the cases in this study prior to a UW 
decision point for different purposes, such as intelligence gathering or military 
advisory. The mechanisms could be utilized to support UW when needed. In 
each of the cases, when a decision was made to commit to a UW option, there 
were already relationships established between U.S. executors and key host 
nation personnel that made it a viable option. These relationships and networks 
were already established in the steady state prior to the decision made by policy 
makers to utilize UW. In some cases, the mechanism was established by a third 
nation but used by the U.S. to facilitate UW. 
In Panama, the lack of a UW capability is attributable to identifying, co-
opting, or developing the movement that led to the failed coups against Noriega. 
Mainly due to the long-standing relationship between the U.S. and Panama, 
there was also a shortfall in developing independent relationships or networks 
separate from the Panamanian’s. A lack of U.S. mechanisms was identified by 
CIA director William Casey who believed one of the weaknesses of the CIA at 
the time was a lack of unilateral U.S. assets and an over reliance on in-country 
intelligence sources “subject to the whims and fortunes of those in power.”291 
This lack of a pre-existing UW capability promoted the use of conventional 
                                            
291 Bob Woodward, Veil, The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987, (New York: Simon and 
Shuster, 1987), 114. 
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warfare or it would have forced the decision makers to accept the time delay 
necessary to develop the UW mechanisms that were not present.292   
The factors identified in this research point to the common existence of a 
pre-developed UW capability established prior to the decision point. With the 
exception of the non-case, the data does not exclude the possibility that a valid 
UW capability could be built after the decision. Relationships or networks can be 
built post-decision, but will undoubtedly extend the time from the decision point to 
utilize UW to the actual start point of a UW campaign. A lack of preparation may 
likely impact the decision negatively as much as a preexisting capability affects 
the decision positively.  
The second element of this variable is authority, or the presence of 
authorities, policies, and strategies, which allow the UW mechanism to be 
developed in preparation for an executable strategic policy option. For the 
execution of an actual campaign once the decision is made, authorities must be 
in place. Without either the mechanism or authorities, the UW capability does not 
exist. Therefore, the decision to use UW could not be a valid option.  
The third and final element of UW Capability is the organization, which 
defines ‘who’ will utilize the mechanism enabled by the authority. Although this 
study did not find that a standing organization was required, it appears that 
having a standing organization that is designated for, trained, and experienced in 
UW increases UW capability. In the cases in this study each had standing 
organizations, civilian and military, that were prepared to execute varied actions 
in support of a UW campaign. An experienced organization provides vetted 
processes to facilitate the preparation and execution of UW.  As observed in all 
of this study’s cases, the legacy of the OSS through the personnel and 
                                            
292 According to U.S. Intelligence personnel assigned to SouthCom “the entire U.S. 
intelligence complex was illprepared to initiate intensive collection operations against Panama.” 
Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama Origins, Planning, and Crisis 
Management June 1987–December 1989, (Center Of Military History United States Army, 
Washington, D.C., 2008), 22. 
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institutionalized knowledge was transferred into the newly established 
organizations of the CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces. Iran specifically was the 
beginning of the fusion. McClure, then the military attaché, had already facilitated 
the beginning of U.S. Army Special Forces.   
Mechanism, Authorities, and Organizations are the three elements that, 
when combined, forms the hypothesis: “The existence of a UW capability prior to 
the decision point is positively associated with a decision to utilize UW.” 
2. Variable 2. The Presence of Positive UW Feedback Loops  
 This variable posits that there is a relatively higher degree of 
influence on the decision maker to choose UW over conventional warfare 
because of past experience. A trusted advisor, or many, can positively or 
negatively impact the decision to conduct UW. In the cases of Iran, Tibet, and 
Laos, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had maintained the Dulles brothers 
as head of the CIA and Secretary of State. In Nicaragua, President Reagan 
maintained Bill Casey as the director of the CIA. In the counter case, Panama, 
President Bush appointed General Colin Powell as a member of the inner circle. 
Powell favored conventional warfare with no alternate voice advocating a UW 
alternative. 
This variable contains three factors that influence the Decision Maker 
(DM) towards UW. The first is the network of trusted advisors F3, “UW 
experienced individual(s) had direct access or influence on the Decision Maker.”  
Such is the trusted advisors to the DM that influence the decision to engage in 
UW. The second is the existing momentum from previous actions and conditions 
initiated by F4, “New Decision Maker inherited a course of action leading to UW.”  
The final is F5, “UW successes increased influence on DM.” The past success of 
F5 is the part of the variable that increases expectations for the DM. 
Many of the decision points in these cases fell shortly after a change in 
decision makers, which is F4, “New Decision Maker inherited a COA leading to 
UW.”  Eisenhower took office only weeks before the decision was made to oust 
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Mosadegh. Reagan inherited Nicaragua. Kennedy inherited Laos and Cuba 
when he took office. F5, “UW successes increased influence on DM,” is related 
to a series of UW successes building momentum, making it easy for the DM to 
sense a higher chance of success. When the decision is made, the question 
asked, “Is the risk worth the reward?” Based on the course of action already pre-
determined, the external influence of past missions’ successes, and the internal 
influence of trusted advisors, the influence on the DM affects his expectations of 
the outcome of his decision.  
This category can produce several hypotheses combined or separated by 
factors. Combined: “Trusted advisors with a preference for UW, combined with 
past UW successes, and a developing UW course of action with growing inertia, 
influence decision makers to choose UW courses of action.”  
Additional studies into leadership theory and decision-making have long 
proposed that, “Leadership in the modern presidency is not carried out by the 
President alone, but rather by Presidents with their associates. It depends 
therefore on both the president’s strengths and weaknesses and on the quality of 
the aides’ support.”293 The establishment of the National Security Council in 1947 
and its subsequent relocation to the executive office of the president in 1949 also 
reinforces the strength of the advisory relationship.  
Variable 1 may seem intuitive and possibly applied to CW operations. 
However, the covert nature of UW and the risk-to-reward ratio may make this 
truer for UW than CW. President Kennedy took command of an empowered CIA 
enjoying a series of successes, and was faced with difficult UW decisions in Laos 
and Cuba. While not selected for this study, Operation ZAPATA--the invasion of 
Cuba--was a clear case where UW was selected from a combination of all of 
these factors. When deciding on the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, in 1972 
Irving L. Janis concluded that President Kennedy and his advisors had 
succumbed to a phenomenon he coined “group think.” He described it as, “a 
                                            
293 Fred I. Greenstein, Leadership in the Modern Presidency, (Boston: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), 352. 
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mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a 
cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”294  
The different individual factors can lead to separate hypotheses. F3, “DMs 
with UW experienced trusted advisors tend to choose UW over CW.” This may 
also be bi-directional as shown in the case of Panama. Additional cases of CW 
would have to be compared to validate this theory.   
F4, “New Decision Maker inherited a COA leading to UW,” also seems to 
apply to both UW and CW and may speak to advisors manipulating this trend 
either consciously or subconsciously.   
F5, “Past UW successes lead to higher percentages of the choice for 
UW.” F5 relates to the idea that a learned behavior is an action or decision that 
was observed by an individual or group that they find to be beneficial to them in 
some way. There is an expected reward acting as a motivating force behind the 
decision. Past success or failures are forms of momentum or inertia that happen, 
and have shown in this study to impact DMs. In the case of successes, the CIA 
had a long string of what were deemed successful operations that gained 
momentum for their methodology during the Cold War. These decisions were 
built on the successes that the OSS had earned from World War II. The 
personnel transferred into the CIA, adding to the CIA’s reputation and influence. 
In the cases where UW was deemed a failure or had negative public support 
(such as Albania, The Bay of Pigs, Indonesia, Nicaragua) the momentum turned 
the other way towards conventional warfare operations.  
3. Variable 3. The Impracticality of Conventional Warfare  
When conventional warfare campaigns are ruled out, unconventional 
warfare campaigns provide decision makers with an easier choice; a lower 
threshold of resources and the potential for less public scrutiny if they remain 
                                            
294 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1972), 9. 
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covert. UW campaigns usually require longer duration or at least foresight. 
Impracticality of CW can manifest due to any number of reasons. The causes for 
impracticality are varied. These could include: insufficient capacity, political 
capital, domestic support, national will, fiscal restraint, legislative restriction, or 
treaty obligation. Regardless, it precludes the use of conventional warfare 
campaigns or makes them less practical for use in the specific situation. 
Examples from the research include:  the case of Iran and Tibet, where the U.S. 
was still impacted by its huge losses in Korea. The U.S. had also tied up much of 
its conventional military forces in the defense of Europe. In Laos, the 1954 and 
1962 Geneva Accords prevented an overt U.S. military presence. In Nicaragua 
neither U.S. Congress nor the public would have supported a conventional 
invasion in the aftermath of Vietnam.   
Similar to the other variables, this variable can be combined to form a 
hypothesis: “When the use of CW is impractical, UW becomes a more likely 
choice for decision makers.” 
Relating to conventional warfare and its impracticality in a specific 
situation are F6, “UW is not constrained when conditions do not predicate an 
immediate CW response,” and F7, “UW decision followed a decisive CW action.”  
F6 presents the time necessary to set up a UW option. UW is a valid choice if 
time is no constraint. With F7, “a UW decision followed a decisive CW action,” 
similar to F5, the effect of learned behaviors is addressed. A momentum is 
formed based on perceived loss or failure that can influence the decision for an 
opposite course of action. The most costly battle of the Korean War occurred 
weeks before the decision was made to use UW in Iran. While it is questionable 
that conventional warfare was ever a practical option, the recent losses impacted 
both decision makers and the American public. The negative effects were likely a 
consideration if not a major factor enabling UW. The reverse of this is true. For 
instance, the perceived failure of the UW operation in Nicaragua and the scandal 
that followed the public Iran-Contra hearings led to reductions in capabilities and 
less trust in UW. The result likely affected the decision to use CW in the invasion 
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of Panama, despite the opportunities for UW that were presented on several 
occasions prior to the decision point. 
Variables 2 and 3 are conditional to the decision to use UW. They may 
affect the decision maker, but based on their value, neither is judged to 
sufficiently cause the decision to be made independent of variable 1. High levels 
of confidence and expectations of success in the operation, combined with the 
lack of conventional forces available for the operation, undoubtedly have a major 
influence on the decision maker. It is the capability to conduct an operation, 
which is a combination of sufficient mechanisms and authorities that is the one 
variable required to conduct the mission. Therefore, the combination of all three 
variables can also synthesize into a conceptual framework (see Figure 14):  
The Decision to use Unconventional Warfare is dependent on a 
UW Capability, Influence on Policy, and the Impracticality of 
Conventional Warfare.   UW Capability is the summation of 
Authority, Organization, and Mechanism. Influence on Policy is a 
result of UW successes, continuation of inherited courses of action, 
and council from Trusted Advisor(s). The Impracticality of 
Conventional Warfare can be a result of any number of causes. 
 
It should be noted that the above framework’s primary purpose is to provide a 
basis for additional theory development and structured empirical research.295 It 
thus should not be regarded as a tested hypothesis.  
                                            
295 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences, (Boston: The MIT Press, 2005). 
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Figure 14.  Conceptual Framework of Variables 1, 2 and 3 
B. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS  
Some findings from the research did not directly answer the research 
question, related to why the decision to use UW was made. These additional 
findings are nonetheless important to discuss in this thesis in order to further 
understand the field of UW. The findings are grouped by related topics, and 
because they were a byproduct of the study, do not follow a specific format. 
Supporting examples from the cases are provided to demonstrate the findings’ 
consistency across the cases. Whether these findings are consistent across the 
entire field of UW, or not, are questions for possible follow up research in the 
subject field.  
1. Expanding and Refining UW Knowledgebase  
This study found that a definitive database of UW cases does not exist. 
This is in part due to the many definition changes throughout the years, identified 
in the introduction of this work. The positive side to this deficiency speaks to the 
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value of the new definition, how it helped re-shape the landscape of what UW is, 
therefore, expanding the field of UW cases.  
The first group of findings was discovered while attempting to identify a 
conclusive list of all cases of U.S. sponsored UW. In an effort to identify a body of 
cases to choose from, our initial research identified 51 likely cases of U.S. 
sponsored UW, not including campaigns in support of conventional warfare. 
While the cases outside of those analyzed in this paper were unconfirmed, or 
validated, the number is still many times higher than previously identified. The 
UW Leaders Handbook lists fifteen cases, but includes both UW in support of 
general war and limited war.296 Once this field expedient database was crafted, 
one of the first assumptions was shattered. It was assumed that the failure of the 
Bay of Pigs would have initiated a decline in use of UW or marked the high point 
in the number of cases of the Cold War. However, these ideas were unfounded.   
Another key assumption about the period in which the most observed 
cases of U.S. unconventional warfare fall in, was the notion that the Cold War 
environmental circumstances were causal to the high number of cases. These 
environmental circumstances of the period, which were defined by the bi-polar 
world, existential threat, mutual assured destruction, and nuclear deterrence so 
commonly characteristic of the time, were not the prime impetus behind UW. The 
number of cases per decade during the Cold War has yet to reappear. It is 
known that U.S. utilization of UW extended beyond that period; U.S. use of UW 
has not declined to “pre-Cold War” numbers.   
2. Refining Contextual UW Typology 
Another group of findings is associated with the Dynamic Typology of UW. 
This group is relevant to the cases. It appears that when the movements were 
Revolutionary, there seemed to be an emphasis on internal enablers much more 
than external ones. This may be a “vetting” process to ensure U.S. national 
                                            
296 Department of the Army, “A Leader’s Guide for Unconventional Warfare,” by Mark 
Grdovic (SWCS PUB 09–1, 2009). 
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interests cause reason for intervention. Another interesting observation made 
while developing the typology was that the coup d’état occurred in almost half of 
the cases, far more than anticipated. This is partly a result of the expansion of 
definition beyond cases of military UW only. It seems that the military coup is 
most predominate in the Organic-Revolution quadrant. 
3. UW Network Primacy and Relevancy 
In the cases studied in this research, the decision to use UW resulted from 
the decision maker expressing a desire to change the status quo followed by the 
outstations providing an option to do it. The planning sequences in all the cases 
followed the same pattern. Policies, authorities and strategies put people in place 
for a variety of reasons or missions well before the decision point. Once in place, 
they developed relationships and built networks, rendering what this study calls 
mechanisms. As events move closer to the decision point, the decision maker 
expresses a desire to change the status quo and options are presented based on 
existing capabilities and practicalities. If a UW capability exists, and CW options 
are less practical to meet the desired goals coupled with advisors who have a 
background in UW, it was chosen. This process was so consistent in the 
research that it was considered a factor in the initial stages of the analysis. In the 
cases studied, the means to carry out the missions, the mechanisms for UW, and 
the plans were all driven from the bottom up. For the most part, these were 
generated from the outstations and presented as options rather than executed 
from checklists, or planned by strategists at the higher levels. In the cases 
studied, other findings reveal that, although the policies existed, the decision to 
use UW and prepare for it was more about innovation or permissions than 
authorities.   
In all of the case analyses, the planners and executors used multiple 
methods to complete the mission. For instance, in Iran, the use of PSYOPs 
(Propaganda), Military Coup, political action, and guerrilla force as backup were 
part of the plan. In Tibet, guerrilla force was the main effort, although propaganda 
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via the Dalai Lama, and air support, were also critical. During the Laos campaign 
guerilla forces reinforced coups and political action, and there was an expanded 
use of military advisors. Nicaragua regarded the guerrilla force as the main effort 
as well, with political action, and air support also key to the plan.  
While the purpose of this thesis was to identify the factors that led to a UW 
decision, the research still identifies trends in how a decision came about. One of 
the assumptions made prior to this research was that many of the cases 
available were executed by the CIA and were less relevant to the military and 
Special Forces, especially regarding details in how UW was executed after the 
decision point. All of the cases in the study had a mixture of CIA and military 
working together. Surprisingly, all four cases had a mixture of both the how and 
who.   
More specific examples of the who can be found during the mission in 
Iran, when the Army Attaché provided information that would be pivotal to the 
operation, such as on Iranian military profiles and General Schwarzkopf’s time as 
an advisor in country, training the police and guard forces and cultivating key 
relationships. In Tibet, U.S. Air Force cargo planes from Kadena, Army support 
personnel and Marine trainers in Camp Hale assigned to Tibet Task Force, and 
the use of Quantico in Virginia for training the Tibetans all show military 
representatives complementing the efforts by the CIA. In Laos, Special Forces 
soldiers were assigned to the PEO, working for the CIA as military attaches or 
“civilian contractors” under Project 404. Additionally, over a hundred SF advisors 
made up the MTT, plus additional members of the MAAG combined to make a 
large contingent of military personnel supporting the CIA. During the operation in 
Nicaragua, SOD, ISA, SF MTTs, JTF-Bravo, the Regional Training center, and 
the numerous named JCS exercises, including BIG PINE, again reveal the heavy 
importance of military participation. This challenges preconceived notions of a 
UW niche that belongs only to the CIA and demonstrates, at least in the cases 
studied, a whole of government approach.    
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Aside from a balanced and intra-agency approach, third nation surrogates 
and allies were also critical. In Iran, the UK was important to U.S. involvement. 
The network that was handed over became decisive to the success of the plan. 
Tibetan Resistance used Nepal as a sanctuary safe haven, Sikkam Royals acted 
as intermediaries for contacts and introductions, training sites were established in 
the Republic of China, and the Indians established the Special Forces unit 
Frontier Force from Tibetan refugees. Thai PARU, Filipino ECCOIL contractors, 
and numerous indigenous tribes were all stakeholders and participants during the 
operations in Laos. In Nicaragua, the United States used Argentinians (and 
allegedly Israelis) as trainers, Iranians and Israelis to provide arms, multiple 
countries to help finance, and the UCLAs who were likely third nation assets for 
key missions.  
4. Objective Alignment 
In several studies overlapping objectives have been advanced as a key 
factor in the success in UW. The idea that “U.S. military objectives must overlap 
with the indigenous force’s political objectives,” suggests that if the objectives 
were incongruent between the sponsor and movement, it would be extremely 
difficult for the U.S. to achieve its objectives.297 The last finding was that mutually 
congruent objectives at the strategic level, between the sponsor and the 
movement, were not as critical as assumed. While objective alignment may be 
effective for meeting military goals, it appears less relevant for UW decisions. In 
all the cases researched, it was apparent that the indigenous movement’s 
objectives only mattered as far as they fit into the narrative of the operation. It is 
clear that planners were fully aware that a UW mission had to be packaged in a 
narrative in keeping with the level of acceptability at the time, while it is difficult to 
verify the level of belief of the narrative in each of the cases. In other words, the  
 
                                            
297 Basilici and Simmons propose five principles of UW: overlapping objectives, decontrol, 
restraint, perseverance, and fostering legitimacy. Steven P Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, 
Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare, (Monterey CA.: Naval: Postgraduate 
School, 2004),128. 
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importance of objective alignment may be a function of the UW capacity and 
networks included in the conceptual framework as opposed to capacity affecting 
the decision directly.  
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the factors that led to a UW 
decision. The additional findings in this research, similar to the other results of 
this study, require further research in order to be validated. The next chapter 
reviews the process, the factors and theory, which may lend recommendations 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 “The trouble with the future is that it’s so much less knowable than the past.” 
― John Lewis Gaddis298 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown that a decision to choose UW as a strategic policy 
option is complex and multifaceted, and that it undoubtedly remains difficult to 
determine the exact factors or events that influenced the decision maker to 
choose a particular course of action. However, it is evident, based on the findings 
in this research, that there are parallels that transcend the differences in time, 
methods, motivations, personalities, and locations, common to the entire field of 
UW. In the end, it is the relationship among the factors, some generalizable and 
some specific that provides insight into answering the research question of the 
thesis.   
Chapter I discussed the purpose of this study and presented the research 
question: What factors lead to the use of unconventional warfare as a strategic 
policy option?  In order to determine the answer, the current definition of 
unconventional warfare, and the evolution of its meaning “mission not method” 
were discussed. The new definition expanded the field and established new 
parameters of UW. Chapter I concluded by presenting the inductive methodology 
that was used to select the cases and the comparative analysis used to answer 
the research question. 
Chapter II drew upon the methods outlined in Chapter I to arrive at case 
selection, choosing UW cases with the highest degree of variance within a 
period. An attempt was made to identify all cases of UW conducted by the United 
States. The field was divided into three time periods separated by significant, 
global shaping events, defined as the Colonial Period, Cold War, and Hegemony 
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of Power. In doing so, the Cold War period was deemed the Golden Era of UW, 
the period in U.S. history with the highest number of UW cases per decade. The 
Cold War cases were differentiated by using the Dynamic Typology of UW, 
showing how the movement was formed, either synthetic or organic and the 
nature of the movement, either resistance or revolutionary.   Four cases of UW 
were selected, representing each quadrant of the typology. The cases included 
examples across the spectrum of UW over a thirty-five year period from the 
beginning to the end of the Cold War. A variety of goals, methods, times and 
locations were represented. Finally, a negative case, or non-UW case, was 
selected; Panama would be the case for comparison where conventional warfare 
was selected.   
These cases were then examined in Chapter III. Each case was presented 
in historical context and included details and events that likely shaped the 
decision to use UW. These were divided into internal and external, constraints 
and enablers. Chapter IV began the comparative analysis of the enablers from 
the cases and the synthesis of the complex enablers into simplified concepts that 
still maintained their meaning while being general enough to test against other 
cases. These enablers were compared across the cases to eliminate outliers that 
may have enabled only one case but were not present in all. Eliminating enablers 
that were present in the non-case shortened the remaining list into what would be 
called factors. Finally, the factors were further synthesized into three variables 
leading to the following conceptual framework: 
The Decision to use Unconventional Warfare is dependent on a 
UW Capability, Influence on Policy, and the Impracticality of 
Conventional Warfare. UW Capability is the summation of 
Authority, Organization, and Mechanism. Influence on Policy is a 
result of UW successes, continuation of inherited courses of action, 
and council from Trusted Advisor(s). The Impracticality of 
Conventional Warfare can be a result of any number of causes. 
 
Chapter IV ended with a series of findings that were an unexpected 
byproduct of this research, and which may add insight into the nature and 
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aspects of UW. The historical cases of UW presented in this research identify 
that UW has been an often-used tool to achieve national military and political 
objectives. The selected case studies also demonstrated that the strategic utility 
of UW is flexible and has been used across a wide range of operational and 
political environments. However, its utility must be bounded within a broader 
review of the policies, strategies, and authorities as well as the capabilities, which 
allow for UW to be a valid option. The results of this study provide 
recommendations for the advancement of UW as a strategic option.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The focus of this study concentrated on identifying the factors that led to 
the decision to use unconventional warfare. These factors, while remaining 
general, are specific to the U.S. political system and the UW capabilities unique 
to the U.S.. This research has proposed the use of unconventional warfare as a 
U.S. strategic policy option based on the factors and variables identified, and that 
it is and will remain relevant in the contemporary environment. The results of this 
study provide recommendations for the advancement of UW as a strategic 
option. These recommendations will be divided into two fields, those for the 
academic community and those for UW stakeholders. The theory proposed in 
this research provides a basis for these recommendations.   
1. Academic Community 
Additional research should be prioritized to first, further refine and develop 
the conceptual framework into a testable theory. Examining it against a wider 
variety of UW cases can further develop the framework. Additional observations 
should be pursued to fill gaps in UW research identified by this, and other works. 
A definitive list of UW cases, sponsored by the United States, should be created 
and proofed. Questions remain unanswered about the ratio of coups, 
methodology and links to “success,” and the overall value of UW as a strategic 
option and should be addressed. Additionally, further studies should look closer 
at the existing UW seven phase operational template in order to determine its 
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relevance and practicality in modern context. If this research is valid in 
determining that relationships and networks need to be developed prior to the 
decision point then initial contact can no longer be templated after the decision 
point in Phase II.299 The entire phased model should be re-evaluated and 
identified against cases in order to determine feasibility. Once these additional 
research tasks are complete, a more robust and systemic theory should be 
formulated in order give each variable a more precise weight and accuracy in 
terms of how they impact the UW decision.  
2. UW Stakeholders 
Since the new definition of UW was created, the community has been 
challenged to determine the ideal posture or structure to be able to conduct 
unconventional warfare and the implications this shift will have on the force in 
terms of organization, training, and deployment. In the first chapter this process 
was described as trying to answer the How before understanding the Why. The 
value of this study for the community is a refinement of the question, “How can 
organizations be best postured to conduct UW?”  The revised question is, “How 
can organizations be best postured to effect the decision to use UW?”  This 
poses a new mindset that should inform stakeholders of innovative approaches 
while developing UW capability. The following suggested lines of effort are 
examples of how to influence the variables and factors identified in the proposed 
theory. 
a. Related to the First Variable: UW Capability 
The most weighted of the factors identified in this study is the 
importance of a UW capability that is developed pre-decision. UW stakeholders 
can improve this capability through three areas of focus:  the organization, the 
                                            
299 The seven-phase UW framework is a conceptual construct that aids in planning. It is 
meant to depict the normal phases of a UW operation Phase I: Preparation, Phase II: Initial 
Contact, Phase III: Infiltration, Phase IV: Organization, Phase V: Build-up, Phase VI: 
Employment, Phase VII: Transition. TC 18–01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare 
(November 2010),1–8 sec. 1–44. 
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authority, and the mechanism. The organizational focus should continue to 
evolve force structures, utilizing an organizational design approach to support 
different aspects of UW such as continued education and innovation, training and 
exercises, and operations. UW stakeholders should support force structures 
designed to develop the UW capability in preparation for a strategic need, and to 
influence the decision point. Instead, organizations appear to focus on how to 
execute the mission once it has been decided. In short, UW stakeholders have 
been focused on the wrong side of the decision point. In the cases researched 
for this study, the keys to the organization were based more on flexibility than 
structure. Opportunities were created by the persistent presence created by other 
non-UW focused operations. The relationships and networks created by military 
advisors, attaché’s, and forward deployed U.S. officials in a variety of diplomatic, 
humanitarian, and intelligence roles that most impacted the UW capability pre-
decision.  
With regard to authority, stakeholders must continue to support 
national strategy by developing UW options. Policy and authority are likely 
sufficient to support current UW efforts, whereas it seems that strategic planning 
has found a void in adequate and competent UW strategists. UW stakeholders 
should develop strategists that can provide decision makers with adequate plans 
that will support their goals. Additionally, stakeholders should continue to 
challenge themselves by attempting to answer policy questions with adequate 
UW answers. Finally, the mechanism, comprised of relationships, networks, and 
organizations can be improved by coordinating with regional commands to unify 
efforts, validate engagements by providing task and purpose specific to 
expanding UW capabilities in the steady state, operationalizing all engagements 
and managing the resultant data. In order to do this, it is recommended the U.S. 
create a framework of organizations and employments that are not mutually 
exclusive to either FID or UW but rather support both. Stakeholders can 
strengthen their efforts to attain policy objectives by coordinating with other 
intelligence agencies to collaborate, both at the tactical level where relationships 
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and networks are being built, and at the strategic level where plans are being 
developed. As the cases in this research showed there is no one method, or one 
organization that owns UW. The findings in this study validate the concept of a 
more joint, combined, inner-agency, partner-nation approach. Stakeholders 
should look to capitalize on building the relationships and networks within the 
U.S. government as well as in target countries prior to decision point in the 
steady state. 
b. Related to the Second Variable: Influence DMs towards 
choosing UW 
Stakeholders can focus efforts to improve the expected reward for 
choosing UW by following three steps. First, increasing credibility by achieving 
milestones in UW capability. Affecting the first variable will achieve this. Then, 
stakeholders should showcase success, to the right audience, to demonstrate a 
capability exists. One method to help showcase success, or at least efforts, is to 
utilize social network analysis to map UW networks. This will provide planners 
with metrics of accomplishment, identify capability and limitations, and help 
identify the assets that can be utilized to achieve certain objectives. Regional 
commands can take ownership of this type of data to provide oversight, 
guidance, and focus of efforts. The final step in this process is to increase 
influence of decision makers, mainly through the first two steps. By achieving UW 
capability, then demonstrating it, some expected reward would result.   
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